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SOLEM (warden) Cert to CA 8 
(Lay [CJ], Bright, Ross) 
v. 
HELM Federal/~ Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Whether a ~atutori{y authorized sentence of 
./ 
life-without-parole, imposed on a nonviolent offender for his seventh 
felony--all committed under the influence of alcohol--constitutes 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Resp entered a guilty plea 
in state court to a 
- 2 -
$100. 
~ Against the advice of counsel, he also admitted to stx prior 
felony convictions. These included three convictions for third degree 
Vburglary, and one conviction each for a third offense for driving 
V' 
while intoxicated, ~rand larceny, and obtaining money under false 
pretenses. The record indicates that resp is an alcoholic, and that ----
alcohol contributed to his actions leading to each of his prior 
convictions. Asked by the TC to describe the events of his last 
crime, resp said: 
"I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that day, 
was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City with more 
money than I had when I started. I knew I'd done something 
I didn't know exactly what. If I would have known this, I 
would have picked the check up. I was drinking and didn't 
remember, stopped several places." Pet. App., at A-3. 
Resp waived his right to a presentence report and requested immediate 
v 
sentencing. The TC agreed, and sentenced him under the state habitual 
offender statute to life imprisonment. That statute provided that 
resp would never be "eligible for parole by the board of pardons and ,.....,.,_, ,_.. .., ...,. -
paroles." S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §24-15-4 (1979). As petr, the 
State of South Dakota, explains it, "by imposing a life sentence, the 
sentencing judge committed [resp] to the state penitentiary for the 
remainder of his natural life, barring a pardon or commutation of his 
sentence" by the governor. 
Resp appealed his sentence to the South Dakota Supreme Court. 
With two justices dissenting (Morgan, Henderson), that court affirmed 
the sentence. Resp then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the 
D.S.D. (Bogue [CJ]). The DC denied the petn. See Supplemental 
~ Appendix. Resp's argument that the sentence violated due process 
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because it was done without a presentence report was unavailing 
because resp had waived a report. Resp's argument that the sentence 
violated the Eighth Amendment was unavailing because governed by this 
Court's decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.s. 263 (1980). 
3. DECISION BELOW: Resp appealed to the CAS, urging only that 
the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. The ~8 reversed and remanded to the DC with instructions 
that the writ issue unless within 60 days the State resentenced resp. 
The court first held that Rummel was QOt dispositive. There, this 
Court rejected an Eighth Amendment disproportionality challenge to a 
life sentence with the possibility of parole under the Texas habitual 
offender statute. But the Rummel Court did not reject entirely the 
idea that a term of imprisonment might be so disproportionate to the 
~ offense as to be unconstitutional. In extreme cases, the Court 
indicated, where a legislature made relatively innocuous behavior 
felonious, a proportionality principle might come into play. 445 
u.s., at 274 n. 11. But more importantly, this Court distinguished I 
the life sentence at issue there from a life sentence without parole. 
This Court noted that Texas had: 
"a relatively liberal policy of granting good time credits 
to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a 
prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years •••• [A] proper assessment 
of Texas' treatment of Rummel could hardly ignore the 
possibility that he will not actually be imprisoned for the 
rest of his life. If nothing else, the possibility of 
parole, however slim, serves to distinguish Rummel from a 
person sentenced under a recidivist statute like 
Mississippi's, which provides for a sentence of life without 
parole upon conviction of three felonies including at least 
one violent felony." 445 u.s., at 280-281. 
- 4 -
Contrary to the State's assertion, Hutto v. Davis, u.s. ' 102 
s. Ct. 703 (per curiam), does not stand for the proposition that 
disproportionality analysis is inapposite except in capital cases. 
Hutto said only that Rummel stands for the proposition that federal 
courts should be "reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of 
imprisonment," and that successful challenges in such contexts should 
be "exceedingly rare." 102 s. Ct. at 705. And Davis was sentenced to 
a definite term of years and so, like Rummel, had the prospect of 
parole or otherwise of release. 
The CAB held that a life sentence without parole differs in 
quality -from a term of years or a life sentence with the prospect of 
parole. "As with the death penalty, the State totally rejects 
rehabilitation as a basic goal of our criminal justice system." Pet. 
~ App., at A-14. Compare Rummel, at 272 (death penalty differs from 
other forms of criminal punishment, inter alia, in rejecting 
possibility of rehabilitation) •1 
Identifying "objective factors" in making its proportionality 
inquiry, as mandated in Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 5B4, 592 (1977), 
the CAB noted that in only one other State, Nevada, could a nonviolent 
1The CAB rejected the State's contention that the possibility 
that the sentence could be commuted by the governor brings the 
case within Rummel. Pet. App., at A-12 n. 6. Although 
commutations were fairly common in South Dakota before 1975, 
since that time the governor had denied all 25 requests for 
commutation, including resp's. The CAB noted this Court's recent 
decision in Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 u.s. 
45B, 464 (19Bl), which held that decisions to commute life 
sentences did not and need not depend--as parole decisions must--
upon objective fact-finding but may rest instead on purely 




habitual offender receive a life sentence ~ithout the possibility of 
parole. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding resp's crimes 
demonstrated that life without parole was "grossly disproportionate." 
In each, alcohol was a factor. Although not excusing the offenses, 
alcoholism "is nonetheless a condition amenable to treatment." Pet. 
App., at A-19. To forsake rehabilitation for such an offender 
violates "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.s. B6, 101 (l95B). 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that this case is controlled by 
Rummel and Hutto and should be summarily reversed. The CAB's 
distinction between life sentences with and without parole does not 
square with Rummel's stateme.nt that "a sentence of death differs in 
kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long," 445 u.s., 
at 390, and Hutto's statement that Rummel distinguished between 
"punishments--such as death--which by their very nature differ from 
all other forms of conventionally accepted punishment, and punishments 
which differ from others only in duration." The State accepts the 
Hutto dissenters' conclusion that the majority there held 
proportionality analysis inapplicable to non-capital punishment cases. 
The "objective factors" relied on by the CAB were rejected in 
Rummel. For example, the fact that South Dakota is more severe in 
this respect than any other State save one was considered irrelevant 
since "some states will always bear the distinction of treating 
particular offenders more severely than in any other state." 445 
u.s., at 2B2. Resp's seven felonies and incarceration for most of his 
adult life distinguish this case from the hypothetical posed in Rummel 
where the plurality indicated it might apply a proportionality 
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approach--"life imprisonment for overtime parking." 
The possibility of parole, although noted in Rummel, was only one 
example posed by the Court of the complexities involved in Rummel's 
attempt to portray Texas as the most severe State in the nation. 
Moreover, Rummel emphasizes the strong state interest in imposing what 
"might otherwise constitute a disproportionate prison sentence on an 
individual determined under state law to be a habitual offender." 
Hutto v. Davis, supra. The State also emphasizes the possibility that 
the governor might commute resp's sentence. 
If summary reversal is not appropriate, the State urges that the 
Court grant this case. It submits that the CAB's distinction between 
life with and life without parole conflicts with Britton v. Rogers, 
631 F.2d 572, 57( (CAB 19BO), Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 997 
(CAS 19Bl), United States v. Valenzuela, 646 F.2d 352 (CA9 19BO), 
Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 592 F.2d 192 (CA3 1979), and Moore 
v. Corvan, 560 F.2d 129B, 1303 (CA6 1977), cert. denied, 435 u.s. 929 
(197B). 
Resp repeats the CAB's argument that life without parole is 
qualitatively different from life with parole. It notes that South 
Dakota is free under the CAB's approach to sentence resp to 99 years 
imprisonment, which would make him ineligible for parole for 3B years, 
24 more than Rummel was. 
Resp also argues that because only Nevada and South Dakota have 
laws like this one, a decision by this court would have very little 
impact. 
He concludes by distinguishing the cases the State claims 
conflict with this one. In Britton, the governor regularly commuted 
- 7 -
t life sentences (and the underlying crime w's rape). In Terrebonne the 
majority equated dealing in heroin, the crime at issue, with violent 
crime. In Valenzuela, a major drug ring was at issue. Gereau dealt 
with a conviction on eight counts of First Degree Murder, and in Moore 
the defendant had been convicted on three counts of rape. 
5. DISCUSSION: Although the CAS's decision is inconsistent with 
the implications of certain passages in Rummel, which suggest that 
terms of imprisonment, no matter how severe, may be immune from 
proportionality analysis in most cases, on its face neither Rummel nor 
Hutto forecloses the result reached below. As the CAS noted, life 
without parole shares with the death penalty a rejection of the 
possibility of rehabilitation. Although the Court may ultimately 
decide that this is a difference in degree, and not a difference in 
kind, from life with parole, that question is not answered by Rummel 
or Hutto and seems more appropriately addressed after plenary review. 
Moreover, if certain passages in Rummel suggest that the distinction 
made is without constitutional significance, it is true as well that 
the Court in Rummel took care to distinguish Mississippi's life-
without-parole statute (which, incidentally, ~equired that at least 
one prior offense be a violent crime) • This Court has held in other 
contexts that the difference between the possibility of parole and the 
possibility of a pardon is of constitutional magnitude. Connecticut 
Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 451 u.s., at 464-465. 
Moreover, the fact, apparently known to the sentencing judge at 
the time of sentencing, that each of resp's offenses were committed 
under the influence of alcohol, also may distinguish this case f~om 
Rummel. The Rummel Court emphasized that recidivist statutes 
--- ·- --· ···--··------·-- -----~~- . ·--·-~·- ----
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punishing comparatively minor crimes with severe sentences were 
supported by a strong state interest "in dealing in a harsher manner 
with those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are 
simply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established 
by its criminal law •••• [T]he State of Texas ••• has a valid interest 
in so dealing with that class of persons." 445 u.s., at 276. The CAS 
held that a State could not validly treat an individual who committed 
each of his minor crimes under the influence of alcohol as one of that 
class, given the fact that alcoholism is treatable. Again, although 
the Court may ultimately reject that position, it is worthy of plenary 
review. 
6. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend that the petn be granted. 
There is a response. 
October 25, 1982 Ogden opn in petn 
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Solem v. Helm 
Michael F. Sturley March 25, 1983 
Question Presented 
Does a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh non-violent~ a felony violate the Eighth 
Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishments? 
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I. Background 
A. The State Statutes 
South Dakota, in common with many other States, has a 
recidivist statute that can be applied to a defendant's fourth 1 
..: -
felony conviction: 
When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convict ions [sic] in addition to the principal 
felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be 
enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony. 
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §22-7-8 (1979) . 2 The maximum penalty for -
a "Class 1 felony" is "life imprisonment in the state penitentia-
ry" and a $25,000 fine. 3 §22-6-1(3) (Supp. 1982) (previously 
codified at §22-6-1(2) (1979)). There is added bite to a life 
sentence in South Dakota, for state law explicitly provides that 
1south Dakota has a separate recidivist statute that can be 
applied to a defendant's second or third felony conviction. 
Under S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §22-7-7 (1979), the subsequent fel-
ony sentence is enhanced by increasing the felony classification 
to the next highest class. See note 3, infra. 
2This is the version in force when Helm was convicted. The 
statute now requires "at least three prior felony convictions," 
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §22-7-8 (Supp. 1982), rather than simply 
"three prior convictions." As H~ ' s previous convictions were 
for felonies, the change would not have affecrtea him. 
'"' 
3There are two more serious felony classes. A "Class A" fel-
ony carries the death penalty or mandatory life imprisonment. 
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §22-6-1(1) (Supp. 1982). A "Class B" 
felony carries mandatory life imprisonment. §22-6-1(2). South 
Dakota has a total of eight felony classes. The lower classes 
and the maximum punishments provided are: 
Class 2 25 years and $25,000 
Class 3 15 years and $15,000 
Class 4 10 years and $10,000 
Class 5 5 years and $5,000 






parole is unavailable: 
A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible 
for parole by the board of pardons and paroles. 
§24-15-4 ( 1979) . The Governor, however, may pardon a defendant 
or commute his sentence. The board o f. :g,ardons and paroles is 
authorized to make _ recommendations to the Governor on this sub-- --, 
ject, §24-14-5; S.D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but 
the Governor is not bound by the recommendation, §24-14-5. 
B. .Facts 
By 1979, resp Helm had been convicted of six felonies. 
I( 
He had ~e convictions for third d~~r:e buri~ary, one convic-
tion for third offense driving while intoxicated, one conviction 
for grand larceny, and one conviction for obtaining money under 
-.:....-._...-. 
false pretenses. The record is essentially devoid of any details 
about these prior convictions, except that they were all non-
violent and alcohol was a contributing factor to Helm's actions 
in each case. 
It is unclear when Helm committed his previous felonies, 
but under the present law thi_; d degree burgla r.y , a "Class 4 felo-... . . 
ny," is defined as "enter [ ing] or remain [ ing] in an unoccupied 
structure, with ----- intent to commit any crime therein." §22-32-8 
(1979). 4 Third offense driving while intoxicated is a "Class 6 
4The Rummel majority asserts "that for crimes concededly 
classified and classifiable as felonies ..• , the length of the 
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative 
.Footnote continued on next page. 
L 
felony." §32-23-4 (Supp. 1982}. There is no "grand larceny" in 
grace." 445 U.S., at 274 (footnote omitted}. I see no legal 
basis for this assertion. But to the extent one might accept it, 
it is worth noting that the South Dakota burglary statute--
particularly third degree burglary--might not satisfy the con-
straint of "concededly ... classifiable as [a] felon[y] ." 
Common law burglary is clearly classifiable as a felony, but 
that crime was defined as breaking and entering the dwelling 
house of another in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony. 
The South Dakota statute applies to any presence (even lawful 
presence} in any structure (even one open to the public} at any 
time (even the middle of the day} with the intent to commit any 
crime (even a petty misdemeanor}. r!] 
In State v. Blair, 273 N.W.2d 187, (S.D 1979}, for example, the 
court upheld a third degree burgla 'ndictment charging the de-
fendants with attempting to steal money from the coin boxes in a 
laundromat's washing machines. The amount of money involved in 
the theft ordinarily would have made the crime "petty theft," a 
class 2 misdemeanor punishable by 30 days in the county jail 
and/or a $100 fine. The laundromat was open to the public, so 
there was no unlawful entry. But the laundromat was a "struc-
ture," so the statutory elements of third degree burglary were 
_patisfied. v Blair's implications are broad indeed. It means that shoplift-
ing, which is ordinarily a class 2 misdemeanor, is automatically 
third degree burglary, a class 4 felony punishable by 10 years in 
the state penitentiary and/or a $10,000 fine. In fact, if a 
South Dakota college student in his own dormitory room intends to 
take a dime from his roommate's desk some night, he already has 
committed first degree burglary, a class 2 felony punishable by 
25 years in the state penitentiary and/or a $25,000 fine. §22-
32-1(3}. / 
The South Dakota burglary statute has been criticized along 
these lines by others. See, e.g., State v. Blair, 273 N.W.2d, at 
188 (Zastrow, J., dissenting}: Note, "Steal the Cb~t the 
Henhouse Door:" The South Dakota BurgJ ::o ..... - ,;:::; _ £ ~J D. L. 
Rev. 158 ( 1980} . I~ 
It is possible, of course, that Hel1 mately 
could have been classified as felonies, t icular 
reason to believe that this is the casE t hap-
pened in this case, it seems at least aE >leaded 
guilty to third degree burglary in retu . entence 
without much concern for the fact that it convic-
tion. The laundromat thief in Blair, f _ __ , uJ.timately 
pleaded guilty to third degree burglary ana received a light sen-
tence. See Note, supra, at 162. Perhaps it would be helpful if, 
at oral argument, you asked for some of the details of Helm's 
prior offenses. 
~~ 
the current South Dakota law, 5 but it was previously defined, in 
relevant part, as "the taking - by fraud or stealth" of .........., ~ 
livestock6 or property worth more than $50. §§22-37-1 and 22-37-
2 { 1) & { 3) { 19 6 7) . It was punishable "by imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in 
the county jail not exceeding one year." §22-37-3 {1967). There 
is also no "obtaining money under false pretenses" in the current 
law, 7 but Helm may have been convicted under §22-41-4 {1967): 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any 
false token or writing, or other false pretense, 
obtains from any person any money or property . . . is 
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary 
not exceeding three years or in a county jail not ex-
ceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding three 
times the value of the money or property so obtained, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment." 
This is comparable to a present "Class 6" felony. In any event, 
it appears that Helm's conviction for obtaining money under false 
5 under the curr.ent §22-30A-15, "theft" includes "the separate 
offens[e] committed or charged before the effective date of [the 
current law] and known as larceny." "Grand theft," a "Class 4 
felony," is defined, in relevant part, as the theft of property 
worth more than $200, any livestock, or a firearm. §22-30A-17. 
6I find it interesting that a ~itic of the South Dakota bur-
glary statute would advise potential chicken thieves to "Steal 
the Chicken at the Henhouse Door" to avoid committing burglary. 
See Note, supra n. 4. Under South Dakota law, however, a chicken 
thief commits a serious felony {previously grand larceny~ now 
grand theft) ins ide or outs ide the henhouse. Once again, we do 
not know the details of Helm's grand larceny. He may have been 
no more than a chicken thj.ef. Clarification at oral argument 
might be useful. 
1 
7current law includes "false pretense" within the theft defi-
nition. §22-30A-15. 
pretenses began with a charge of uttering a "no account" check. 
See Helm's Brief in Supreme Court of South Dakota, No. 12789, at 
5. (This is the most information we have about any of his prior 
convict ions.) 
In sum, it is impossible to be certain about Helm's pre-
vious offenses on the record now before the Court. It appears 
that prior to 1979 he had been convicted of four "Class 4" felo-
nies and two "Class 6" felonies, but the statutory definitions 
leave room for some very minor behavior. We do know that none of -
the offenses was a crime against a person, and all six involved 
-... ~..-,.....__..,. ~ .... 
alcohol. As a result of the convictions, the 36-year-old Helm 
had spent much of his adult life in the South Dakota State Peni-
tentiary. 
In 1979, Helm pleaded guilty to uttering a "no account" 
~ check for $100, a "Class 5 felony." §22-41-1.2. It appears that 
the offense was committed after Helm had been drinking to such an 
extent that he was unable to remember what had happened. 
c. Decisions Below 
The state TC (Parker) accepted Helm's guilty plea and 
sentenced him to life imprisonment under §22-7-8. It reasoned 
that because his prior imprisonments had been insufficient to 
motivate Helm to correct his drinking problem, ther~ was no pur-
pose in giving him another chance. Since he was "beyond reha-
bilitation," the TC "lock[ed] [him] up for the rest of [his] nat-
ural life, so [there would not be] further victims of [his] 
crimes." 
/ 
The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed th~ sentence by 
a~. 287 N.W.2d 497 (1980). The majority, per Justice 
D~d the sentence "severe," but "it [did] not shock the 
conscience of the court." Id., at 498. Chief Justice Wollman, 
concurring specially, noted the availability of executive clemen-
cy. Id., at 499. Justices Morgan and Henderson filed dissenting 
opinions in which they argued that Helm's sentence was dispropor-
tionate. Justice Morgan would reserve life sentences for crimes 
against persons. Justice Henderson, applying the analysis adopt-
ed by CA4 in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (1973), cert. denied, 
415 u.s. 983 (1974), concluded that Helm's sentence violated the 
Eighth Amendment. At the very least, he would give Helm "an op-
portunity to obtain parole during his lifetime." 287 N.W.2d, at 
502. 
Helm then sought federal habeas. The DC (S.D.; Bogue) 
denied the writ, relying on Rummel v. Estelle to dispose of 
Helm's Eighth Amendment claim. 
On appeal,~A8 (Lay, Bright, Ross) reversed. The court 
distinguished Rummel v. Estelle on the grouno that Helm had been 
sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In 
~Hutto v. Davis, 454 u.s. 370 (1982) (per curiam), there was also 
a possibility of parole. There is a qualitative difference, be-
cause the State has rejected the possibility of rehabilitation. 
Examining the crimes Helm had committed and the sentence he had 
{'A,(' 
received, the c66rt concluded that the sentence was grossly dis-
proportionate. Accordingly it granted habeas relief. 
~ 
II. Discussion 
In view of your familiarity with this area, I discuss 
the principles very briefly. The main purpose of this bench 
memo, as I see it, is to fill in some of the gaps that the briefs 
have left. 
A. The Relevant Precedents 
Two recent decisions of this Court are of particular 
significance here: Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (~ 
curiam), and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). You dis-
sented from JUSTICE REHNQUIST's opinion in Rummel, writing an 
opinion in which JUSTICES BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS joined. 
In Davis, a summary reversal of CA4, you declined to join JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST's per curiam opinion, but concurred in the judgment on 
the authority of Rummel. 
Since you wrote in both of these cases, I will only sum-
mar ize their facts briefly to refresh your memory. Rummel was 
convicted in 1964 of presenting a credit card with intent to de-
fraud, obtaining $80. In 1969 he was convicted of passing a 
forged check for $28. 36. In 1973 he was convicted of a third 
felony: obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses. 8 After the 1973 
conviction, the state TC sentenced Rummel to life imprisonment 
under Texas's habitual criminal statute. Relying in part on the 
8These were the only convictions specifically at issue, but 
it appears thatvRummel had a total of 13 conyictions. See Amicus 
Brief of the Criminal District Attorney of Bexai: County, Texas, 
in Rummel, No. 78-6386, at 3, n. 2. 
possibility of parole, see 445 u.s., at · 280-281; cf.. id., at 268, 
this Court upheld the sentence in a 5-4 decision. ~xas freed 
after the decision was announced. 
Davis was convicted of selling marijuana and with pos-
session of marijuana with intent to distribute. A total of nine 
ounces of marijuana, with a value of approximately $200, was at 
issue. Davis had at least one prior conviction involving LSD. 
In addition, there was evidence that he had been distributing 
other drugs {including LSD) at the time he was arrested on the 
marijuana charges. There were two other possible aggravating 
circumstances: sale of marijuana for use by a prisoner, and for 
the use of an inmate's wife left alone with an infant child. Da-
vis was sentenced to 20 years and fined $10,000 on each of the 
~ two marijuana charges, the sentences to run consecutively. De-
spite a letter from the State's prosecutor admitting that the 
sentence was grossly disproportionate, this Court summarily re-
versed an en bane CA4 decision granting habeas relief on Eighth 
Amendment grounds. 
B. The Applicable Principles 
In Rummel, the Court recognized that some sentences 
short of death still may be so disproportionate that they violate 
the Eighth Amendment, regardless of whether they are "different 
in kind" from other penalties. Although the Court deemphasized 
cases such as Weems v. United States, 217 u.s. 349 {1910), 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (your opinion), and 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.s. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion), it 
admits their statement of this principle. See 445 .u.s., at 271-
272. And it concedes "that a proportionality principle would ••• 
come into play in [an] extreme [case]." _!_Sh_, at .,..,A 
the Court does not identify this proportionality 
Rummel holds, therefore, is that the appropriate 
principle--whatever it might be--was not violated 
that case. 
Under these circumstances, I think you should continue 
to apply the principles that you announced in your Rummel dis-
sent. You identified three factors in particular: "(i) the na-
ture of the offense ... : (ii) the sentence imposed for commission ~~.~ 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions -- . . . . , and (iii) the sen-tence imposed upon . other criminals in the same jurisdiction •.•• " 
~ Id., at 295 (POWELL, J., dissenting). In applying these princi-
ples, Rummel serves as a benchmark. If a sentence is more gross-
ly disproportionate than that in Rummel, it violates the Eighth 
Amendment. But if the sentence is less grossly disproportionate 
(or equally disproportionate), then Rummel controls. You already 
have recognized Rummel's controlling authority in appropriate 
circumstances. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S., at 375 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
c. The Application of the Principles 
Here the sentence is more grossly disyroportionate than 
~ '-- ......,...-;w. ~ 
that in Rummel. It therefore violates the Eighth Amendment, and 
the decision below should be affirmed. 
On its face, the nature of the principal felony here 
(uttering a $100 no account check) is very like the principal 
felony in Rummel (obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses). The 
prior criminal records are also similar. Both consist of rela-
:rwz ~------
tively minor, non-violent property crimes. 9 The principal dif-~ 
~t-ference is that all of Helm's c ~ imes were c~ as a result ~/ 
of ~sm. As CAS properly recognized, this does not by ~ 
any means serve to excuse the crimes. Petn. app. A-19. But it 
is a condition that can be treated. 
~~ 
a~ 
In Rummel the Court reasoned ~~ 
that "the interest of the State of Texas ••• , expressed in all 
recidivist statutes, [is] in dealing in a harsher manner with 
those who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are sim-
ply incapable of conforming to the norms of society as estab-
~~ 
lished by its criminal law." 445 U.S., at 276. Here Helm's "re-s 
peated criminal acts" do not show that he is "incapable of con- 7 
forming to the norms of society." He may well be able to conform 
/~~~~ 
if his alcoholism is treated. Thus Helm's record does not 
present so serious a case as Rummel's, while his sentence is more 
severe, see infra. 
Turning to the second factor you identified ("the sen-
9Helm had six prior felony convict ions, while only two of 
Rummel's prior felony convictions were in the record. The Court 
had been informed, however, of Rummel's full criminal record, 
which consisted of 13 convictions. See Amicus Brief of the Crim-
inal District Attorney of Bexar County, Texas, in Rummel, No. 78-
6386, at 3, n. 2. Included on this list were "unlawfully carry-
ing a deadly weapon" and "aggravated assault on a female." Ac-
cording to your Conference notes, the existence of these 13 con-
victions was one of the three principal factors on which THE 




tence imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions"), there is not a large difference between this case and 
Rummel. But to the extent there is a difference, it is in Helm's 
favor. In Rummel, you noted that only two other States necessar-
ily would have punished Rummel's conduct so severely. 445 u.s., 
,-- ~ ,.._.,..._..... ------.. 
at 296. Here, only one other State could match South Dakota's ~-
,...- --... ~ ...... ~~ ,....-. .- v ,_..,.,., 
sentence. The distinction, however, is greater than this state-~ 
ment suggests. In Rummel, the comparison was made between Texas~ 
and other States that had mandatory life sentences for habitual 
criminals like Rummel. At least three additional States would 
have permitted a life sentence for someone in Rummel's circum-
stances. See 445 U.S., at 280, and n. 21. Here, however, only - -one other St~e- ~ ~ven authorized to sentence a person~ ike Helm 
'""--= ~ -....-~ --~ ~..... .....,...._.. 
to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Thus there 
is a real distinction in Helm's favor. 
In my view, the most telling distinction between Rummel ----- -· 
and this case is the nature of the sentence imposed. While 
Rummel involved life imprisonment, here it is life imprisonment 
w~ut possibJJ i~~ar~le.lO The State implicitly (and the 
10This Court often has recognized that there is a difference 
in kind between capital punishment and all other forms of punish-
ment. That difference is relevant when applying a proportionali-
ty analysis, but I do not thipk it is relevant in deciding wheth-
er to apply proportionality analysis. Even the Rummel Court 1 
would apply propor.tionali ty analysis to a life sentence for a 
traffic offense. · 
In any event, I think there is a difference in kind between ' 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole and other forms 
of imprisonment. It is not nearly so great as the difference 
between capital punishment and all other forms of punishment. I 
would not even put it in the same order of magnitude. But given 
Footnote continued on next page. 
TC explicitly) rejected rehabilitation as a goal of the penal 
system. The prisoner has no prospect of ever resuming a normal 
life. It is also significant that the Rummel Court relied on the 
possibility of parole in reaching its result. 445 u.s., at 280-
281; cf. id., at 268.11 
Here the State suggests that the possibility of execu-
tive clemency is comparable to parole.12 I see no basis for that 
in fact, and there is certainly no basis for it in law. In Con-
necticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 u.s. 458 (1981), the 
legal distinction between pardon and parole was made explicit. 
Even Rummel implicitly recognized the distinction. The Court 
stressed that Rummel was better off than a person sentenced to 
life without parole under Mississippi's recidivist statute. 445 
U.S., at 281. But the Mississippi Constitution empowers the Gov-
ernor to grant powers "[i]n all criminal and penal cases, except-
the State's rejection of rehabilitation as a goal, there is a 
qualitative difference. 
However great the qualitative difference may be in the capital 
punishment context, the Court clearly has recognized that other 
qualitative differences exist. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25 (1972), for example, the Court distingusihed between pun-
ishments involving imprisonment and other punishments. Only the 
former involved a loss of liberty, and thus only the former re-
quired the appointment of counsel. 
11According to your Conference notes, the possibility of pa-
role was one of the three principal factors on which THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE based his decision. It is the only point that JUSTICE 
WHITE mentions. 
12Executive clemency, of course, is also available in capital 
cases. That fact has never prevented the Court from finding a 
death penalty to be a disproportionate punishment. 
ing those of treason and impeachment." ·Section 124. The Missis-
sippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to pardon 
includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See 
Wh i t t in g ton v . S t evens , ~ 21 M i s s . 5 9 8 , 6 0 3-6 0 4 , 7 3 So • 2 d 13 7 , 
139-140 (1954). The Rummel Court must have recognized that the 
possibility of executive clemency does not compensate for the 
unavailability of parole. This is sensible, for executive clem-
ency is not the same "'established variation on imprisonment of 
convicted criminals,'" Rummel, 445 U.S., at 280 (quoting 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471, 477 (1972)), that parole is. 
III. Conclusion 
The sentence imposed on Helm is more grossly dispropor-
tionate to his crimes than was the sentence imposed on Rummel. 
Accordingly, Rummel is not controlling. Applying your Rummel 
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Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 
I have examined the records of commutations of life sen-
tences contained at J.A. 22-29. There are two charts. The first 
(pp. 22-26) shows the inmates presently serving life sentences, 
the dates on which they began serving those sentences, and the 
dates on which commutation was denied. The second (p. 29) lists 
the inmates whose life sentences have been commuted since 1964, 
the dates on which commutation was granted, the date on which 
parole was granted (if any), and the date of discharge (if any). 
Statistically the charts are not very helpful for a num-
ber of reasons. (1) Neither chart gives us the full population 
of life prisoners. We do not know, for example, how many life 
prisoners there have been since 1964 who are no longer serving in 
the state penitentiary but who were denied commutation. This 
category would include life prisoners who died in prison, prison-
ers who have been transferred to a different prison (see, e.g., 
Olim v. Wakinekona, No. 81-1581), and escapees. In other words, 
the State has told us about all of the cases that support its 
position, but left open the possibility that there are other 
cases contrary to its position. (2) Neither chart gives any de-
tails about either the crimes or the reasons for granting or de-
nying commutation. This omission could cut either way. To the 
extent that life prisoners have committed serious, violent 
., 
.. 
crimes, it is understandable whv commutation has been denied. On 
the other hand, death-bed commutations for terminally ill prison-
ers do little to support the State's position. Since (i) the 
State prepared these charts, (ii) the State has the full records 
available, and (iii) Helm lacks access to the full records, I 
would construe the omission against the State. (3) Since commu-
tation is left to the Governor's discretion, past practice may be 
a poor indicator of future performance. While parole is usually 
subject to fairly detailed guidelines, that does not seem to be 
the case with commutations. Even if commutations were frequently 
granted, there is no reason to assume that they will continue to 
be granted. 
Even if we ignore these problems with the State's sta-
tistics, there is not much support for their position in them. 
There has not been a commutation in South Dakota since March 7, 
1975. Since that date, over one hundred requests for commutation 
have been denied. Furthermore, the commutation that was granted 
in 1975 is not very meaningful. Although the prisoner's sentence 
was commuted (after 38 years) he still has not been paroled. 
This demonstrates that commutation is only the first hurdle a 
prisoner must clear to be released. The last time that a life 
prisoner was paroled was in 1974. 
It should also be noted that Helm was one of the those 
whose commutation request was denied. That seems to be the best 
indication of his chances. The governor has already refused to 
commute his sentence to a fixed term of years. 
82-492 Solem v. Helm No. ·-----,-· Con£. 4/1/83 
The Chief Justice /2W 
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Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 
At oral argument, the South Dakota Attorney General in-
formed the Court of the dates of Helm's prior convictions. Al-
though we still do not know the details of his crimes, it is at 
least possible to find the statutory definitions . 
.From 1964 to 1969, third degree burglary was defined in 
at least two sections. Under §22-32-8 (1967), "breaking into any 
dwelling house in the nighttime with intent to commit a crime" 
was third degree burglary. In addition, "breaking or entering at 
any time .•. any building or part of any building, booth, tent, 
railroad car, vessel, vehicle •.. , or any structure or erection 
in which any property is kept, with intent to commit larceny or 
any felony," §22-32-9 (1967), was also third degree burglary. 
Under §22-37-1 (1967), "[l]arceny is the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive 
another thereof." "Larceny" includes petit larceny, which is 
otherwise punishable by 30 days in county jail and/or a $10-$100 
fine. Shoplifting would apparently satisfy the definition of 
third degree burglary. 
The definitions for the other crimes are as noted in my 
bench memo. In particular, the minimum amount for grand larceny 







Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 
I have examined the records of commutations of life sen-
tences contained at J.A. 22-29. There are two charts. The first 
(pp. 22-26) shows the inmates presently serving life sentences, 
the dates on which thev began serving those sentences, and the 
dates on which commutation was denied. The second (p. 29) lists 
the inmates whose life sentences have been commuted since 1964, 
the dates on which commutation was granted, the date on which 
parole was granted (if any), and the date of discharge (if any). 
Statistically the charts are not very helpful for a num-
ber of reasons. (1) Neither chart gives us the full population 
of life prisoners. We do not know, for example, how many life 
prisoners there have been since 1964 who are no longer serving in 
the state penitentiary but who were denied commutation. This 
category would include life prisoners who died in prison, prison-
ers who have been transferred to a different prison (see, e.g., 
Olim v. Wakinekona, No. 81-1581), and escapees. In other words, 
the State has told us about all of the cases that support its 
position, but left open the possibility that there are other 
cases contrary to its position. (2) Neither chart gives any de-
tails about either the crimes or the reasons for granting or de-
nying commutation. This omission could cut either way. To the 
extent that life prisoners have committed serious, violent 
2. 
crimes, it is understandable why commutation has been denied. On 
the other hand, death-bed commutations for terminally ill prison-
ers do little to support the State's position. Since (i) the 
State prepared these charts, (ii) the State has the full records 
available, and (iii) Helm lacks access to the full records, I 
would construe the omission against the State. (3) Since commu-
tation is left to the Governor's discretion, past practice may be 
a poor indicator of future performance. While parole is usually 
subject to fairly detailed guidelines, that does not seem to be 
the case with commutations. Even if commutations were frequently 
granted, there is no reason to assume that they will continue to 
be granted. 
Even if we ignore these problems with the State's sta-
tistics, there is not much support for their position in them. 
There has not been a commutation in South Dakota since March 7, 
1975. Since that date, over one hundred requests for commutation 
have been denied. Furthermore, 
in 1975 is not very meaningful. 
was commuted (after 38 years) 
the commutation that was granted 
Although the prisoner's sentence 
he still has not been paroled. 
This demonstrates that commutation is only the first hurdle a 
prisoner must clear to be released. The last time that a life 
prisoner was paroled was in 1974. 
It should also be noted that Helm was one of the those 
whose commutation request was denied. That seems to be the best 
indication of his chances. The governor has already refused to 
commute his sentence to a fixed term of years. 
.§np-rmtt <!Jcurl cf t£rt~lt .§tates-
~ag~ ~. <!J. 2ll,?~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
April 1, 1983 
Re: · No. 82-492 --Solem v. Helm 
Dear Chief, 
Lewis has agreed to write the 
opinion for the Court in the above. 
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To: JUSTICE POWELL 
.From: Michael 
Re: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 
I have begun working on a draft opinion in this case. 
In the near future I will have to set it aside for a time to re-
sume work on the April bench memos, but I wanted to at least get 
a start on it so that I could put the research 1 ibrar ians to 
work. Before I invest inordinate amounts of their time or my 
time, however, I would like to explain my strategy to you. If 
this is not what you have in mind, I will take a different tack 
before I go too far. 
focus. 
It seems to me that JUSTICE BLACKMUN will have to be our 
There is a real risk that he will concur only in the 2 
judgment, and if that happens we will have accomplished little. 
I therefore propose to attempt a draft that he can join happily. 
I see this as imposing several constraints on us. 
(1) We cannot rely on the Rummel dissent at all. We 
obviously cannot rely on it for binding authority. I do not 
think it would be wise to cite it even for persuasive autho~~ 
The arguments made in Rummel will have to be repeated--even 
------------~-----~ 
elaborated--rather than being incorporated by reference. The 
points you made in dissent should be made in a majority opinion 
in any event. ~ 
/' 
(2) We will have to cover all of the bases. I view this 
as an important constitutional case in which we should cover all 
2 0 
of the bases anyway. It's not like Lockheed, where the Govern-
ment made some frivolous arguments that didn't warrant response. 
But the importance of JUSTICE BLACKMON's vote makes it particu-
larly important to do a thorough job. 
~
You may recall that he 
even objected in Lockheed to our failure to respond to frivolous 
arguments. 
(3) We cannot cast doubt on the correctness of the judg-
ment in Rummel. This should not be a problem for you, since you 
recognized Rummel as binding in Davis. Fortunately there is no 
real analysis in Rummel to reject. We should thus be able to 
7 
provide an analytical framework, 
note that it is consistent with Rummel. 
apply it to Helm's facts, and 
I should add, though, 
that we cannot endorse the judgment in Rummel, either. We would 
then risk losing JUSTICES BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, who 
would not follow Rummel in Davis. 
I am afraid that this looks like a large project. It / ----' probably will increase the average length of your opinions. But 
I am excited about this opportunity to establish some precedent 
in an area where the Court has offered no guidance in 70 years. 
There is a lot out there, including some good historical materi-
al. (I hope to get at least one Magna Carta citation in here. 61( 
'-------------------~ 
That's real history!) And Rummel has sparked a fair bit of aca-








Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 
I have examined the records of commutations of life sen-
tences contained at J.A. 22-29. There are two charts. The first 
(pp. 2 2-26) shows the inmates presently serving 1 i fe sentences, 
the dates on which they began serving those sentences, and the 
dates on which commutation was denied. The second (p. 29) lists 
the inmates whose life sentences have been commuted since 1964, 
the dates on which commutation was granted, the date on which 
parole was granted (if any), and the date of discharge (if any). 
Statistically the charts are not very helpful for a num-
ber of reasons. (1) Neither chart gives us the full population 
of life prisoners. We do not know, for example, how many life 
prisoners there have been since 1964 who are no longer serving in 
the state penitentiary but who were denied commutation. This 
category would include life prisoners who died in prison, prison-
ers who have been transferred to a different prison (see, e.g., 
Olim v. Wakinekona, No. 81-1581), and escapees. In other words, 
the State has told us about all of the cases that support its 
position, but left open the possibility that there are other 
cases contrary to its position. (2) Neither chart gives any de-
tails about either the crimes or the reasons for granting or de-
nying commutation. This omission could cut either way. To the 
extent that life prisoners have committed serious, violent 
2. 
crimes, it is understandable why commutation has been denied. On 
the other hand, death-bed commutations for terminally ill prison-
ers do little to support the State's position. Since (i) the 
State prepared these charts, (ii) the State has the full records 
available, and (iii) Helm lacks access to the full records, I 
would construe the omission against the State. (3) Since commu-
tation is left to the Governor's discretion, past practice may be 
a poor indicator of future performance. While parole is usually 
subject to fairly detailed guidelines, that does not seem to be 
the case with commutations. Even if commutations were frequently 
granted, there is no reason to assume that they will continue to 
be granted. 
Even if we ignore these problems with the State's sta-
tistics, there is not much support for their position in them. 
There has not been a commutation in South Dakota since March 7, 
1975. Since that date, over one hundred requests for commutation 
have been denied. Furthermore, the commutation that was granted 
in 1975 is not very meaningful. Although the prisoner's sentence 
was commuted (after 38 years) he still has not been paroled. 
This demonstrates that commutation is only the first hurdle a 
prisoner must clear to be released. The last time that a life 
prisoner was paroled was in 1974. 
It should also be noted that Helm was one of the those 
whose commutation request was denied. That seems to be the best 
indication of his chances. The governor has already refused to 
commute his sentence to a fixed term of years. 
lfp/ss 05/21/83 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mike DATE: May 21, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-492 Solem v. Helm 
I have carefully reviewed your draft of 5/19 and 
like it very much. The organization is particularly good, 
and you have applied the relevant factors quite 
persuasively - with an excellent use of the South Dakota 
array of criminal penalties. Working with a state 
criminal code is painstaking. 
this with special care. 
Your editor should check 
In addition to customary type editing, I have 
dictated a couple of riders. I do have some general 
comments. 
1. I admire and envy your knowledge of early 
English history and the common law. It also is evident 
that you have gone to the ancient sources with your usual 
care and insight. Nevertheless, I would like for you to 
eliminate some of the erudition now present in subpart II-
A (p. 7-9). Perhaps we could put the reference to King 
Alfred's laws in a footnote, as well as the discussion of 
"amercements" and what happened under the Tudors. But to 
2. 
put this in the text can be viewed as ostentatious, and 
the sort of opinion writing by other Justices that I have 
sometimes criticized. Moreover, Mike, in view of the 
torture, what went on in the Tower of London and other 
barbarisms, few really will believe that any serious 
attention was paid in those very early centuries to 
proportionality or due process. As for what goes into the 
text, I would start with the English Bill of Rights at the 
bottom of p. 8. This is the basic source for us. Some of 
what you have in the first three paragraphs can be 
summarized for a footnote. Also, Mike, I made a speech in 
the Great Hall of the Law Courts in 1965 when the English 
were celebrating the 750th anniversary of Magna Carta. 
Take a look at this (published in the ABA Journal) , and if 
I said anything really relevant we might cite it. Also 
Professor Dick Howard at Virginia has written on Magna 
Carta. Ask the library to find this for you. I would 
like to cite Dick if it is relevant. 
Before we go to a printed Chambers draft, I 
would like to see your revision of this subpart II-A, as 
it is a fairly personal type of statement. 
2. In Rummel and other cases, we have 
emphasized that legislatures have broad authority to 
3. 
determine the types and limits of punishments for crimes, 
and normally this authority is not challenged by courts. 
Moreover, appellate review of sentences also is rarely 
undertaken in view of the necessary deference that must be 
accorded sentencing decisions by trial courts. It is 
necessary, Mike, for us to recognize and repeat these 
principles loudly and clearly. 
3. Helms has paid his penalty for each of the 
other six offenses. You do focus only on the $100 check 
offense. It might be well at some point to say explicitly 
that this is the only offense that triggered the life 
sentence and is before us, as all other sentences have 
been served. 
4. The discussion of the difference betwee 
parole and commutation is good. It occurs to me, however, 
that it may be strengthened by emphasizing that parole is 
expressly authorized by statute ) that hearings with due 
process characteristics normally are required, that good 
time usually is allowed by statute, etc. A governor 1 s 
authority to commute is different from the authority to 
pardon, and I suppose commutation also is authorized by 
statute. But am I not right that in the end the 
governor•s discretion is as absolute as his authority to 
4. 
pardon? I think we have said, in a case decided within 
the past two or three years, that there is a significant 
~-i-~~ 
difference~ the parole system and a governor's authority to 
pardon. The case came, as I recall, either from 
Connecticut or the Second Circuit. There are due process 
cases involving parole. Are there any with respect to 
commutation? 
5. The paragraph that commences on page 25 is 
of doubtful force at least on a first reading. It 
leaves me with the impression that we are "reaching" to 
make an argument that we really do not need. Take a close 
second look at the paragraph. 
6. Footnote 13 also leaves me rather cool. 
Apart from being longer than I like, I am not persuaded 
that it - or least all of it adds strength of our 
opinion. 
* * * 
If you accept the substance of my changes, and 
meet the comments suggested above, I will not need to see 
a draft until your editor has worked it over. Then, 
unless he make substantive suggestions, go directly to a 
printed Chambers draft so we have it in print before the 
50 
'1-t/ 
mad rush at the end of May. The I\. remind me that I will 





Further thoughts about our opinion: 
1. We should make clear that the Court is not 
condemning all sentences without parole. Add a note along 
the following lines: 
1. We raise no question as to the validity 
generally of sentences without parole. The only 
issue before us is whether, in the circumstances 
of this case and in light of the principle of 
proportionality, the sentence authorized and 
imposed violates the Eighth Amendment. 
2. The dissent will emphasize the "habitual 
criminal" argument. We might anticipate this by a note 
saying in substance: 
"Peti tioiner, age , is not a professional 
criminal. The record indicates an addiction to 
alcohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding 
a job. His record of relative minor crimes 
involved no instance of violence of any kind. 
Incarcerating petitioner for life is not likely 
to serve in any substantial way the goals of our 
criminal justice system. Neither petitioner nor 
the state will have any incentive to persue 
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol 
problem. 
2. 
3. We must bear in mind our opinion in Jones (Mark's 
case} where the dissent will emphasize that Jones is no 
danger to society because his only crime was against 
property. See our footnote to the effect that sometimes 
property crimes result in threats to the safety of 
persons. Try to work out a note with Mark. 
4. I do not recall whether our draft refers to how 
infrequently commutation has been granted by the Governor 
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May 31, 1983 
No. 82-492 Solem v. Helm 
Dear Lewis, 
I am sorry to part company on this, 
but I will await the dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JU S TICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~upuuu Qt1tttrl1tf Ur~ ~uh ~btt~s 
,ras!fittgfon. ~. Qt. 2ll.;t~~ 
May 31, 1983 
Re: 82-492 - Solem v. Helm 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
In the second sentence of footnote 14 on pages 
10-11, I think you mean to refer only to a sentence 
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June 1, 1983 
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JUSTICE B Y RON R . WHITE 
Re: 82-492 - Solem v. Helm 
Dear Lewis, 
I await the dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
June 1, 1983 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
j;tqtrtmt Qfllu.rt llf tlrt ~ta j;taf:tg 
11JagJrittgLtn. !9. <!f. 21lt?~~ 
June 1, 1983 
Re: No. 82-492-Solem v. Helm 
Dear Lewis: 




cc: The Conference 
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.hJrrtm:t Qfottrl o-f t!rt ~nitt~ ~tattg ~~ 
Jlaglthtgto-n. ~. "f. 20~,..;1 , 1113 .r 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN ~v June 6, 1983 
Re: No. 82-492 - Solem v. Helm 
Dear Lewis: 
I am certainly with you in the judgment in this case 
and may well be able to join your opinion. 
I write to inquire whether you could see your way clear 
to omit the material concerning Ballew v. Georgia appearing 
on page 15. In fact, if you could omit the paragraph that 
begins on page 15 and concludes after the first five lines 
on page 16, and then mend the first sentence of the follow-
ing paragraph on page 16, I think I could join your opinion 
in full. I may write a few words in separate concurrence, 






JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.iupuutt <qourl af Urt ~nittb ~taf:tg 
.. ulfi:n:gton. ~. <q. 2.llc?.Jt~ 
Re: No. 82-492 - Solem v. Helm 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
June 8, 1983 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
j)n.pumt Qfourl cf tqt ~~ j)taftg 
Jfu!pnghtn. ~. <!f. zo.;t~.;l 
June 21, 1983 
Re: 82-492 - Solem v. Helm 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Enclosed is a typescript early draft of my dissent in this case. 
Given the date, I send what is essentially a "work draft" so you 
can see the "direction." 
Regards, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'cONNOR 
.§u.vrtmt ~ourt llf tqt ~nUtlt $;tait.ll' 
1lJagltington, ~. ~· 2!l.;t.Jf~ 
June 21, 1983 
No. 82-492 Solem v. Helm 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.:§u:p-rtmt ~ourl of tlrt ~tb .:§ta:ft.s-
~frhtgion, :!B. ~· 20bt~~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 22, 1983~ 
Re: 82-492 - Solem v. Helm 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
;§u.prtmt Qflturl of tfrt 'J!ltt!ftb .$5tws-
~as-frington. tB. <!f. 2ll?J!.;l 
Re: No. 82-492 Solem v. Helm 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
June 22, 1983 
Sincerely~ 
lfp/ss 06/22/83 Rider A, p. 18 (Solem) 
SOLM18 SALLY-POW 
Note: Justice Blackmun is concerned by the Chief's charge 
that we are overruling Rummel and ignoring stare decisis. 
We could add a fo9tnote along the following s: 
The disseht of the Chief Just· ce, arguing that 
Rummel controls case, the Court with 
"blithely of stare decisis." 
Post, at 1, -- and and judges often 
disagree as to which are "controlling". But 
contrary to repeated in the dissent, we neither 
ignore nor overrule silento --- as is evident 
from our to it. The critical 
distinction be and apparently 
was paroled promptly, Helm, at 36, was sentenced to 
life with ssibility of 
Th dissenting 
consistent ' ith precedent. 
itself is hardly 
accept that "the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits 'disproportionate 
to the crime committed'". Post, at and 14. --
The Court repeatedly has expressed a contrary view. In 
addition to the early decision in Weems, more recent 
2. 
expressions by the Court have recognized that the 
proportionality principle may apply to imprisonment. See, 
e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s. 678, 685 (1978); Ingraham 
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Rummel v. Estelle, 
445 u.s., at 274, n. 11 (1979); and Hutto v. Davis, 454 







Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 
I have reviewed your comments on my proposed changes. I 
attach the master copy with changes marked; the copies of the 
riders that I gave you yesterday, and that you have already 
marked; and fresh copies of the riders that incorporate your sug-
gestions. On notes 13 and 30, I propose new language along the 
lines of your suggestions. This new language is marked on the 
current copies of the riders. (I have not marked technical 
changes, or changes that you made.) 
I also attach a copy of the revision of n. 15 that you 
drafted. The substance of the last sentence is incorporated in 
my proposed n. 15. I fear that we will get into trouble, howev-
er, if we use the first sentence without some explanation. We do 
say that all sentences are subject to appellate scrutiny to en-
sure that they are proportionate--just as all trials are subject 
to appellate scrutiny to ensure that they are sufficiently 
"speedy." In most cases, of course, an appellate court can dis-
miss an Eighth Amendment claim summarily, for few sentences are 
constitutionally disproportionate (even if they are very severe). 
In the same way, an appellate court generally can dismiss a Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial claim summarily, for few trials are de-
layed by constitutional dimensions (even if they move slowly) • 
The point we have to make, therefore, is that--although all sen-
tences are subject to appellate scrutiny--few sentences will re-
page 2. 
quire extended appellate scrutiny. This is because the standard 
is not, as the dissent seems to suggest, whether the sentence is 
"correct." Rather, the standard is whether the sentence is with-
in constitutional limits. If this is not clear enough from my 
proposed draft, perhaps we could add the following sentence: 
Indeed, the limited scope of review suggests that few 
prisoners will find it worthwhile to bring Eighth 
Amendment challenges to the length of their sentences. 
If you think it worthwhile, we could also add a cross-cite to the 
"speedy trial" discussion I plan to draft. 
I have reviewed the changes you marked on pages 10 and 
11. I agree wholeheartedly. They should make the point of n. 15 
even clearer. 
I will draft language covering two additional points. 
On page 7, n .10, I will propose an addition in support of our 
view that the Framers incorporated the English principle of pro-
portionality when they adopted the English language. On page 15, 
I will draft a paragraph discussing the Speedy Trial Clause 
cases. As both of these points are fairly self-contained, you 
should be able to review them in isolation when I have finished 
my research and drafting. 
I have made a comment on page 8. 
I would hope that we could have all of this in the Print 
Shop by Monday morning, so we could easily circulate a printed 
draft by Tuesday. 
mfs 06/24/83 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Michael 
Re: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 
I have reviewed your latest comments on my proposed 
changes. I attach the master copy with changes marked and fresh 
copies of the riders that incorporate your suggestions. I also 
attach proposed language for page 15 discussing the speedy trial 
example. I anticipate that I will finish the historical addition 
by tomorrow afternoon. ~
b; . 
~o,y.?_~~ ~ /rY 
. ~ ~ ~- ... _. tJVV :..:...----- // t:/ ( ) 
~P-L1.':fa~n r for page 15, which is new, I 
I think ~ f~t~ote 13 warrants your part cular attention. At 
the moment, it seems that there is either t o much or not enough 
there. I think we should either argument in more 
detail or cut back the footnote to rejection f the 
Rummel/CJ-dissent argument. 
We say that the Rummel dicta is meaningless as an Eighth 
Amendment standard. But our only justification for this asser-
~ . 
tion is the observation that there is a wide range of sub-
classifications within "felonies." For this point to make sense 
to the uninitiated reader, I think we have to continue the analy-
sis. The idea lurking behind the observation about sub-
classifications is that a felony punishment at the lower end of 
the scale may be justified for a given crime (i.e., the crime 
could be classified as a class 6 felony), but a felony punishment 
page 2. 
at the higher end of the scale would be out of all proportion 
(i.e., the crime is clearly not a class A felony). The fact that 
a crime may fall within some sub-classification does not mean 
that it may be placed in any sub-classification. 
II 
I think the argument can be made even stronger than 
that, however, for the analysis does not depend on the existence 
of explicit sub-classifications. Even if South Dakota did not 
have a fragmented definition, the ~y in the Rummel dicta r 
would still apply. The fact that a crime may fall within the 
lower range of a broad definition does not mean that it therefore 
may be placed in the higher range. 
One of the reasons that the felony classification 
is \ 
particularly meaningless is the fact that it is totally arbi-
trary. There is nothing that sets felonies 
~
apart from other 
crimes except their punishments. The definitions vary slightly, 
but generally a "felony" is a crime that is punishable by more 
than one or two years in prison. See, e.g., 18 u.s.c. §1(1): 18 
U.S.C. App. §1202(c) (2). Historically the definition was differ-
ent, but even in the middle ages it was based solely on the au-
thorized punishment. See 2 Pollock & Maitland, The History of 
English Law 467 (2nd ed. 1909) ("We thus define felony by its 
legal effects: any definition that would turn on the quality of 
the crime is unattainable"). 
In other words, the Rummel dicta is entirely circular. 
It uses the fact that a crime warrants punishment to justify the 
page 3. 
imposition of a punishment. What is worse, it is boot-strapping. 
It relies on the fact that a crime may warrant some lower level 
of punishment to justify the imposition of a much higher level of 
punishment. If you break down the reasoning, this boot-strapping 
becomes clear. It is a simple three-step argument: 
(i) Crime X may be punished by one year in prison. 
(ii) Crime X is, by definition, classifiable as a fel-
ony (at least under the most common definition). 
(iii) Crime X may be punished by life imprisonment 
without possibility of parole. 
Rummel tries to insert step (ii) to disguise the real argument 
that is being made: If (i) a crime may be punished by one year in 
prison, then (iii) it may be punished by life imprisonment with-
out possibility of parole. 
III 
There are, of course, other responses that we could make 
to the Rummel/CJ-dissent argument. The "without fear of contra-
diction" language is, in my view, simply silly. The Third Amend-
ment is still an enforceable part of the Constitution, despite 
the fact that this Court has not been called upon to enforce it 
yet. The "purely a matter of legislative prerogative" is simply 
an abdication of responsibility. We recognize the deference 
properly due to legislatures, but in the final analysis it is 
this Court that must determine what is constitutional. 
If you would like me to develop any of these arguments, 
I will be happy to do so. 
page 4. 
IV 
Given the Chief's heavy reliance on this Rummel dicta, I 
think it would be appropriate for us to expose it with some ex-
planation, rather than to dismiss it summarily. I do not think 
we need to worry about frightening off JUSTICE BLACKMUN. If he 
thought the felony standard were correct, he obviously would not 
have voted with us. If he had thought it was correct when he 
joined Rummel, JUSTICE REHNQUIST would have made it the rule of 
the case, rather than putting it in the "one could argue" form. 
Furthermore, I think JUSTICE BLACKMUN would prefer us to justify 
our failure to follow the spirit of Rummel (so that he will not 
have to justify his failure to do so}. Pointing out that this 
passage (the one on which the Chief relies most heavily} is mean-
ingless dicta would be a big step in that direction. 
H7R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: page 7 rider 
I propose the following changes on page 15: 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights,lO they also adopted the 
English principle of proportionality. -~fie-~ee~~e-wefe-~eafaft~eee 
~fie-ff~fi~e-~fiey-fiae-~eeeeeeee-ae-Bft~~fefi-eeejee~e Indeed, one of 
the consistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the 
rights of English subjects. R. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of 
Rights, 1776-1791, at (1955). Thus our Bill of Rights was 
designed in part to ensure that these rights were preserved. Al-
though the Framers may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go 
beyond the scope of its English counterpart, their use of the 
language of the English Bill of Rights is convincing proof that 
they intended to provide at least the same protection--including 
the right to be free from excessive punishments. 
------lfp/ss 06/28/83 
r-V-6.-vy 
82-492 Solem v. Helm 
This case is here on writ of certiorari to the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 
Under South Dakota's habitual offender law, re-
spondent Helm was sentenced to life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole. This sentence was occasioned by his 
issuing a $100 check without an account. 




over a period of 15 years - ee classified 
The other six offenses also were nonvio-
1\ 
lent. They included third degree burglaries, obtaining mon-
ey under false pretenses, larceny as defined by the state, 
and drunk driving. 
Respondent was 36 years old when convicted of the 
check offense. He is not a professional criminal. He is 
addicted to alcohol, with consequent difficulty in holding a 
job. 
After exhausting state remedies, Helm sought habe-
as relief in federal court, contending that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
CAB agreed, and granted the writ. 
Our prior cases establish that the Eighth Amend-
ment~rohibits , ~s~~orti~~ sentences~as well as punish-
ments that are inherently barbaric. In determining --
disproportionality, j we examined a number of objective fac-
tors that are set forth fully in our opinion. 
On the basis of these factors, we find that re-
spondent's sentence to life imprisonment without possibility 
of parole is grossly disproportionate to his crimes. Ac-
cordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals. 
Our opinion makes clear, however, that invalidat-
ing an imprisonment sentence ;fimposed under state law,J'is 
action reserved only for the most exceptional cases. 
The Chief Justice has filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor join. 
82-492# Solem v. Helm (Mike) 
LFP for the Court 
1st draft 5/27/83 
2nd draft 6/2/82 
3rd draft 6/7/83 
4th draft 6/27/83 
Joined by WJB, TM, HAB, JPS 
Copy to Mr. Lind 6/2/83 
CJ dissent 
typed draft 6/21/83 
Printed copy 6/22/83 
2nd draft 6/23/83 
Joined by BRW, WHR, SOC 
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The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
October 17, 1983 
I thought you might like to know that I spoke at the Third 
Circuit Judicial Conference recently and took as my text "In 
Praise of Solem v. Helm." As you may remember, the proportionality 
analysis which the Court undertook in that case is precisely the 
kind of inquiry which I suggested at the time of the Mullaney-
Patterson controversy as the preferable focus of attention. Thus, 
it will hardly surprise you that I endorsed your views, and in-
deed stole shamelessly from arguments advanced in the Solem 
opinion and in your dissent in Rummel v. Estelle (which I still 
regard as one of the best and most thoughtful opinions ever to 
issue from the Supreme Court). 
In any event, the topic seemed to excite a lot of interest. 
Some judges, as you would imagine, expressed concern over how 
such an inquiry might be conducted, but in general I'd say the 
reaction was favorable. They seemed particularly receptive to 
the argument, which I lifted from the Rummel dissent, that the 
supposed impossibility of conducting a proportionality inquiry 
is belied by the experience of the lower federal courts, most 
notably the Fourth Circuit, in actually administering such an 
approach. 
On a different note, you will be pleased to hear that Paul 
Stephan's spirits, which had seemed to drag a bit of late, have 
entirely revived with the faculty's favorable decision on tenure. 
He is his old cheerful self and very welcome. 
And by this time you will perhaps have heard that the 
faculty have acted favorably on David Martin. David's case was 
perceived here as uncomfortably close, but ultimately we were 
persuaded to go forward. My own view is that we have made no 
mistake, and I am very pleased for David and Cyndy. 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Page 2 
October 17, 1983 
Finally, I understand from Dick Merrill that I and others 
will join Justice and Mrs. Rehnquist for dinner at Dick's house 
in early November. As you know, I am an admirer of his and look 
forward to the chance to meet him socially. 
Well, that's the news from this front. I shall keep in 
mind your kind invitation to call you for lunch. In the mean-
time, I am, with warm regards, 
Sincerely, 






CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting • . ~ . . 
The controlling law govern1ng th1s case is crystal clear, but 
today the Court ? lithelY discards any concept of stare deci-
sis, trespasses gravely on the authority of the States, and dis---
torts the concept of proportionality of punishment by tearing it -
from its moorings in capital cases. Only two Terms ago, we held in 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.s. 263 (1980), that a life sentence im-
posed after a third nonviolent felony conviction did not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Today, 
the Court ignores its recent precedent and holds that a life sen-
tence imposed after a seventh felony conviction does constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, 
I reject the fiction that all Helm's crimes were innocuous or non-
,/ 
violent. Among his felonies were three burglaries and a third con-
( . .. 
viction for drunk driving. By comparison Rummel was a relatively 
- 2 -
"model citizen." ' Although today' s holding cannot rationally be 
reconciled with Rummel, the Court does not purport to overrule 
Rummel. I dissent. 
I 
A 
The Court's starting premise is that the Eighth Amendment's 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "prohibits not only barbaric 
punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the 
crime committed." Ante, at 6. What the Court means is that a sen- -
tence is unconstitutional if it is more severe than five justices 
(
think appropriate. In short, all sentences of imp~ isonment are t::t }l..f subject to appellate scrutiny ~he ensure ;:;,~ t th; are "proportion-
al" to the crime committed • . 
C; The Court then sets forth three assertedly "objective" factors 
to guide the determination of whether a given sentence of imprison-
ment is constitutionally excessive: (1) the "gravity of the offense 
and the harshness of the penalty," id. , at 11; ( 2) a comparison of 
the sentence imposed with "sentences imposed on other criminals in 
the same jurisdiction," id., at 12 (emphasis added); (3) and a com-
parison of "the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime 
in other jurisdictions." Ibid (emphasis added). In applying this 
analysis, the Court determines that respondent 
"has received the penultimate sentence for relative-
ly minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more 
harshly than other criminals in the State who have 
committed more serious crimes. He has been treated 
more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, ••• " Id., at 23. (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, the Court concludes, respondent's sentence is "signifi-
- 3 - , 
cantly disproportionate to his crime) and is ••• prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment." This analysis is completely at odds with the 
reasoning of our recent holding in Rummel, in which, of course, 
JUSTICE POWELL dissented. 
B 
The facts facing us in Rummel bear repeating. William James 
Rummel was convicted in 1964 of fraudulent use of a credit card; in 
1969, he was convicted of passing a forged check. Both of these 
offenses were felonies. In 1973, Rummel was charged with obtaining-
money by false pretenses, which is a felony under Texas law. These 
were indeed nonviolent crimes. Under Texas' recidivist statute, 
which provides for a mandatory life sentence upon conviction for a 
third felony, the trial judge imposed a life sentence as he was 
C· obliged to do after the jury returned a verdict of guilty of felony 
theft. 
Rummel, in this Court, advanced precisely the same arguments 
that respondent advances here; we rejected those arguments notwith-
standing that his case was stronger than respondent's. The test in 
Rummel which we rejected would have required us to determine on an 
abstract moral scale whether Rummel had received his "just deserts" 
for his crimes. We declined that invitation; today the Court ac-
cepts it. Will the Court now recall Rummel's case so five justices 
will not be parties to "disproportionate" criminal justice? 
It is true, as we acknowledged in Rummel, that the "Court has 
on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition 
of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of a 






shows that this type of proportionality review has been carried out 
only in a very limited category of cases, and never before in a 
case involving solely a sentence of imprisonment. In Rummel, we 
said that the capital punishment cases were inapposite because of 
the "unique nature of the death penalty •••• " Id., at 272. "Be-
cause a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of im-
prisonment, no matter how long, our decisions applying the ·prohibi-
tion of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases are of lim-
ited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment-
meted out to Rummel." Ibid. 
The Rummel Court also rejected the claim that Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), required it to determine whether 
Rummel's punishment was "disproportionate" to his crime. In Weems, 
the Court had struck down as cruel and unusual punishment a sen-
tence of cadena temporal imposed by a Phillipine Court. This bi-
zarre penalty, which was unknown to Anglo-Saxon law, entailed a 
minumum of 12 years' imprisonment chained day and night at the 
wrists and ankles, hard and painful labor, and a number of "acces-
sories" including lifetime civil disabilities. In Rummel the Court 
carefully noted that "[Weems'] finding of disproportionality cannot 
be wrenched from the facts of that case." 445 U.S., at 273. 1 
The lesson the Rummel Court drew from Weems and from the capi-
tal punishment cases was that the Eighth Amendment did not author-
1other authorities have shared this interpretation of 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). E.g., Packer, 
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1075 
·-- .. ( 19 6 4) • ·\:f.b_; ... 
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ize courts to review sentences of imprisonment to determine whether 
they were "proportional" to the crime. In language quoted incom-
pletely by the majority, ante, at 9 n. 13, the Rummel Court stated: 
"Given the unique nature of the punishments consid-
ered in Weems and in the death penalty cases, one 
could argue without fear of contradiction by any 
decision of this Court that for crimes concededly 
classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as 
punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a 
state penitentiary, the length of the sentence actu-
ally imposed is purely a matter of legislative 
perogative." 445 u.s., at 274. (Emphasis added). 
In context it is clear that this Court was not merely summarizing 
an argument, as the majority suggests, ante, at 9 n. 13, but was 
stating affirmatively the rule of law laid down. This passage from 
Rummel is followed by an explanation of why it is permissible for 
courts to review sentences of death or bizarre punishments as in 
Weems, but not sentences of imprisonment. Id., at 274-275. The 
Rummel Court emphasized, as has every opinion in capital cases in 
the past decade, that it was possible to draw a "bright line" be-
tween "the punishment of death and the various other permutations 
and commutations of punishment short of that ultimate sanction"; 
similarly, a line could be drawn between the punishment in Weems 
and "more traditional forms of imprisonment imposed under the 
Anglo-Saxon system." Id., at 275. How e ver, the Rummel Court em-
phasized that drawing lines between different sentences of impris-
onment would thrust the Court inevitably "into the basic line-
drawing process that is pre-eminently the province of the legisla-
ture" and produce judgments that were no more than the visceral 
reactions of individual Justices. Ibid. 
The Rummel Court c a t egorically rej ect e d the very an a lysis 







adopted by the Court today. Rummel had argued that various objec-
tive criteria existed by which the Court could determine whether 
his life sentence was proportional to his crimes. In rejecting 
Rummel's contentions, the Court explained why each was insufficient 
to allow it to determine in an objective manner whether a given 
sentence of imprisonment is proportionate to the crime for which it 
is imposed. 
First, it rejected the distinctions Rummel tried to draw be-
tween violent and nonviolent offenses, noting that "the absence of 
violence does not always affect the strength of society's interest 
in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular indi-
vidual." Ibid. Similarly, distinctions based on the amount of 
money stolen are purely "subjective" matters of line drawing. Id., 
at 275-276. 
Second, the Court squarely rejected Rummel's attempt to com-
pare his sentence with the sentence he would have received in other 
States--an argument that the Court today accepts. The Rummel Court 
explained that such comparisons are flawed for several reasons. 
For one, the recidivist laws of the various states vary widely. 
"It is one thing for a court to compare those States that impose 
capital punishment for a specific offense with those States that do 
not. It is quite another thing for a court to attempt to eval-
uate the position of any particular recidivist scheme within 
Rummel's complex matrix." 445 U.S., at 280 (citation and footnote 
omitted). Another reason why comparison between the recidivist 
statutes of different States is inherently complex is that some 
states provide for parole and others oo not. Id., at 280-281. Fi-
- 7 -
nally, and most importantly, such comparions trample on fundamental 
concepts of federalism. Different states surely may view particu-
lar crimes as more or less severe than other states. Thus, even if 
the punishment accorded Rummel in Texas were to exceed that which 
he would have received in any other State, 
"that severity would hardly render Rummel's punish-
ment 'grossly disproportionate' to his offenses or 
to the punishment he would have received in the oth-
er States •••• Absent a constitutionally imposed 
uniformity inimical to traditional notions of feder-
alism, some State will always bear the distinction 
of treating particular offenders more severely than 
any other State." 445 U.S., at 281-282. (Emphasis 
added) • 
Finally, we flatly rejected Rummel's suggestion that we meas-
ure his sentence against the sentences imposed by Texas for other 
crimes: 
"Other crimes, of course, implicate other societal 
interests, making any such comparison inherently 
speculative •••• Once the death penalty and other 
punishments different in kind from fine or imprison-
ment have been put to one side, there remains little 
in the way of objective standards for judging wheth-
er or not a life sentence imposed under a recidivist 
statute for several separate felony convictions not 
involving 'violence' violates the cruel-and-unusual-
punishment of the Eighth Amendment." 445 U.S., at 
282-283 n. 27. 
Rather, we held that the severity of punishment to be accorded dif-
ferent crimes was peculiarly a matter of legislative policy. Ibid. 
In short, Rummel held that the length of a sentence of impris- I 
onment is a matter of legislative discretion: this is so particu-
larly for recidivist statutes. I simply cannot understand how the 
majority can square Rummel with its holding that "a criminal sen-
tence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defe ndant 




has been convicted." Ante, at 11. 2 
If there were any doubts as to the meaning of Rummel, they 
were laid to rest last Term in Hutto v. Davis, 454 u.s. 370 (1982) 
{per curiam). There a United States District Court held that a 40-
year sentence for the possession of nine ounces of marijuana vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court applied almost ex-
actly the same analysis adopted today by the Court. Specifically, 
the District Court stated: 
"After examining the nature of the offense, the leg-
islative purpose behind the punishment, the punish-
ment in the [sentencing jurisdiction] for other of-
fenses, and the punishment actually imposed for the 
same or similar offenses in Virginia, this court 
must necessarily conclude that a sentence of forty 
years and twenty thousand dollars in fines is so 
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the 
crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the United States Constitution." 
Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 453 (WD Va. 
19 7 7) • 
The Court of Appeals sitting en bane affirmed. 646 F. 2d 123 (CA4 
1981) (per curiam). We reversed in a brief per curiam opinion, 
holding that Rummel had disapproved each of the "objective" factors 
on which the District Court and en bane Court of Appeals purported 
to rely. 454 u.s., at 373. It was therefore clear error for the 
District Court to have been guided by these factors, which, para-
doxically, the Court adopts today. 
2Although Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.s. 263, 274 n. 11 
(1980), conceded that "a proportionality principle [might] come 
into play •• ~ if a legislature made overtime p a rking a felony 
punishable by life imprisonment," the majority has not suggested 
that respondent's crimes are comparable to overtime parking. 
Indeed, re s pondent's seven felonies compare unfavorably with 
Rummel's three. 
- 9 -; 
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Contrary to the Court's interpretation of Hutto, see ante, at 
11 and n. 16, the Hutto Court did not hold that the District Court 
miscalculated in finding Davis' sentence disproportionate to his 
crime. It did not hold that the District Court improperly weighed 
the relevant factors. Rather, it held that the District Court 
clearly erred in even attempting to determine whether the sentence 
was "disproportionate" to the crime. Hutto makes crystal clear 
that under Rummel it is error for appellate courts to second-guess 
legislatures as to whether a given sentence of imprisonment is ex- -
cessive in relation to the crime, 3 as the Court does today. Ante, 
at 16-23. 
JUSTICE POWELL, on~o, stated that "the doctrine of 
stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a consti-
tutional question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society 
' governed by the rule of law." City of Akro~ v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., u.s. --' (1983). I agree. 
While the doctrine of stare decisis does not absolutely bind a 
court to its prior opinions, a decent regard for the orderly devel-
opment of the law and the administration of justice requires that 
3Both Rummel and Hutto v. Davis, 454 u.s. 370 (1982) (per 
curiam), leave open the possibility that in extraordinary cases--
such as a life sentence for overtime parking--it might be 7 
permissible for a court to decide whether the sentence is grossly (7 ~ 
/
disproportionate to the crime. I agree that the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause might apply to those rare cases where 
reasona ble men cannot differ as to the inappropriateness of a 
punishment. ~ n a l l other cases, we must defer to the 
legislature's line-drawing. However, the majority does not 
contend that this is such an extraordinary case that reasonable 
men could not differ about the appropriateness of this 
{-- •. 1 punishment. 
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directly controlling cases be either followed or candidly over-
ruled.4 Especially is this so with respect to two key holdings 
less than three years old. What the Court does today is purely and 
simply visceral jurisprudence. 
II 
Although historians and scholars have disagreed about the 
Framers' original intentions, the more common view seems to be that 
the Framers viewed the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as pro-
hibiting the kind of torture meted out during the reign of the Stu--
arts. 5 Moreover, it is clear that until 1892, over 100 years after 
+~~..-(~ 
7 ~ 
4 I do not read the Court's opinion a that 
respondent's sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of 
I parole is so different from Rummel's sentence of I1te 
i~sonment with the possibility of parole as to permit it to 
apply the proportionality review used in the death penalty cases, 
e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 584 (1977), to the former 
although not the latter. Nor would such an argume nt be tenable. 
As was noted in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 
( 197 6} (opinion of Justice Stewart, JUSTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE 
STEVENS), 
"[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a 
sentence of imprisonment. Death, in its finality, differs more 
from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from 
one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative 
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate 
punishment in a specific case." 
The greater need for reliability in death penalty cases 
cannot·support a distinction betw e en a sentence of life 
i mprisonment with possibility of parole and a sent e nce of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole, especially when an 
execu5ive commutation is permitted as in South Dakota. 
Compare, e.g., Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev 
839 (1969); Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis 
and the Compelling Ca se of William Rummel, 71 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 378, 379 - 382 (1980); Katkin, Habitual Offe nder Laws: 
A Reconsideration, · 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 99, 115 (1971), with, e.g., 
Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Ex amination of 
the Eighth Ame ndment, 24 Stan. L. Re v. 838, 853-855 (1972); 
Footnote continue d on next p a ge. 
- 11 7"" 
' 
the ratification of the Bill of Rights, not a single Justice of 
this Court even asserted the doctrine adopted for the first time by 
the Court today. The prevailing view up to now has been that the 
Eighth Amendment reaches only the mode of punishment and not the 
length of of a sentence of imprisonment. 6 In light of this histo-
ry, it is disingenuous for the Court blandly to assert that "The 
- ....... """'l:a.::-- ........ ~- ..,._..,..,_.._. - ..... 
constitutional principle of proportionality has been recognized 
explicitly in this Court for almost a century." Ante, at 8. That 
statement seriously distorts history and our cases. 
This Court has applied a proportionality test only in extraor-
dinary cases, Weems being one example and the line of capital cases 
another. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 584 (1977); Enmund 
v. Florida, 458 u.s. (1982). The Court's reluctance to give 
legislatures unlimited freedom in choosing which crimes to punish 
by death rests on the uniqueness and finality of the death sen-
Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: 
An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States -
Exces~ive Punishment Doctrine, 24 Buffalo L. Rev. 783 (1975). 
In 1892 , the dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 u.s. 323, 
339-340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting), argued that the Eighth 
Amendment "is directed ..• against all punishments which by their 
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the 
offenses charged." Before and after O'Neil, most authorities 
thought that the Eighth Amendment reached only the mode of 
punishment and not the length of sentences . See, e.g., Note , 24 
Harv. L. Rev . 54, 55 (1910). Even after Weems was decided in 
1910, it was thought unlikely that the Court would extend 
proportionality analysis to cases involving solely sentences of 
imprisonment. See Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 
77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1075 (1964). Until today, not a single 
case of this Court applied the "excessive punishment" doctrine of 
Weems to a punishment consisting solely of a sentence of 
imprisonment, despite numerous opportunities to do so. E.g., 
Hutto v. Davis , 454 u.s. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 
263 (1980); Badders v. United States; 240 U.S. 391 (1916); Graham 
v. West Virginia, 224 u.s. 616 (1912). 
0 
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tence, which calls for exacting procedural limitations to ensure 
that only those most deserving of the death penalty receive it. 
Such scrutiny is not required where only a sentence of imprisonment 
is at stake. 
The Court's traditional abstention from reviewing sentences of 
imprisonment to ensure that punishment is "proportionate" to the 
crime has been well founded. Today's claim by ,five Justices that 
they are able to say that one offense has less "gravity" than an-
other is nothing other than a bald substitution of individual sub-
,....... ............... 
jective moral values for those of the legislature. Nor, as this 
case well illustrates, are we endowed with Solomonic wisdom that 
permits us to draw principled distinctions between a sentence of X 
years and a sentence of X + Y years for "repeaters" who have demon-
strated that they will not abide by the law. The simple truth is 
that "[nJo neutral principle of adjudication permits a federal 
court to hold that in a given situtation individual crimes are too 
trivial in relation to the punishment imposed." Rummel v. Estelle, 
S68 F. 2d 1193, 1201-1202 (CAS) (Thornberry, J., dissenting), va-
cated, S87 F. 2d 6Sl (CAS 1978) (en bane), affirmed, 44S u.s. 263 
(1980). The apportionment of punishment entails, in Justice Frank-
furter's words, "peculiarly questions of legislative policy." Gore 
v. United States, 3S7 u.s. 386, 393 (l9S8). Legislatures are far 
better equipped than we are to balance the competing penal and pub-
lie interests and to draw the essentially arbitrary lines between 
appropriate sentences for different crimes. 
By asserting the power to review sentences of imprisonment for 




unchartable waters. Today it holds that a sentence of life impris-
onment, without the possibility of parole, is excessive punishment 
for a seventh allegedly "nonviolent" felony. How about the eighth 
"nonviolent" felony? The ninth? The twelth? Suppose one offense 
was a simple assault? Or selling liquor to a minor? Or statutory 
rape? Or price-fixing? The permutations are endless ana the 
Court's opinion is bankrupt of realistic guiding principles. In-
stead, it casually lists several allegedly "objective factors" ana 
arbitrarily asserts that they show respondent's sentence to be 
"significantly disproportionate" to his crimes. Ante, at 23. Must 
all these factors be present in order to hold a sentence excessive 
under the Eighth Amendment? How are they to be weighed against 
each other? Suppose several States punish severely a crime that 
the Court views as trivial or petty? Unfortunately, I can see no 
limiting principle in the Court's opinion. · 
Moreover , the Court's decision will flood the appellate courts 
with cases in which equally arbitrary lines must be drawn. It is 
·-
no answer to say that appellate courts must review criminal convic-
tions in any event ; up to now, that review has been on the validity 
of the judgment, not the sentence . Moreover , the vast majority of 
criminal cases are disposed of by pleas of guilty, 7 ana ordinarily 
cases . To require appellate 
as the Court's opinion 
cou to the courts of appeal as 
7 In 1972 , nearly 90% of the convictions 
followed pleas of guilty or nolo contedere . 
Jurisdiction: A General View 36 (1973). 
in federal courts 
H. Friendly , Federal 
'• ' 
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know them." n. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A G~~ 
(1973). This is judicial usur2ation with a vengea~ 
III 
Even if I agreed that the Eighth Amendment prohibits impriso 
-=4: 
ment "disproportionate to the crime committed," ante, at 6, I re-
ject the notion that respondent's sentence is disproportionate to 
his crimes for, if we are to have a system of laws, Rummel -is co 
trolling. 
The differences between this case ana Rummel are insubstan 
tial. First, Rummel committed three truly nonviolent 
while respondent, as noted at the outset, committed seven felo 
four of which cannot fairly be characterized as "nonviolent." At 
driving posed real risk of serious harm to others. It is· 
fortuity that the places respondent burglarized were unoc a no 
that he killed no pedestrians while behind the wheel; w at would 
have happened if a guard hao been on duty during the 
a matter of speculation, but the possibilities shatt the notion 
to bring his conduct into conformity with the m' i mum standards of 
civilized society. Clearly, this diffe rence a sem-
blance of logic in the Court's conclusion tha respondent's sen-
tence constitutes cruel ano unusual punishmen although Rummel's 
oio not. 
The Court's opinion necessarily reduces to the proposition 
~hat a s e ntence of life i mpri s onme nt with the possibility of c ornrnu-
- 15 -
tation, but without possibility of parole, is so much more severe 
--------------------- -than a life sentence with the possibility of parole that one is 
excessive while the other is not. This distinction does not with-
stand scrutiny: a well-behaved "lifer" in respondent's position is 
most unlikely to serve for life. 
It is inaccurate to say, as the Court does, ante, at 22, that 
the Rummel holding relied on the fact that Texas had a relatively 
liberal parole policy. In context, it is clear that the Court's 
discussion of parole merely illustrated the difficulty of comparing -
sentences between different jurisdictions. 445 u.s., at 280-281. 
However, accepting the Court's characterization of Rummel as accu-
rate, the Court today misses the point. Parole was relevant to an 
evaluation of Rummel's life sentence because in the "real world," 
he was unlikely to spend his entire life behind bars. Only a frac-
tion of "lifers" are not released within a relatively few years. 
In Texas, the historical evidence showed that a prisoner serving a 
life sentence could become eligible for parole in as little as 12 
years. In South Dakota, the historical evidence--which the Court's 
op~~ws that sinc~~22 ~ ife sentences have been 
commuted to terms of years, while requests for commutation were 
denied. In short , there is probability that respond-
ent will experience what so experience . Even assum-
ing that at the time of senten ing, respondent was likely to spend 
more time in prison than Rumm 1, 8 that marginal difference is sure-
8 No one will ever know if 
released on parole since he was 
Footnote 
r when Rummel would have been 
released in connection with a 
ntinued ~ext page . 






ly supported by respondent's greater . demonstrated propensity for 
crime--and more serious crime at that. I find it nothing less than 
bizarre for the Court to say that while Rummel's sentence was con-
stitutional, respondent's is "significantly disproportionate to his 
crime," and hence unconstitutional. 
IV 
It is indeed a curious business for this Court to so far in-
trude into the administration of criminal justice to say that a 
state legislature is barred by the Constitution from identifying 
its habitual criminals and removing them from the streets. Surely 
seven felony convictions warrant the conclusion that respondent is 
incorrigible. It is even more curious that the Court should brush 
aside controlling precedents that are barely in the bound volumes 
of United States Reports. The Court would do well to heed the 
words of Justice Black in condemning judges who usurp the policy--
making powers of legislatures under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation: 
"Such unbounded authority in any group of political-
ly appointed or elected judges would unquestionably 
be sufficient to classify our Nation as a governmen t 
of men , not the government of laws of which we 
boast. With a 'shock the conscience ' test of con-
stitutionality, citizens must guess what is the law, 
guess what a majority of nine judges will believe 
fair and reasonable . Such a test wilfully throws 
away the certainty and security that lies in a writ-
separate federal habeas proceeding in 1980. On October 3, 1980, 
a federal District Court granted Rummel's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus on the grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel . Rummel v. Estelle , 498 F. Supp . 793 (WD Tex 1980) . 
Rummel then plead guilty to theft by false pretenses and was 
sentenced to time served under the terms of a plea bargaining 
agreement . Two-Bit Lifer Finally Freed--After Pleading Guilty, 





ten co~stitution, one that. does not alter with a 
judge's health, belief, or his politics." Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 u.s. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
I dissent. 
To: J ustlce 1Jrcnnan 
I. ~ ~J.-.;~-f- k ~ .. '2. Just~ceMarshall Justice White 'tJHI 
' r~~ ____ ~ -~~~-,..I Justice Blaclanun 
2 £•.....,+r-=._.( Justice Powell 
L ~ ... ~~ ~6 _ __, ~ ~st~ce Rehnquist 
f 11~~ ~ · ..--- ' TustlceStevens r· /-'>~ ~ ~ ~--~  ~st~if;r 
l!tte.,._,HA., :.{ "1~1 £1,4..4..L..- ·3 From: The Chief Justice 
f • 4,.......,.~.,...., ~4,t Circulated: _ ______ _ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-492 ' 
HERMAN SOLEM, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. 
JERRY BUCKLEY HELM 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[June - , 1983] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom JUSTICE WHITE, Jus-
TICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting. 
The controlling law governing this case is crystal clear, but 
today the Court blithely discards any concept of stare decisis, 
trespasses gravely on the authority of the States, and dis-
torts the concept of proportionality of punishment by tearing 
it from its moorings in capital cases. Only two Terms ago, 
we held in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), that a 
life sentence "iinpo~ed after only a third nonviolent felony con-
viction did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment. Today, the Court i@ore0ts 
re~n~~ceden! and holds that a life sentence impos~ after 
a seven elony conviction constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment under the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, I reject 
the fiction that all Helm's crimes were innocuous or nonvi-
olent. Among his felonies were three burglaries and a third 
conviction for drunk driving. By comparison Rummel was a 
relatively "model citizen." Although today's holding cannot 
rationally be reconciled with Rummel, the Court doesnot 
purport to overrule Rummel. I therefore dissent. 
I 
A 
The Court's starting premise is that the Eighth Amend-
\ 
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ment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause "prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed." Ante, at 6. What 
the Court means is that a sentence is unconstitutional if it is 
more severe than five justices think appropriate. In short, I 
all sentences of imprisonment are sub· ect to a ellate scru-
t~ t e n e t a t ey are ' proportional" to t e cnme 
committed. 
The Court then sets fQrth three assertedly "objective" fac-
tors to guide the determination of whether a given sentence 
of imprisonment is constitutionally excessive: (1) the "gravity 
of the offense and the harshness ofthe penalty," id., at 11; (2) 
a comparison of the sentence imposed with "sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction," id., at 12 
(emphasis added); (3) and a comparison of "the sentences im-
posed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions." Ibid (emphasis added). In applying this analysis, the 
Court determines that respondent 
''has received the penultimate sentence for relatively 
minor criminal conduct. He has been treated more 
harshly than other criminals in the State who have com-
mitted more serious crimes. He has been treated more 
harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdic-
tion, ... " !d., at 23. (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, the Court concludes, respondent's sentence is 
"significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is ... pro-
hibited by the Eighth Amendment." This analysis is com-
pletely at odds with the reasoning of our recent holding in 
Rummel, in which, of course, JUSTICE POWELL dissented. 
B 
The facts in Rummel bear repeating. Rummel was con-
victed in 1964 of fraudulent use of a credit card; in 1969, he 
was convicted of passing a forged check; finally, in 1973 
Rummel was charged with obtaining money by false pre-
' 
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tenses, which is also a felony under Texas law. These three 
offenses were indeed nonviolent. Under Texas' recidivist 
statute, which provides for a mandatory life sentence upon 
conviction for a third felony, the trial judge imposed a life 
sentence as he was obliged to do after the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty of felony theft. 
Rummel, in this Court, advanced precisely the same argu-
ments that respondent advances here; we rejected those ar-
guments notwithstanding that his case was stronger than re-
spondent's. The test in Rummel whi'ch we rejected would 
have required us to determine on an abstract moral scale 
whether Rummel had received his "just deserts" for his 
crimes. We declined that invitation; today the Court accepts 
it. Will the Court now recall Rummel's case so five justices 
will not be parties to "disproportionate" criminal justice? 
It is true, as we acknoyyledg~Q, ~rnel, that the "Court~ 
has on occasion statedthaf the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to 
the severity of a crime." 445 U.S., at 271. But even a cur 
sory review of our cases shows that this type of proportional-
ity review has been carried out only in a very limited cate-
gory of cases, and never befo e · a case involvin solei a 
se~en.s_e _gf i~i~m~t. In Rumme , we sru he 
proporii"''llaittY c~ of the capital punishment cases was 
inapposite because of the "unique nature of the death pen-
alty .... " I d., at 272. "Because a sentence of death differs 
in kind from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how 
long, our decisions applying the prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishments to capital cases are of limited assistance in 
deciding the constitutionality of the punishment meted out to 
Rummel." Ibid. 
The Rummel Court also rejected the claim that Weems v. 
United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), required it to determine 
whether Rummel's punishment was "disproportionate" to his 
crime. In Weems, the Court had struck down as cruel and 
unusual punishment a sentence of cadena temporal imposed 
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by a Phillipine Court. This bizarre penalty, which was un-
known to Anglo-Saxon law, entailed a minumum of 12 years' 
imprisonment chained day and night at the wrists and ankles, l 
hard and painful labor while so chained, and a number of "ac-
cessories" including lifetime civil disabilities. In Rummel 
the Court carefully noted that "[Weems'] finding of 
disproportionality cannot be wrenched from the facts of that 
case." 445 U. S., at 273. 1 
The lesson the Rummel Court drew from Weems and from 
the capital punishment cases was that the Eighth Amend-
ment did not authorize courts to review sentences of impris-
onment to determine whether they were "proportional" to 
the crime. In language quoted incompletely by the Court, 
ante, at 9, n. 13, the Rummel Court stated: 
"Given the unique nature of the punishments considered 
in Weems and in the death penalty cases, one could arw e,... 
without fear of contradiction by any decision of this 
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifi-
able as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant 
terms of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length 
of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of 
legislative perogative." 445 U. S., at 274. (Emphasis 
added). 
Five Justices joined this clear an<lli!recis~limit~anguage. 
In context it is clear that tllls Co~ Wisiiot ffiel!cly sum-
marizing an argument, as the Court suggests, ante, at 9, n. 
13, but was statin~ affirmative~h~ rule of law laid down. 
This passage "fFFiii~mez isf'O~l)Yan e'X'Pfanati'o; of 
why it is permissible for courts to review sentences of death 
or bizarre physically cruel punishments as in Weems, but not 
sentences of imprisonment. I d., at 274-275. The Rummel 
'Other authorities have shared this interpretation of Weems v. United 
States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910). E. g., Packer, Making the Punishment Fit 
the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1071, 1075 (1964). 
l 
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Court emphasized, as has every opinion in capital cases in the 
past decade, that it was possible to draw a "bright line" be-
tween "the punishment of death and the various other per-
. mutations and commutations of punishment short of that ulti-
mate sanction"; similarly, a line could be drawn between the 
punishment in Weems and "more traditional forms of impris-
onment imposed under the Anglo-Saxon system." I d., at 
275. However, the Rummel Court emphasized that draw-
ing lines between different sentences of imprisonment would 
thrust the Court inevitably "into the basic line-drawing proc-
ess that is pre-eminently the province of the legislature" and 
produce judgments that were no more than the visceral reac-
tions of individual Justices. Ibid. 
The Rummel Court categorically rejected the very analy-
sis adopted by the Court today. Rummel had argued that 
various objective criteria existed by which the Court could 
determine whether his life sentence was proportional to his 
crimes. In rejecting Rummel's contentions, the Court ex-
plained why each was insufficient to allow it to determine in 
an objective manner whether a given sentence of imprison-
ment is proportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. 
First, it rejected the distinctions Rummel tried to draw be-
tween violent and nonviolent offenses, noting that "the ab-
sence of violence does not always affect the strength of soci-
ety's interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a 
particular individual." Ibid. Similarly, distinctions based 
on the amount of money stolen are purely "subjective" mat-
ters of line drawing. !d., at 275-276. 
Second, the Court squarely rejected Rummel's attempt to 
compare his sentence with the sentence he would have re-
ceived in other States-an argument that the Court today ac-
cepts. The Rummel Court explained that such comparisons 
are flawed for several reasons. For one, the recidivist laws 
of the various states vary widely. "It is one thing for a court 
to compare those States that impose capital punishment for a 
specific offense with those States that do not. . . . It is quite 
82--492-DISSENT 
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another thing for a court to attempt to evaluate the position 
of any particular recidivist scheme within Rummel's complex 
matrix." 445 U. S., at 280 (citation and footnote omitted). 
Another reason why comparison between the recidivist stat-
utes of different States is inherently complex is that some 
states have comprehensive provisions for parole and others 
do not. I d., at 280-281. Perhaps most important, such 
comparions trample on fundamental concepts of federalism. 
Different states surely may view particular crimes as more or 
less severe than other states. Stealing a horse in Texas may 
have different consequences and warrant different punish-
ment than stealing a horse in RAhode Island or Washington, 
D. C. Thus, even if the punishment accorded Rummel in 
Texas were to exceed that which he would have received in 
any other State, 
"that severity would hardly render Rummel's punish-
ment 'grossly disproportionate' to his o{fenses or to the 
punishment he would have received in the other States. 
. . . Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity in-
imical to traditional notions of federalism, some State 
will always bear the distinction of treating particular of-
fenders more severely than any other State." 445 U. S., 
at 281-282. (Emphasis added). 
Finally, we flatly rejected Rummel's suggestion that we 
measure his sentence against the sentences imposed by 
Texas for other crimes: 
"Other crimes, of course, implicate other societal inter-
ests, making any such comparison inherently specula-
tive. . . . Once the death penalty and other punish-
ments different in kind from fine or imprisonment have 
been put to one side, there remains little in the way of 
objective standards for judging whether or not a life sen-
tence imposed under a recidivist statute for several sepa-
rate felony convictions not involving 'violence' violates 
82-492-DISSENT 
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the cruel-and-unusual-punishment of the Eighth Arnend-
ment.t• 445 U. S., at 282-283t n. 27. -
Rathert we held that the severity of punishment to be ac-
corded different crimes was peculiarly a matter of legislative 
policy. Ibid. 
In short, Rummel held .that the length of a sentence of 
imprisonmenf 1s a"iiiafter of legislative discretion; this is so 
particularly for recidivist statutes. I simply cannot under-
stand how the Court can square Rummel with its holding 
that "a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime 
for which the defendant has been convicted." Ante, at 11.2 
If there were any doubts as to the meaning of Rummelt 
they were laid to rest last Term in J!.utto v. Dw;ist 454 U. S. 
370 (1982) (per curiam). There a tJruTed States District 
Court held that a 40-year sentence for the possession of nine 
ounces of marijuana violated the Eighth Amendment. The 
District Court applied almost exactly the same analysis 
adopted today by the Court. Specifically, the District Court 
stated: 
"Mter examining the nature of the offense, the legisla-
tive purpose behind the punishment, the punishment in 
the [sentencing jurisdiction] for other offenses, and the 
punishment actually imposed for the same or similar of-
fenses in Virginia, this court must necessarily conclude 
that a sentence of forty years and twenty thousand dol-
lars in fines is so grossly out of proportion to the severity 
of the crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the United States Constitution." 
Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444t 453 (WD Va. 
2 Although Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 274, n. 11 (1980), con-
ceded that "a proportionality principle [might] come into play ... if a legis-
lature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment," 
the majority has not suggested that respondent's crimes are comparable to 
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1977). 
The Court of Appeals sitting en bane affinned. 646 F. 2d 
123 (CA4 1981) (per curiam). We reversed in a brief per 
curiam opinion, holding that Rummel had disapproved each 
of the "objective" factors on which the District Court and en 
bane Court of Appeals purported to rely. 454 U. S., at 373. 
It was therefore clear error for the District Court to have 
been guided by these factors, which, paradoxically, the Court 
adopts today. 
Contrary to the Court's interpretation of Hutto, see ante, 
at 11 and, n. 16, the Hutto Court did not hold that the Dis-
trict Court miscalculated in finding Davis' sentence dispro-
portionate to his crime. It did not hold that the District 
Court improperly weighed the relevant factors. Rather, it 
held that the District Court clearly erred in even embarking 
cs•~a••••l8,... determination whether the sentence 
was "disproportionate" to the crime. Hutto makes crystal 
clear that under Rummel it is error for appellate courts to 
second-guess legislatures · as to whether a given sentence of 
imprisonment is excessive in relation to the crime,3 as the 
Court does today, ante, at 16-23. 
I agree with what the Court stated only days ago, that "the 
doctrine of stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely per-
suasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine that de-
mands respect in a society governed by the rule of law." 
City of Akron v, Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 
3 Both Rummel and Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam), 
leave open the possibility that in extraordinary cases--such as a life sen-
tence for overtime parking-it might be permissible for a court to decide 
whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime. I agree 
that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause nlight apply to those rare 
cases where reasonable men cannot differ as to the inappropriateness of a 
punishment. In all other cases, we should defer to the legislature's line-
drawing. However, the Court does not contend that this is such an ex-
traordinary case that reasonable men could not differ about the appropri-
ateness of this punishment. 
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Inc., -- U. S. --, -- (1983). While _the doctrine of 
stare decisis does not absolutely bind the Court to its prior 
opinions, a decent regard for the orderly development of the 
law and the administration of justice requires that directly 
controlling cases be either followed or candidly overruled. 4 
Especially is this so with respect to two key holdings only 
three years old. 0 fY' 1 s..s, o'1 
II 
Although historians and scholars have disagreed about the 
Framers' original intentions, the more common view seems 
to be that the Framers viewed the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause as prohibiting the kind of torture meted out 
during the reign of the Stuarts. 5 Moreover, it is clear that 
• I do not read the Court's opinion as arguing that respondent's sentence 
of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is so different from 
Rummel's sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole as to 
permit it to apply the proportionality review used m the death penalty 
cases, e. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977), to the former although 
not the latter. Nor would such an argument be tenable. A£ was noted in 
. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (opinion of Justice 
Stewart, JusTICE POWELL, and JUSTICE STEVENS ), 
"[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of 
imprisonment. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment 
than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because 
of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the 
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate pun-
ishment in a specific case." 
The greater need for reliability in death penalty cases cannot support a 
distinction between a sentence of life imprisonment with possibility of pa-
role and a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, espe-
cially when an executive commutation is permitted as in South Dakota. 
5Compare, e. g., Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments In-
flicted": The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 839 (1969); Schwartz, 
Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis and the Compelling Case of 
William Rummel, 71 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 378, 379--382 (1980); 
Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 
99, 115 (1971), with, e. g., Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punish-
ment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 838, 
82-492-DISSENT 
10 SOLEM v. HELM 
until 1892, over 100 years after the ratification of the Bill of 
Rights, not a single Justice of this Court even asserted the 
doctrine adopted for the first time by the Court today. The 
prevailing view up to now has been that the Eighth Amend-
ment reaches only the mode of punishment and not the length 
of of a sentence of imprisonment. 6 In light of this history, it 
is disingenuous for the Court blandly to assert that "[t]he 
constitutional principle of proportionality has been recog-
nized explicitly in this Court for almost a century." Ante, at 
8. That statement seriously distorts history and our cases. 
This Court has applied a proportionality test only in ex-
traordinary cases, Weems being one exa:r:nple and the line of 
capital cases another. See, e. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.- (1982). 
To read the Eighth Amendment as restricting legislatures' 
authority to choose which crimes to punish by death rests on 
the finality of the death sentence. Such scrutiny is not re-
quired where a sentence of imprisonment is imposed after the 
853--855 (1972); Comment, The Eighth Ameruiment, Beccaria, and the 
Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United 
States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 Buffalo L. Rev. 783 (1975). 
• In 1892, the dissent in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 339-340 
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting), argued that the Eighth Amendment ''is di-
rected ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or se-
verity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." Before and 
after O'Neil, most authorities thought that the Eighth Amendment 
reached only the mode of ·punishment and not the length of sentences. 
See, e. g., Note, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 55 (1910). Even after Weems was 
decided in 1910, it was thought unlikely that the Court would extend pro-
portionality analysis to cases involving solely sentences of imprisonment. 
See Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 
1071, 1075 (1964). Until today, not a single case of this Court applied the 
"excessive punishment" doctrine of Weems to a punishment consisting 
solely of a sentence of imprisonment, despite numerous opportunities to do 
so. E. g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370 (1982); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U. S. 263 (1980); Badders v. United States, 240 U. S. 391 (1916); Graham 
v. West Virginia, 224 U. S. 616 (1912). 
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State has identified a criminal offender whose record shows 
he will not conform to societal standards. 
The Court's traditional abstention from reviewing sen-
tences of imprisonment to ensure that punishment is "propor-
tionate" to the crime is well founded in history, in p~rudentlal 
considerations, and in traditions of comity. Today's conclu-
sion by five Justices that they are able to say that one offense 
has less "gravity'' than another is nothing other than a bald 
substitution of individual subjective moral values for those of 
the legislature. Nor, as this case well illustrates, are we en-
dowed with Solomonic wisdom that permits us to draw prin-
cipled distinctions between sentences of different length for a 
chronic "repeater" who has demonstrated that - will not he-
abide by the law. A 
The simple truth is that "[n]o neutral principle of adjudica-
tion permits a federal court to hold that in a given situtation 
individual crimes are too trivial in relation to the punishment 
imposed." Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F. 2d '1193, 1201-1202 
(CA5) (Thornberry, J., dissenting), vacated,- 587 F. 2d 651 
(CA51978) (en bane), aff'd, 445 U. S. 263 (1980). The appor-
tionment of punishment entails, in Justice Frankfurter's 
words, "peculiarly questions of legislative policy." Gore v. 
United States, 357 U. S. 386, 393 (1958). Legislatures are 
far better equipped than we are to balance the competing pe-
nal and public interests and to draw the essentially arbitrary 
lines between appropriate sentences for different crimes. 
By asserting the power to review sentences of imprison-
ment for excessiveness the Court launches into uncharted 
and unchartable waters. Today it holds that a sentence of 
life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, is exces-
sive punishment for a seventh allegedly "nonviolent" felony. 
How about the eighth "nonviolent" felony? The ninth? The 
twelth? Suppose one offense was a simple assault? Or sell-
ing liquor to a minor? Or statutory rape? Or price-fixing? 
The permutations are endless and the Court's opinion is 
.. 
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bankrupt of realistic guiding principles. Instead, it casually 
lists several allegedly "objective" factors and arbitrarily as-
serts that they show respondent's sentence to be "signifi-
cantly disproportionate" to his crimes. Ante, at 23. Must 
all these factors be present in order to hold a sentence exces-
sive under the Eighth Amendment? How are they to be 
weighed against each other? Suppose several States punish 
severely a crime that the Court views as trivial or petty? I 
can see no limiting principle in the Court's holding. 
There is a real risk that this holding will flood the appellate 
courts with cases in which equally arbitrary lines must be 
drawn. It is no answer to say that appellate courts must re-
view criminal convictions in any event; up to now, that re-
view has been on the validity of the judgment, not the sen-
tence. The vast majority of criminal cases are disposed of by 
pleas of guilty, 7 and ordinarily there is no appellate review in 
such cases. To require appellate review of all sentences of 
imprisonment-as the Court's opinion does-Will "administer 
the coup de grace to the courts of appeal as we know them." 
H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 36 (1973). 
This is judicial usurpation with a vengeance; Congress has 1 
pondered for decades the concept of appellate review of sen-
tences and has hesitated to act. 
III 
Even if I agreed that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
imprisonment "disproportionate to the crime committed," 
ante, at 6, I reject the notion that respondent's sentence is 
disproportionate to his crimes for, if we are to have a system 
of laws, not men, Rummel is controlling. 
The differences between this case and Rummel are insub-
stantial. First, Rummel committed three truly nonviolent 
7 In 1972, nearly 90% of the convictions in federal courts followed pleas 
of guilty or nolo contedere. H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General 
View 36 (1973). 
. -
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felonies, while respondent, as noted at the outset, committed 
seven felonies, four of which cannot fairly be characterized as 
"nonviolent." At the very least, respondent's burglaries and 
his third-offense drunk driving posed real risk of serious 
harm to others. It is sheer fortuity that the places respond-
ent burglarized were unoccupied and that he killed no pedes-
trians while behind the whee\?)~hat would have happened if a 
guard had been on duty during the burglaries is a matter of 
speculation, but the possibilities shatter the notion that re-
spondent' · were innocuous, inconsequential, minor, or 
"nonviolent." Fo I repeat, had harsh potentialities for vi-
olence. Respondent, far more than Rummel, has demon-
strated his inability to bring his conduct into conformity with 
the minimum standards of civilized society. Clearly, this dif-
ference demolishes any semblance of logic in the Court's con-
clusion that respondent's sentence constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment although Rummel's did not. 
The Court's opinion necessarily reduces to the proposition 
that a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of 
commutation, but without possibility of parole, is so much 
more severe than a life sentence with the possibility of parole 
that one is excessive while the other is not. This distinction 
does not withstand scrutiny; a well-behaved ''lifer" in re-
spondent's position is most unlikely to serve for life. 
It is inaccurate to say, as 'the Court does, ante, at 22, that 
the Rummel holding relied on the fact that Texas had a rela-
tively liberal parole policy. In context, it is clear that the 
Rummel Court's discussion of parole merely illustrated the 
difficulty of comparing sentences between different jurisdic-
tions. 445 U. S., at 280-281. However, accepting the 
Court's characterization of Rummel as accurate, the Court 
today misses the point. Parole was relevant to an evaluation 
of Rummel's life sentence because in the "real world," he 
was unlikely to spend his entire life behind bars. Only a 
fraction of "lifers" are not released within a relatively few 
.. 
82-492-DISSENT 
14 SOLEM v. HELM 
years. In Texas, the historical evidence showed that a pris-
oner serving a life sentence could become eligible for parole 
in as little as 12 years. In South Dakota, the historical evi-
dence--which the Court's opinion ignores-shows that since 
1964, 22 life sentences have been commuted to terms of 
years, while 25 requests for commutation were denied al-~ 
though they may be reopened. 
In short, there is a significant probability that respondent 
will experience what so many "lifers" experience. Even as-
suming that at the time of sentencing, respondent was likely 
to spend more time in prison than Rummel, 8 that marginal 
difference is surely supported by respondent's greater dem-
onstrated propensity for crime--and for more serious crime 
at that. DV"hiSSton 
IV 
It is indeed a curious business for this Court to so far in-
trude into the administration of criminal justice to say that a 
state legislature is barred by the Constitution from identify-
ing its habitual criminals and removing them from the 
streets. Surely seven felony convictions warrant reasonable 
minds to conclude that respondent is incorrigible. It is 
even more curious that the Court should brush aside control-
ling precedents that are barely in the bound volumes of 
United States Reports. The Court would do well to heed 
Justice Black's comments on judges who usurp the policy-
making powers of legislatures under the guise of constitu-
tional interpretation: 
8 No one will ever know if or when Rummel would have been released on 
parole since he was released in connection with a separate federal habeas 
proceeding in 1980. On October 3, 1980, a federal District Court granted 
Rummel's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Rummel v. Estelle, 498 F. Supp. 793 (WD Tex 
1980). Rummel then plead guilty to theft by false pretenses and was sen-
tenced to time served under the terms of a plea bargaining agreement. 
Two-Bit Lifer Finally Freedr-After Pleading Guilty, Chicago Tribune, 
Nov. 15, 1980, at 2, col. 3. 
J ' •' 
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"Such unbounded authority in any group ()f politically ap-
pointed or elected judges would unquestionably be suffi-
cient to classify our Nation as a government of men, not 
the government of laws of which we boast. With a 
'shock the conscience' test of constitutionality, citizens 
must guess what is the law, guess what a majority of 
nine judges will believe fair and reasonable. Such a test 
wilfully throws away the certainty and security that lies 
in a written constitution, one that does not alter with a 
judge's health, belief, or his politics." Boddie v. 
Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
I dissent. 
lfp/ss 05/21/83 Rider A, p. 16 (Solem) 
SOLEM16 SALLY-POW 
Application of the relevant factors assumes that 
courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, 
at least on a relative scale. In a broad sense this 
assumption is justified, and courts traditionally have 
made these judgments - just as legislatures make them in 
the first instance. Most comparisons of the gravity of 
crimes are close "judgment calls" left to legislative 
bodies responsible for enacting the criminal laws. 
Comparisons can be made in light of harm caused or 
threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability 
of the offender. Thus is Enmund the Court determined that 
murder is more serious than aiding and abetting murder, 
and a line customarily is drawn between intent to commit a 
2. 
crime and the actual consummation of the intent. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative 
seriousness of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The 
Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual 
Differences, 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 224, 237 (1974). For 
example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent 
crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or 
the threat of violence. Indeed, the State concedes that 
crimes against people generally are more serious than 
crimes against property. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16. 
Note to Mike: Your subpart B (p. 16-18) is excellent. I 
have merely reframed the first two paragraphs. Tell me 
3. 
about the Rossi article that you cite. I generally avoid 
citing even law review articles in the text. 
lfp/ss 05/21/83 Rider A, p. 14 (Solem} 
SOLEM14 SALLY-POW 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth 
Amendment, courts should be guided by objective factors 
that our cases have recognized. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 
U.S., at 373-374, n. 2~ Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S., at 
275-276. 
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SOLEM14 SALLY-POW 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth 
Amendment, courts should be guided by objective factors 
that our cases have recognized. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 
U.S., at 373-374, n. 2: Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S., at 
275-276. 
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SOLEM16 SALLY-POW 
Application of the relevant factors assumes that 
courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, 
at least on a relative scale. In a broad sense this 
assumption is justified, and courts traditionally have 
made these judgments - just as legislatures make them in 
the first instance. Most comparisons of the gravity of 
crimes are close "judgment calls" left to legislative 
bodies responsible for enacting the criminal laws. 
Comparisons can be made in light of harm caused or 
threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability 
of the offender. Thus is Enmund the Court determined that 
murder is more serious than aiding and abetting murder, 
and a line customarily is drawn between intent to commit a 
2. 
crime and the actual consummation of the intent. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative 
seriousness of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The 
Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual 
Differences, 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 224, 237 (1974). For 
example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent 
crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or 
the threat of violence. Indeed, the State concedes that 
crimes against people generally are more serious than 
crimes against property. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16. 
Note to Mike: Your subpart B (p. 16-18) is excellent. I 
have merely reframed the first two paragraphs. Tell me 
... . 
3. 
about the Rossi article that you cite. I generally avoid 
citing even law review articles in the text. 
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Suggested Revision of Footnote 15: 
15. Contrary to the repeated assertion in the 
dissenting opinion, we neither say nor imply that "all 
sentences of imprisonment are 
scrutiny to ensu that they ar 
ect to appellate 
1 proportional 1 to the 
crime committed." {Post, at 2!; 7, 13}. We do say, in 
accord with decisions of tqJs Court, that the principle of 
proportionality is inherent in the Eighth Amendment. 
[cites] In view, however, of the substantial deference 
that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts 
we anticipate that there will be relatively few occasions 
for appellate review -- as has been true in the past • 
... ' 
HN15R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83 Helm: n. 15 rider 
I propose revising footnote 15, on page 11, as follows: 
15In view of the substantial deference properly due to legisla-
tures and sentencin courts, will 
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HN12.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83 Helm: new n. 12.5 rider 
I propose adding a new footnote at the end of Part II.B, 
on page 9, as follows: 
~ ~ 
~ the Court has continued to recognize that the Eighth Amend-
~~ ment proscribes grossly disproportionate punishments, even when 
~( 
it has not been necessary to rely on the proscription. See, 
e.g., [citations] •12 • 5 
~~-. !JI< 
J.A--
12.5The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any 
concept of stare decisis." Post, at 1; cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14. 
On the contrary, with 
this Court's u.s. 
263 (1980). See n. 30, infra. It is rather the dissent that 
""' t. Jf~s o discard prior precedent. Its assertion that the Eighth 
Amendment establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality 
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HN13R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83 Helm: n. 13 rider 
I propose revising footnote 13, on page 9, as follows: 
13According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445-a .. s .. -~63--f~989t7- 11 one 
could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this 
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as 
felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of impris-
onment in a state penitentiary,-...... the length of sentence actu-
ally imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative. 11 
:te .. 445 u.s., at 274 (emphasis added}. The Court did not adopt 
the standard proposed, but merely recognized that the argument 
was possible. 
To the extent that the State--or the dissent, see post, at 4--
makes this argument here, we find it meritless. The class of 
11 Cr imes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies 11 is 
less as an Ei hth Amendment -is invariabl based on its le al conse uences. See, e •• 
9 
11 18 u.s.c. §1(1}. The effect of this standard would be absurd~· 1 -
il - I 
(: ( when a State concededly may punish a crime by imprisonment for a 
\ year, it could punish the crime by life imprisonment without>§ 
\ sibili ty -
'\ 
~dt~t;/ ,.~,. .. ~ t:C. 
c...,~ ~ (' "' 
~ ~~ 
~ ,.c. 
HN15R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83 Helm: n. 15 rider 
I propose revising footnote 15, on page 11, as follows: 
15 rn view of the substantial deference properly due to legisla-
tures and sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will 
not be required to engage in extended analysis to determine that 
a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate. The dissent , 
thus exaggerates the difficulties that appellate courts will face 
in applying the Eighth Amendment. See post, at 2, 12. An appel-
late court need not decide if a sentence is "correct"~ it need 
only decide if the sentence is within constitutional limits. 
I 
HN16R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83 Helm: n. 16 rider 
I propose revising footnote 16, on page 11, as follows: 
16The dissent concedes--as it must--that some sentences of im-
prisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional 
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Post, at 8, n. 
3; cf. id., at 7, n. 2. The dissent, however, offers no m&e~tr~  
guidance to enable courts to recognize these admittedly rare 
cases. We prefer to reiterate the objective factors that our 
cases have recognized. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 
584, 592 {1977) {plurality opinion). As the Court has indicated, 
no one factor will be dispositive in a given case. See Hutto v. 
Davis, 454 u.s. 370, 373-374 n. 2 {1982) {per curiam); Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S., at 275-276. The inherent nature of our feder-
al system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions 
result in a wide range of constitutional sentences. Thus nNo 
single criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly dis-
proportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment. See Jef-
fries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in 
the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L.J. 1325, 1376-1377 {1979). But a 
combination of objective factors can make such analysis possible. 
? 
l 
HN27.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83 Helm: new n. 27.5 rider 
I propose adding a new footnote near the bottom of page 22 as 
follows: 
no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years, 
while parole--where authorized--has been granted regu-
larly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. 27.5 
1~~ 
27.Sd'~the--la-s- <' eight years, over 100 requests for commutation 
I ~ave been denied. See app. 22-26. Although 22 life sentences 
I 
, 
were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975, see app. 
29; but see n. 28, infra, we do not have complete figures on the 
number of requests that were denied during the same period. We 
know only that at least 35 requests were denied. See app. 22-26. 
In any event, we believe that past practice--particularly the 
practice of ~ decade ago--is not a reasonable indicator of future 
performance when the relevant decision is left to the Governor's 
dirl.. ~ t-L . , 
unfettered discretibn. Even/ if a particular Governor were to -
comm.u..t.e ....ev.eu aen.t,ence, ther-e is no reason to believe that his 
succesSO! would continue the practice. Indeed, the best indica-
tion we have of Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that 
his request [hasS al~ad~ been denied. App. 26. 
HN30R-MICHAL-POW 06/23/83 Helm: new n. 30 rider 
I propose adding a new footnote after the penultimate sentence, 
on page 23, as follows: 
We conclude that his [Helm's] sentence is significantly dispro-
portionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. 30 
30cont~ary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our 
conclusion today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle. The 
Rummel Court recognized--as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n. 
3--that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate 




the dissent today--offered no eaningfu~ ~ 
~·nen an Eighth Amendment violation he¥¥ 
occurred, it is controlling only in a similar factual situation. --- ,....,.... 
.-"' h • --------- • • .-'! I --rn t 1s case, Helm's cr 1mes were about as ser 1ous as Rummt!L s. 
See supra, at 1-3, and 16-17. His sentence, however, is far more 
{ 
than Rummel's. See supra, at 17-18, and 20-23. Thu~ 
is ~ot controlling. ------.. ---·-· _ .. oJI 
HN12.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: new n. 12.5 rider 
I propose adding a new footnote at the end of Part II.B, 
on page 9, as follows: 
And the Court has continued to recognize that the Eighth Amend-
ment proscribes grossly disproportionate punishments, even when 
it has not been necessary to rely on the proscription. See, 
e.g., [citations] .12 • 5 
125The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any 
concept of stare decisis." Post, at 1~ cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14. 
On the contrary, our decision is entirely consistent with this 
Court's prior cases--including Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 
(1980). See n. 30, infra. It is rather the dissent that would 
discard prior precedent. Its assertion that the Eighth Amendment 
establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is con-
trary to the entire line of cases cited in the text. 
These are (he Ct-trreat 
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HN13R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: n. 13 rider 
I propose revising footnote 13, on page 9, as follows: 
13According to Rummel v. Estelle, "one could argue without fear 
of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes 
concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as 
punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state peni-
tentiary, the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a 
matter of legislative prerogative." 445 U.S., at 274 (emphasis 
added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but mere-
ly recognized that the argument was possible. 
To the extent that the State--or the dissent, see post, at 4--
makes this argument here, we find it meritless. The class of 
"crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies" is 
meaningless as an Eighth Amendment standard. Legislatures do not 
simply define crimes and classify them as felonies or misdemean-
/11444 ,.aq~ 
ors. Within the broad class of felonies, there ~ is a wi~e range 
I\ 
---------c~-----------~------------------~~= 
Hl5R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: page 15 rider 
I propose adding the following paragraph on page 15. To place 
~
the new paragraph in context, I reprint the last two sentences of 
the paragraph before and the first sentence of the paragraph that 
follows. Except as marked, I have made no changes in these para-
graphs. Since the new paragraph is entirely new, I have left it 
unmarked so e easier to read. It may be a bit 
longer than you had anticipated, but I think it is justified for 
two reasons. First, it is our strongest line-drawing example. 
--~--~~~~----'-~~~--~­Although there is good language in Baldwin spec1 1cally about 
sentencing, the Barker analysis is closer to our present inquiry. 
Second, this section was a little light. You will recall that in 
the first two drafts we discussed Williams v. Florida, Apodaca v. 
Oregon, Ballew v. Georgia, and Burch v. Louisiana at this point. 
Since JUSTICE BLACKMUN was mentioned by name, he asked us to de-
lete that paragraph. The new paragraph is shorter than the one 
we deleted. 
Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are not unique to 
this area. The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar 
lines in a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment offers two good examples. A State 
speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the 
right in the particular context of the case II Barker v. 
page 2. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (unanimous opinion). In Barker, 
we identified some of the objective factors that courts should 
consider in determining whether a particular delay was excessive. 
Id., at 530. None of these factors is "either a necessary or 
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right 
of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be 
considered together with such other circumstances as may be rele-
vant." Thus the type of inquiry that a court 
~L~ ..L,"':... .. tJt1~~ 
should conduct to determine if a given sentence is disp~o~rt~ 
I\ 
Id. , at 533. 
ate is j)<Y similar to the type of inquiry required by the Speedy 
Trial Clause.* 
The s~~~fi -Ameru:lmefl~- right to a jury trial is another 
example. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), in particular, 
illustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and of-
fers guidance on the method by which some lines may be drawn. 
* [If you think it would be helpful, I could add a footnote 
explaining a further parallel between the Speedy Trial 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause: all trials 
e subject to appellate scrutiny to ensure that they are suffi-
ciently "speedy," just as all sentences are subject to appellate 
~utiny to ensure that they are proportionate, but in both cases 
reviewing courts often can dismiss such claims summarily. This, 
of course, would tie in with footnote 15. We might even say that 
we are confident courts can handle proportionality claims because 
they have been able to handle speedy trial claims, where the 
line-drawing is at least as difficult.] 
HN27.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: new n. ~ rider 
2~ 
New footnote near the bottom of page 22: 
Our ing these eight years, over 100 requests for commutation 
have been denied. See app. 22-26. Although 22 life sentences 
were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975, see app. 
29; but see n. __ , infra, we do not have complete figures on the 
number of requests that were denied during the same period. We 
are told only that at least 35 requests were denied. See app. 
22-26. In any event, past practice in this respect--particularly 
the practice of a decade ago--is not a reliable indicator of fu-
ture performance when the relevant decision is left to the unfet-
tered discretion of each Governor. Indeed, the best indication 
we have of Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that his 
request already has been denied. App. 26. 
HN30R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: new n. iD rider 
32 
New footnote after the penultimate sentence on page 23: 
Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our 
conclusion today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle. The 
Rummel Court recognized--as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n. 
3--that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate 
that they violate the Eighth Amendment. 445 u.s., at 274, n. 11. 
Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 454 u.s., at 374, and n. 3, makes clear 
that Rummel should not be read to foreclose proportionality re-
view of sentences of imprisonment. Rummel did reject a proper-
tionality challenge to a particular sentence. But since the 
Rummel Court--like the dissent today--offered no standards for 
determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, it 
is controlling only in a similar factual situation. Here the 
facts are clearly distinguishable. Whereas Rummel was eligible 
for a reasonably early parole, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to 
life with no possibility of parole. See supra, at ____ , and 
lfp/ss 06/24/83 Rider A, p. 11 (Solem) 
SOLll SALLY-POW 
Revise footnote 15 to read as follows: 
15. Contrary to the repeated assertions in the 
dissenting opinion, post, at 2, 7, 13, we do not adopt or 
imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of 
sentences. Absent statutory authority, is not the role of 
an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court as to the appropriateness of a particular 
sentence~ rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the 
appellate court decides only whether the sentence under 
review is within constitutional limits. In view of the 
substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures 
and sentencing courts a reviewing court rarely will be 
2. 
required to engage in extended analysis to determine that 
a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate. 
lfp/ss 06/24/83 Rider A, p. 11 (Solem) 
SOLll SALLY-POW 
Revise footnote 15 to read as follows: 
15. Contrary to the repeated assertions in the 
dissenting opinion, post, at 2, 7, 13, we do not adopt or 
imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of 
sentences. Absent statutory authority, is not the role of 
an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of 
the trial court as to the appropriateness of a particular 
sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the 
appellate court decides only whether the sentence under 
review is within constitutional limits. In view of the 
substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures 
and sentencing courts a reviewing court rarely will be 
2. 
required to engage in extended analysis to determine that 
a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate. 
HN16R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: n. 16 rider 
I propose revising footnote 16, on page 11, as follows: 
16The dissent concedes--as it must--that some sentences of im-
prisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional 
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Post, at 8, n. 
3: cf. id., at 7, n. 2. · .9foffers no guild~ 
t2.4- -h, ~ ~~ ~ ~"7-:<. " 
te ~e CQI.ute, te :r.:Jieegnizs the~ adrni ttedly rare cases. We 
1\ ~ 
~Qfer t:e reiterate the objective factors that our cases have 
recognized. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 584, 592 
(1977) (plurality opinion) . As the Court has indicated, no one 
factor will be dispositive in a given case. See Hutto v. Davis, 
454 u.s. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam): Rummel v. Es-
telle, 445 U.S., at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal 
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions re-
sult in a wide range of constitutional sentences. Thus no single 
criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly dispropor-
tionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries & 
Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Crim-
inal Law, 88 Yale L.J. 1325, 1376-1377 (1979). But a combination 
of objective factors can make such analysis possible. 
HN27.5R-MlCHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: new n. 27.5 rider 
I propose adding a new footnote near the bottom of page 22 as 
follows: 
In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over eight years, 
App. 29, while parole--where authorized--has been granted regu-
larly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. 27 5 
275nuring these eight years, over 100 requests for commutation 
have been denied. See app. 22-26. Although 22 life sentences 
were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975, see app. 
29: but see n. 28, .infra, we do not have complete figures on the 
number of requests that were denied during the same period. We 
~ .fobl-
~ ~ only that at least 35 requests were denied. See app. 22-26. 
" ~~~ 
In any event, w~l;t'll't! t!h!M: past practice--particularly the 
practice of a decade ago--is not a ~~dicator of future 
performance when the relevant decision is left to the unfettered 
discretion of each Governor. Indeed, the best indication we have 
of Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that his request 
already has been denied. App. 26. 
HN30R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: new n. 30 rider 
I propose adding a new footnote after the penultimate sentence, 
on page 23, as follows: 
We conclude that his [Helm's] sentence is significantly dispro-
portionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment.30 
30contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our 
conclusion today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle. The 
Rummel Court recognized--as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n. 
3--that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate 
that they violate the Eighth Amendment. 445 U.S., at 274, n. 11. 
Since Rummel--like the dissent today--offered no standards for 
determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, it 
is controlling only in a similar factual situation. Here the 
facts are clearly distinguishable. Whereas Rummel was eli9ible 
for a reasonably early parole, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to 
life with no possibility of parole. -%A-~fifs-ease7-He~m~s-epfmes 
wePe-aee~~-as-sePfe~s-as-R~mme~~s~--see-s~~P~,-a~-~-37-aAe-~6-~+~ 
Hfs- seA~eAee7 - fiewe¥eP7 - fs- £ap -mef'e- se¥ePe- ~A aft- R~mme~~s~- See 
supra, at 17-18, and 20-23. ~fi~s-R~mme~-fs-Ae~-eeft~Pe~~fft~~ 
~.; ~ ~~~ ~~}./~. 
4S''+ tL-.s. a.--f 3-11.1-, ~ 
~~4~~~ 
 &-{ ~~ ~ /.~~~_,....-..u-~ 
~~%~~.~~~ 
HN12.5R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: new n. ~ rider 
13 
New footnote at the end of Part II.B, on page 9: 
The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any con-
cept of stare decisis." Post, at 1; cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14. On 
the contrary, our decision is entirely consistent with this 
Court's prior cases--including Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.s. 263 
(1980) • See n. ___ , infra. It is rather the dissent that would 
discard prior precedent. Its assertion that the Eighth Amendment 
establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is con-
trary to the entire line of cases cited in the text. 
HN13R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: n. 'J!t rider 
1'1 
Revised footnote 13, on pages 9-10: 
13According to Rummel v. Estelle, "one could argue without fear 
of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes 
concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as 
punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state peni-
tentiary, the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a 
matter of legislative prerogative." 445 U.S., at 274 (emphasis 
added}. The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but mere-
ly recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that 
the State--or the dissent, see post, at 4--makes this argument 
here, we find it meritless. 
HN15R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: n. ~ rider 
/h 
Revised footnote 15, on page 11: 
15contrary to the dissent's suggestions, post, at 2, 12, we do 
not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of appellate review 
of sentences. Absent statutory authority, it is not the role of 
an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sen-
tence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate 
court decides only whether the sentence under review is within 
constitutional limits. In view of the substantial deference that 
must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing 
court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to 
determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportion-
ate. 
HN16R-MICHAL-POW 06/24/83 Helm: n. lr rider 
If-
Revised footnote 16, on page 11: 
16The dissent concedes--as it must--that some sentences of im-
prisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional 
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Post, at 8, n. 
3; cf. id., at 7, n. 2. It offers no guidance, however, as to 
how courts are to judge these admittedly rare cases. We reiter-
ate the objective factors that our cases have recognized. See, 
e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion). As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be disposi-
tive in a given case. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 u.s. 370, 373-374 
n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.s., at 275-
276. The inherent nature of our federal system and the need for 
individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide range of 
constitutional sentences. Thus no single criterion can identify 
when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates 
the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presump-
tions, and Burden of Proof in the Crimina! Law, 88 Yale L .J. 
1325, 1376-1377 (1979). But a combination of objective factors 
can make such analysis possible. 
H7R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: page 7 rider 
Additional language on page 7: 
Indeed, one of the consistent themes of the era was that Ameri-
cans had all the rights of English subjects. See, e.g., 1 J. 
Continental Congress 83 (Ford ed. 1904) (Address to the People of 
Great Britain, Oct. 21, 1774) ("we claim all the benefits secured 
to the subject by the English constitution"); 1 American Archives 
700 (4th series 1837) (Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774) ("his 
Majesty's subjects in America are entitled to the same 
rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellow-subjects in 
Great Britain"). Thus our Bill of Rights was designed in part to 
ensure that these rights were preserved. Although the Framers 
may have intended the Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of 
its English counterpart, their use of the language of the English 
Bill of Rights is convincing proof that they intended to provide 
at least the same protection 
Hl5R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: page 15 rider 
Additional language on page 15: 
offers two good examples. A State is constitutionally required 
to provide an accused with a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Caro-
lina, 386 u.s. 213 (1967), but the delay that is permissible must 
be determined on a case-by-case basis. 11 [A] ny inquiry into a 
speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the 
right in the particular context of the case II Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (unanimous opinion). In Barker, 
we identified some of the objective factors that courts should 
consider in determining whether a particular delay was excessive. 
Id., at 530. None of these factors is 11 ei ther a necessary or 
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right 
of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be 
considered together with such other circumstances as may be rele-
vant. 11 Id., at 533. Thus the type of inquiry that a court 
should conduct to determine if a given sentence is constitution-
ally disproportionate is similar to the type of inquiry required 
by the Speedy Trial Clause. 
The 
HNlOR-MICHAL-POW 06/26/83 Helm: n. 10 rider 
Revised footnote 10, on page 7: 
The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, §9 of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), authored by George Mason. 
He, in turn, had adopted verbatim the language of the English 
Bill of Rights. There can be no doubt that the Declaration of 
Rights guaranteed at least the liberties and privileges of En-
glishmen. See A. Nevins, The American States During and After 
the Revolution 146 (1924) (Declaration of Rights "was a restate-
ment of English principles--the principles of Magna Charta ..• 
and the Revolution of 1688")~ A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede: 
Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 205-207 (1968). As 
Mason himself had explained: "We claim Nothing but the Liberties 
& Privileges of Englishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had 
still continued among our Bretheren in Great Britain ••.• We have 
received [these rights] from our Ancestors, and, with God's 
Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired to our Posterity." Let-
ter to "the Committee of Merchants in London" (June 6, 1766), 
reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 71 (Rutland ed. 1970)~ 
cf. the Fairfax County Resolves (1774) (colonists entitled to all 
"Privileges, Immunities and Advantages" of the English Constitu-
tion), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 201. 
HN13R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: new n. 13 rider 
New footnote 13, on page 9: 
The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any con-
cept of stare decisis." Post, at 1; cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14. On 
the contrary, our decision is entirely consistent with this 
Court's prior cases--including Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 
(1980) . See n. 32, infra. It is rather the dissent that would 
discard prior precedent. Its assertion that the Eighth Amendment 
establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is con-
trary to the entire line of cases cited in the text. 
HN14R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: new n. 14 rider 
new footnote 14, on pages 9-10: 
According to Rummel v. Estelle, "one could argue without fear 
of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes 
concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as 
punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state peni-
tentiary, the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a 
matter of legislative prerogative." 445 U.S., at 274 (emphasis 
added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but mere-
ly recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that 
the State--or the dissent, see post, at 4--makes this argument 
here, we find it meritless. 
HN16R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: new n. 16 rider 
new footnote 16, on page 11: 
Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, post, at 2, 12, we do 
not adopt or imply approval of a general rule of appellate review 
of sentences. Absent statutory authority, it is not the role of 
an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sen-
tence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate 
court decides only whether the sentence under review is within 
constitutional limits. In view of the substantial deference that 
must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing 
court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to 
determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportion-
ate. 
HN17R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: new n. 17 rider 
new footnote 17, on page 11: 
The dissent concedes--as it must--that some sentences of im-
prisonment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional 
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Post, at 8, n. 
3: cf. id., at 7, n. 2. It offers no guidance, however, as to 
how courts are to judge these admittedly rare cases. We reiter-
ate the objective factors that our cases have recognized. See, 
e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion). As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be disposi-
tive in a given case. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373-374 
n. 2 (1982) (per curiam): Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S., at 275-
276. The inherent nature of our federal system and the need for 
individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide range of 
constitutional sentences. Thus no single criterion can identify 
when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates 
the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presump-
tions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L. J. 
1325, 1376-13 77 (1979) . But a combination of objective factors 
can make such analysis possible. 
HN29R-MICHAL-POW 06/26/83 Helm: new n. 29 rider 
New footnote 29, on page 22: 
The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota 
occurred in 1975. App. 29. During the eight years since then, 
over 100 requests for commutation have been denied. See id., at 
22-26. Although 22 life sentences were commuted to terms of 
years between 1964 and 197 5, see id. , at 29: but see n. 30, 
infra, we do not have complete figures on the number of requests 
that were denied during the same period. We are told only that 
at least 35 requests were denied. See app. 22-26. In any event, 
past practice in this respect--particularly the practice of a 
decade ago--is not a reliable indicator of future performance 
when the relevant decision is left to the unfettered discretion 
of each Governor. Indeed, the best indication we have of Helm's 
chance for commutation is the fact that his request already has 
been denied. Id., at 26. 
HN30R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: new n. 30 rider 
New footnote 30, on page 22: 
The record indicates that the prisoner whose life sentence was 
commuted in 1975, see n. 29, supra, still has not been paroled. 
App. 29. 
HN32R-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: new n. 32 rider 
New footnote 32, on page 23: 
Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our 
conclusion today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle. The 
Rummel Court recognized--as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n. 
3--that some sentences of imprisonment are so disproportionate 
that they violate the Eighth Amendment. 445 U.S., at 274, n. 11. 
Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S., at 374, and n. 3, makes clear 
that Rummel should not be read to foreclose proportionality re-
view of sentences of imprisonment. Rummel did reject a propor-
tionality challenge to a particular sentence. But since the 
Rummel Court--like the dissent today--offered no standards for 
determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, it 
is controlling only in a similar factual situation. Here the 
facts are clearly distinguishable. Whereas Rummel was eligible 
for a reasonably early parole, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to 
life with no possibility of parole. See supra, at ___ , and 
mfs 05/24/83 
second draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment pro-
scribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a sev-
~ 
])o~0~& e~ ~~. ~~ . ~ 
enth nonviolent felony. 
~~~~~o~~ 
Dakota had convicted respond-~~· 
I 
By 1975 the State of Sou 
(/\ ~ 
ent Jerry Helm of six( nonviol~ felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of --t hird-degree burglary • 1 In 1972 he 
was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
"1}-f~\ 
~ . r 
(r~-k 
In 1973 ~~·I" 
h,r~ tJ" 
,.,-trttt • 
p~to"i'~) 1In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two ' .. 
sections of the South Dakota criminal code: vl~~tf 
t>-1AM~t 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the 
nighttime with intent to commit a crime but under such 
circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the 
first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third de-
gree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any build-
ing within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not 
forming a part thereof, or any building or part of any 
building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as 
defined in §32-14-1, or any structure or erection in 
which any property is kept, with intent to commit lar-
ceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-9 (1967) (re-
pealed 1976) • 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essen-
tially the same. See S.D. Code §13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 
1965 S.D. Laws, ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by 
"imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term not exceed-
ing fifteen years." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-10 (1967) (pre-
viously codified at S.D. Code §13.3705 (3) (1939)) (repealed 
1976) • 









second draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 page 2. 
he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he was convicted 
of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 The record contains 
no details about the circumstances of any of these offenses, ex-
2In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any 
false token or writing, or other false pretense, 
obtains from any person any money or property • • • is 
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary 
not exceeding three years or in a county jail not ex-
ceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding three 
times the value of the money or property so obtained, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
3In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of 
personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with in-
tent to deprive another thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-37-1 
(1967) (repealed 1976). Grand larceny and petit larceny were 
distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the 
following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding 
fifty dollars: 
(2) When such property, although not of a value ex-
ceeding fifty dollars, is taken from the person of an-
other: 
~~ (3) When such property is livestock. 
~ ~t~arceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. 
dJZ-~ ~ Laws Ann. §22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
~:L Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state 
r ., penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the 
L; v., 
v>o county jail not exceeding one year." 37-3 (1967) (repealed 1976) • S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-
4A third offense of driving while under the influence of al-
cohol is a felony in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws §32-23-4 
(1976). See 1973 S.D. Laws, ch. 195, §7 (enacting version of 
§32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
second draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 page 3. 
cept that they were all nonviolent, none was a crime against a 
person, and alcohol was a contributing factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are those 
given by Helm to the state trial court: 
"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places.'" State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., d1ssenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no 
account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D. 
Codified Laws §22-6-1 (6) (1979) (now codified at §22-6-1 (7) 
(Supp. 1982)). As a result of his criminal record, however, Helm 
was subject to South Dakota's recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal 
felony, the sentence-tor the principal felony shall be 
enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. 
Codified Laws §22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
5The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or repre-
sentative of another for present consideration with 
intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial 
institution knowing at the time of such passing that he 
or his principal does not have an account with such 
financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony." 
S.D. Codified Laws §22-41-1.2 (1979). 
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The maximum penalty for a •class 1 felony• e ife imprisonment 
in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand dollar 
fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(now codified at S.D. Codified Laws S22-6-l (3) (Supp. 1982)). 
Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is 
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not 
6when Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law 
classified felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are 
divided into the following seven classes which are dis-
tinguished from each other by the respective maximum 
penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary. A lesser sentence may not be giv-
en for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-
five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
( 3) Class 2 felony: twenty-£ i ve years imprisonment 
in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine 
of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in 
the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of 
fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of ten 
thousand dollars may be imposed; 
( 6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of five 
thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary or a fine of two thousand 
dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sen-
tences for habitual criminals •••• 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by 
law, every offense declared to be a felony and not oth-
erwise classified is a Class 6 felony." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 
and 1980). 
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eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. 
Codified Laws §24-15-4 (1979}. The Governor 1 is authorized to 
pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, S.D. Const., 
Art. IV, §3, but no other relief from sentence is available even 
to a rehabilitated risoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the 
South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under §22-7-8. The court explained: 
"'I think you certainly earned this sentence and cer-
tainly proven that you're an habitual criminal and the 
record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation 
and that the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up 
for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have 
further victims of your crimes, just be coming back 
before Courts. You' 11 have plenty of time to think 
this one over.'" State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 500 
(Henderson, J., d1ssenting} (quoting S.D. Circuit 
Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County 
(Parker, J.}} • 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed the 
sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the Eighth 
Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentia-
ry, he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a fixed 
term of years. Such a commutation would have had the effect of 
making Helm eligible to be considered for parole when he had 
served three-fourths of his new sentence. See S.D. Codified Laws 
7The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make rec-
ommendations to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws §24-14-1 (1979}: 
§24-14-5: S.D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982) , but the 
Governor is not bound by the recommendation, §24-14-5. 
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S24-15-5 (3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's rE!quest in May 
1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
~A. 
Helm ~ District Court for the District of South Dakota. 
~ ..._/ \, \ ......... 
/ 
'j 
argued, among other things, that his sentence constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Although the District Court recognized that the sentence 
was harsh, it concluded that this Court's recent decision in 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.S. 263 (1980) , was dispositive. It 
therefore denied the writ. 
The--united States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir- stJ:: 
cuit reversed. 684 F.2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals noted 
that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's sentence of 
life without parole was qualitatively different from Rummel's J.s ~~ 
.rl~o 
life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota 
has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of the criminal justice 
system. The Court of Appeals examined the nature of Helm's of-
fenses, the nature of his sentence, and the sentence he could 
have received in other States for the same offense. It conclud-
ed, on the basis of this examination, that Helm's sentence was 
"grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." 684 
F.2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue 
the writ unless the State resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
{ Recognizing the important Eighth Amendment question pre-
sented ~his case, we granted certiorari. 459 u.s. (1982). 
We now affirm. 
CJ~ 
;jll.V 
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II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not only bar-
baric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate 
to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate 
to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-
~urisprudence.8 In 1215,~~~~am&±~, three chapters of Mag-
na Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 9 may not be ~~v-
~~ v excessive. 10 
Cf.A Or' 






First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 (1275). These were 
not hollow guarantees, for the royal courts relied on them to 
invalidate disproportionate punishments. See, e.g., Le Gras v. 
wt ~~eJ 
n~ue ~t'6 
t1'l f,.. 8The principle is by no means original to the common law. It 
~~teA of was a recognized limitation on punishments in biblical times. 
See Exodus 21:23-25; Leviticus 24:19-20; Deuteronomy 19:19, 21. 
~~~~ is 
c,&~ri"' ' 9An amercement ~ similar to a modern-day fine. It was the 
ev ~ most common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 
,r l (1-, 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 
~ ~ (2d ed. 1909). 
D ll\ or '-' V..J! lOchapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced 
l-z.: ~. r for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a 
\'lJ'? great crime according to the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Cod-
prVtl ified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna Carta more grateful to 
the mass of the people •••• " F. Maitland, Pleas of the Crown for 
the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted the 
same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same 
rights to the clergy. 
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Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y .B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 
(C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52 Selden Society 3 (1934). When pris-
on sentences became the normal criminal sanctions, the common law 
recognized that these, too, must be proportional. See, e.g. , 
Hodges v. Hum kin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 
(K.B. 1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of 
proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor exces-
sive Fines imposed nor cruel! and unusual! Punishments 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the pre-
cise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punish-
ment ••• should not be, by reason of its excessive length or se-
verity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." R. 
Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959): see 4 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries *16-19 (1769): see also id., at *16-17 (in condemn-
ing "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean 
severe or excessive). Indeed, barely three months after the Bill 
~~ of Rights was adopted, the House of Lords declared that a "fine 
~4r'Q of thirty thousand pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench 
~ J. upon the earl of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against 
h1 \) ·'\ 
v'b ~~""' magna charta, the common right of the subject, and against the 
~J~ law of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 
_,/ r-i· 
c_y ~.r (1689) • 
·\4~,...,t'\"' When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
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language of the English Bill of Rights, 11 they also adopted the • 
English principle of proportionality. The people were guaranteed ;/'~ ~ 
the rights they had pos~essed ~En~lish subjects--including the ~~ 
right to be free from excessive punishments. A-rtc-~~ ~:t 
,<.---~ .f-1,.__~ ~ ~. 
~--<>\ ~ ~0, 
B t-:~ ..... ~-
U Nl, 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been 
recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 12 In 
the leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 u.s. 349 (1910}, 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document 
and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form of impris-
onment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil 
~ .,j-~ r-+ l- . ~ f J$/l '1 c.- ( , 9' 'Z ~.~ 
disabilities.--The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice 
A 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
offense," id., at 367, and held that the sentence violated the 
Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of propor-
tionality as a constitutional standard, see, e.g., id., at 372-
11This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, Art. I, §9. 
12In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 u.s. 323 (1892}, the defendant had 
been conv1cted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor 
without authority," and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. 
The majority did not reach O'Neil's contention that this sentence 
was unconstitutional, for he did not include the point in his 
assignment of errors or in his brief. Id., at 331. Furthermore, 
the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not apply to 
the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. Id., at 336-337. 
The dissent, however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, ob-
~(~~ serving that it "is directed ••• against all punishments which by 
J 4 __ ~ their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to 
~ Jo 1 the offences charged." Id., at 339-340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
c;-b ~~1'"1W" CnJ . 
~ ~ ~"''ll 4 ..L. wl!..? l 
'tT Dffi' (\~ j 
(o./\tN\l-4-t~~ 
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373, and determined that the sentence before it was "cruel in its 
excess of imprisonment," id., at 377. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a 
criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 u.s. 660 
(1962) • 13 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for the 
crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The Court 
explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the ab-
stract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." Id., at 
667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric pun-
ishment. "But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. 
Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment 
for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of 
proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 u.s. (1982) (death 
penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant did not take -rz --t' .:-- (fi-~
life, attempt to take life, or intend ~o take life or that lethal 
force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 u.s. 584, 592 (1977) (plu-
rali ty opinion) ("sentence of death is grossly disproportionate 
and excessive punishment for the crime of rape"); id., at 601 
(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) ("ordinarily death is disproportionate punishment for the 
crime of raping an adult woman"). And the Court has continued to 
13Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of 
proportionality in the meantime. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 
u.s. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring); id., at 125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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recognize that the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly dispropor-
tionate punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely 
on the proscription. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s. 678, 
685 (1978) ; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) ; Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, 
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, 
and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) . (recognizing that some prison sen-
tences may be constitutionally disproportionate); . Rummel v. Es-
telle, 445 u.s., at 274, n. 11 (same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the 
general principle of proportionality does not apply to felony 
prison sentences. 14 The constitutional language itself suggests 
no exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, fines, 
14According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.s. 263 (1980), "one 
could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of th1s 
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as 
felonies ••• the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a 
matter of legislative prerogative." Id., at 274 (emphasis 
added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but mere-
ly recognized that the argument was possible. 
To the extent that the State seeks to make this argument here, 
we reject it. Although courts should be reluctant to invalidate 
legislative judgments, we have a constitutional duty to ensure 
that legislative judgments are consistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 u.s. , (1982). 
The class of "crimes concededly classifieaiand classifiable as 
felonies" is of little assistance as an Eighth Amendment stand-
ard. The definition of a felony is invariably based on its legal 
consequences. See, e.g., 18 u.s.c. Sl(l). The effect of this 
standard would be absurd: when a State concededly may punish a 
crime by imprisonment for a year, it could punish the crime by 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 
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and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 u.s., at 664, and 
the text is explicit that bail and fines may not be excessive. 
It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine 
and the greater punishment of death were both subject to propor-
tionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprison-
ment were not. There is also no historical support for such an 
exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth 
Amendment clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that pris-
on sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. See, e.g., 
Weems, 217 u.s., at 377: cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s., at 685 
("Confinement in a prison is a form of punishment subject to 
scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in f 
capital cases, we have drawn no distinction h h imprisonment. 
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s., at 176 (opinion of Stewart, POW-
ELL, and STEVENS, JJ.) • It is true that the "penalty of death 
differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in de-
gree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 408 u.s. 238, 306 (1972) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). As a result, "our decisions [in] cap-
ital cases are of limited assistance in deciding the consti tu-
tionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case. Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 u.s., at 272. All this means, however, is that, 
"[o] utside the context of capital punishment, successful chal-
lenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be 1 
exceedingly rare," 15 ibid. (emphasis added): see Hutto v. Davis, 
Footnote(s) 15 will appear on following pages. 
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454 u.s., at 374. It does not mean that proportionality analysis 
is entirely inapplicable in noncapital cases. 
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. 
As a matter of theory, therefore, every sentence is subject to 
challenge on constitutional grounds. Reviewing courts should 
grant considerable deference to the broad authority that legisla-
tures possess in determining the types and limits of punishments 
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts pos-
in sentencing convicted criminals. Thus in most cases it 
not require extended analysis to determine that a sentence 
not constitutionally disproportionate. See, e.g., Badders v. 
States, 240 u.s. 391, 394 (1916) (seven concurrent five-
~~~~~~~~ 
and $7,000 fine for seven counts of mail fraud). But 
is per se constitutional. As the Court noted in Rob-
lnson v. California, 370 u.s., at 667, a single day in prison may 
be unconstitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment, 
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases have 
recognized. First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the 
15In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to 
be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. 
But clearly no sentence short of death would be unconstitutional 
for Enmund's crime. 
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harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court ex-
amined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great de-
tail. 458 u.s., at In Coker the Court considered the 
seriousness of the crime of rape, and compared it to other 
crimes, such as murder. 433 u.s., at 597-598 (plurality 
opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). In Robinson the emphasis was 
placed on the nature of the "crime." 370 u.s., at 666-667. And 
~~tinheweems, the Court's opinion commented in two separate places on 
~ ...... 4 pettiness of the offense. 217 u.s., at 363 and 365. Of 
~ ~ course, a court must consider the severity of the penalty in de-
~iding whether it is disproportionate. See, e.g .. Coker, 433 
u.s., at 598 (plurality opinion); Weems, 217 u.s., at 366-367. 
~~~~ Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
~ posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more seri-
-f> .H · ous crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious 
~ '(o~ penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue 
~~ ~ay be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted that all of the 
vJIA0lt. ~ other felony murderers on death row in Florida were more culpable 
tA ("" --.{ ap \( {~ than the petitioner there. 458 U.S., at • The Weems Court 
fh'~ f).il' 
~p ~ ,~, identified an impressive list of more serious crimes that were 
~t ·f~ ~ubject to less serious penalties. 217 u.s., at 380-381 • 
. .,nt• ~ rt · 
~"~ 6'(1;\"- Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sen-
~'l\ . ~ tences imposed for commission of the same crime in other JUris-
dictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review of 
capital punishment statutes and determined that "only about a 
third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant 
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[such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 u.s., at 
Even in those jurisdictions, however, the death penalty was al-
most never imposed under similar circumstances. Id., at 
~1 Jf The Court's review of foreign law also supported its conclusion. 
~t -h Id., at __ , n. 22. The analysis in Coker was essentially the 
~---same. 4 3 3 U.S • , at 59 3-5 9 7 • And in Weems the Court relied on 
~·~\, the fact that, under federal law, a similar crime was punishable 
~ ... ~~ by only two year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 u.s., at 380. 
,..\'~ Cf. TroE v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opin-
/ ion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the 
Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, includ-
ing (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the pen-
al ty; ( i i) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are 
competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a rela-
tive scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments--just as legisla-
tures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons can be 
made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus in Enmund the 
Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not so serious 
as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, there are widely shared 
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views as to the relative seriousness of crimes. See Rossi, 
Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Struc-
ture and Individual Differences, 39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 
(1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent 
crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the 
threat of violence. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16 (State recognizes 
that law protects people before property). 
There are other widely held principles that courts may 
apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. 
Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious than steal-
ing a hundred dollars--a point recognized in statutes distin-
guishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e.g., S.D. Codified 
Laws S22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Other things being equal, murder-
ing two people is more serious than murdering one. See, e.g., 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 279, S69 (a) (8) (West Supp. 1982). Few 
would dispute that a lesser included offense should not be pun-
ished more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is 
justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168, 
169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 u.s. 973 
(1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 N .E. 2d 
815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than robbery)1 Cannon 
v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P.2d 233, 235 (1955) (rape more 
serious than assault with intent to commit rape). It is also 
~ widely recognized that attempts are less serious than completed 
~ crimes. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-4-1 (1979)1 4 Black-
at~}_/ : ;y"7 . ~ ~. 
(lr -rv~ -/u~~ 
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stone *15. Similarly, an accessory after the fact should not be 
subject to a higher penalty than the principal. See, e.g., 18 
u.s.c. §3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are 
again clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court . looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill ~ determin~at he was less culpable than his accomplices. 
458 u.s., at Most would agree that neglig-ent conduct is 
less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for exam-
ple, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of seriousness as 
follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing acts, intentional 
acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified Laws §22-1-2 (1) (f) 
(Supp. 1982). A court is also entitled to look at a defendant's 
motive in committing a crime. As Blackstone observed, "theft, in 
case of hunger, is far more worthy of compassion, than when com-
mitted through avarice, or to supply one in luxurious excesses." 
4 Blackstone *15; cf. In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073 
(1974) (furnishing heroin to fellow addict going through with-
drawal not so serious as sale for profit). Similarly, a murder 
is more serious when it is committed pursuant to a contract. 
See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 279, §69 (a) (5) (West Supp. 
1982). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illus-
trates that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing 
the severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the 
difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions be-
tween similar crimes. 
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Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of course, 
is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the 
death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather 
than degree. 1 6 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not 
so much one of ordering, but one of line-drawing. It is clear 
that a 25-year sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year 
sentence, 17 but in most cases it would be more difficult to de-
cide whether the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the 
latter does not. Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are 
not unique to this area. The courts are constantly called upon 
to draw similar lines in a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example. 
In Williams v. Florida, 399 u.s. 78 (1970), the Court upheld a 
criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member jury, and in 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 u.s. 404 (1972), we upheld a conviction 
returned by ten members of a 12-member jury. In Ballew v. Geor-
~, 435 U.s. 223 (1978) , however, we reversed a conviction re-
turned by a unanimous 5-member jury. JUSTICE BLACKMON "readily 
admit[ted] that we d[id] not pretend to discern a clear line be-
16There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment 
and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 u.s. 25 (1972). 
17The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, 
depending upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
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tween six members and five." Id., at 239 (opinion of BLACKMUN, 
J.). He nevertheless found a difference between them of "consti-
tutional significance." Ibid.~ cf. id., at 245-246 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. 
Louisiana, 441 u.s. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction returned 
by five members of a 6-member jury: 
"[W)e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a 
bright line below which the number of jurors partici-
pating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit 
the jury to function in the manner required by our pri-
or cases. But ••• it is inevitable that lines must be 
drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial 
right is to be preserved." Id., at 137 (citations 
omitted). ---
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-
drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the 
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v. New York, 
399 u.s. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a defendant has a 
right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for more than six 
months is authorized." Id., at 69 (plurality opinion). In 
choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclu-
sively on the fact that only New York City denied the right to a 
jury trial for an offense punishable by more than six months. As 
JUSTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn--on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone--between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." 
Id., at 72-73. 
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In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly may 
distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. It also 
supports our holding that courts should look to the practices in 
other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences 
should be drawn. 
IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider 
the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's 
argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to 
save an otherwise unconstitutional sentence. 
A ...--
P,~ 
~~tperson could commit.• 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a 
State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 501 (Bender-
~~ son, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor threat of 
~ · violence to any person. The $100 face value of Helm • s •no ac-
tt ~ount" check was not trivial, but neither was it a large amount. 
~ ~tflr~'A o' ne 
v-· hundred dollars was less than half the amount South Dakota 
required for a felonious theft. 18 It is easy to see why such a 
18If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash 
register, S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-l (1979), or defrauding 
someone of $100, §22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, 
§22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, S22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit 
card to obtain $100, S22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, S22-30A-10, 
he would not be in prison today. All of these offenses would 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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crime is viewed by society as among the less serious offenses. 
See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender •19 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely 
than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, can-
not be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although 
classified as felonies, were all relatively minor. 20 All were 
nonviolent and none was a crime against a person. As the State 
conceded at oral argument, the three third-degree burglary con-
victions could have been the result of stealing three loaves of 
f 
.r-~ ~ ~ li::~· c.T+~ a._fS.......::.~ R~·~~) 
brea • Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. There was also no minimum amount in 
the statute against obtaining money under false pretenses. See 
n. 2, supra. Helm's "grand larceny" may have been no more than 
have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. S22-30A-17 (amended 1982). 
Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check against insufficient 
funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would have been 
guilty of a misdemeanor. §§22-41-1. Under South Dakota law 
~
here is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for 
large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. 
22-41-1.2. 
19we must focus on the principal felony--the felony that trig-
gers the life sentence--since Helm already has paid the penalty 
for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize that Helm's 
prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision. 
20Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a 
professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to al-
cohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record 
involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him 
for life without possibility of parole is unlikely to advance any 
of the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial 
way. Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pur-
sue clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem. 
second draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 page 22. 
the theft of a chicken. See n. 3, supra. On its face, Helm's 
most serious crime was a felony . case of driving while intoxicat-
ed, but he served barely nine months for that offense, Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 17. Such a short sentence 21 suggests that the particu-
lar circumstances of Helm's conduct were not considered to be so 
serious by the South Dakota authorities. 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole. 22 Barring executive clemency, see infra, 
at ___ , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peni-
tentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was likely to 
have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his initial con-
finement, 23 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. See 445 
u.s., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is more severe than any other 
sentence the State could have imposed on any crimina! for any 
crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital punishment, a penalty 
not authorized in South Dakota when Helm was sentenced, exceeds 
it. 
21The sentence was well below that authorized for even the 
least serious felony in South Dakota. See note 6, supra. It was 
also shorter than the sentences Helm served for other minor 
crimes. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. 
22we raise no question as to the general validity of sentences 
without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is 
whether, in the circumstances of this case and in light of the 
constitutional principle of proportionality, the sentence imposed 
on this petitioner violates the Eighth Amendment. 
23we note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight (f0~ 
months of the Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 
16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
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We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was sen-
tenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a life sen-
tence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws §22-16-12 (1979) (amended 
1980), and was authorized to impose a life sentence for treason, 
S22-8-l, first degree manslaughter, §22-16-15, kidnapping, §22-
19-1, and first degree arson, 22-33-1. No other crime was pun-
ishable so severely on the first offense. Attempted murder, §22-
4-1 (5), placing an explosive device on an aircraft, §22-14A-5, 
and first degree rape, §22-22-1 (amended 1980 and 1982), were 
only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot, S22-10-5, was only a 
Class 3 felony. Distribution of heroin, §§22-42-2 (amended 
1982), 34-20B-13 (7) (1977), and aggravated assault, §22-18-1.1 
(amended 1980 and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analy-
sis, but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under §22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or third 
conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, kidnap-
ping, or first degree arson, and a life sentence would have been 
authorized when a second or third conviction was for such crimes 
as attempted murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, 
or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7-8, under which Helm was 
sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convic-
tions, regardless of the crimes. 
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were neces-
sarily punished by life imprisonment: murder; and treason, first 
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degree manslaughter, kidnapping, or first degree arson on a sec-
ond or third offense. There was a larger group for which life 
imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sentencing 
judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, kidnapping, 
or first degree arson~ attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a second or third 
offense~ and any felony after three prior offenses. Finally, 
there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life 
imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of 
heroin dealing or aggravated assault. 
In any rational system, criminals committing these of-
fenses would be thought more deserving of punishment than one 
uttering a "no account" check--even when the bad-check writer had ., fl.:He ,, 
already committed six ~iR&r felonies. Furthermore, there is no 
indication in the record that any habitual offender other than 
Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the basis of 
comparable crimes. It is more likely that the possibility of 
life imprisonment under S22-7-8 generally is reserved for crimi-
nals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while habitual bad-check 
writers receive more lenient treatment. 24 We can only conclude 
24The State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the 
Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment 
under S22-7-8 is discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for 
Petitioner 22. Helm, however, has challenged only his own sen-
tence. No one suggests that §22-7-8 may not be applied constitu-
tionally to fourth-time heroin dealers or other violent crimi-
nals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Un-
lik~ Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent w1 th both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See 
Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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that Helm has been treated in the same manner as, or more severe-
ly than, criminals who have committed far more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals 
found that "Helm could have received a life sentence without pa-
role for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F.2d, 
at 586, and we have no reason to doubt its finding. See Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that 
Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 
50 States. But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without 
possibility of parole is merely authorized in these circum-
stances. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §207. 010 ( 2) (1981) • We are not 
advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses 
were so minor, actually has received the maximum penalty in Neva-
da. 25 It appears that Helm was treated more severely than he 
would have been in any other State. 
L. Rev. 1119, 1160 (1979). 
25under Nev. Rev. Stat. §207.010(2), a court is authorized to 
impose a sentence of "imprisonment in the state prison for life 
with or without possibility of parole. If the penalty fixed by 
the court is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, 
eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years has been 
served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far 
more serious than Helm's. See, e.g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 
778, 617 P.2d 1302 (1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-
felon, two instances of driving an automobile without the owner's 
consent, four first degree burglaries, two sales of marijuana, 
two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of heroin, one 
escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
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B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially 
the same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute Helm's 
sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, that the 
South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally different from 
the parole system that was before us in Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular 
part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it 
is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. The law 
generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to be con-
sidered for parole, and details the standards and procedures ap-
plicable at that time. See, e.g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal 
Inmates, 442 u.s. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole 
procedures)~ Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471, 477 (1972) ("the 
practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their 
sentences has become an integral part of the penological 
system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at least to some ex-
tent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other 
hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor 
may commute a sentence at any time for any reason without refer-
ence to any standards. See, e.g., Connecticut Board of Pardons 
v. Dumschat, 452 u.s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between 
parole and commutation in our prior cases. 26 Writing on behalf 
Footnote(s) 26 will appear on following pages. 
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of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER con-
trasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an ad hoc exer-
cise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprison-
ment of convicted criminals." 408 u.s., at 477. In Dumschat, 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained that "there is a vast dif-
ference between a denial of parole ••• and a state's refusal to 
commute a lawful sentence." 452 u.s., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply on the 
existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked to the pro-
visions of the system presented, including the fact that Texas 
had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits 
to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a pris-
oner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as 
little as 12 years." 445 u.s., at 280. A Texas prisoner became 
eligible for parole when his calendar time served plus "good con-
duct" time equaled one-third of the maximum sentence imposed or 
20 years, whichever is less. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 
26In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the 
possibility of commutation is not equivalent to the possibility 
of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish [ed] Rummel from a 
person sentenced under a recidivist statute like [Miss. Code Ann. 
599-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for a sentence of life 
without parole." 445 u.s., at 281. But the Mississippi Consti-
tution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal 
and penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." 
Art. 5, §124. The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized 
that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a 
convict's sentence. See Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 
603-604, 73 So.2d 137, 139-140 (1954). The Rummel Court gave no 
weight to the possibility of executive clemency. 
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42.12, Sl5(b) (Vernon 1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days 
good-time per 30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 
O.T. 1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., 
Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus Rummel could have 
been eligible for parole in as few as 10 years, and could have 
expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in 
only 12 years. 
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles is 
authorized to make commutation recommendations to the Governor, 
see n. 7, supra, but §24-13-4 provides that "no recommendation 
for the commutation of ••• a life sentence, or for a pardon ••• , 
shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of 
the board." In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over 
) ~ o.....;-r -~~)~~~/ 
eight years, App. 29, while parole has been granted regularly 
-1 
during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if 
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible to be 
considered for parole.27 Not only is there no guarantee that he 
would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole system is far more 
stringent than the one before us in Rummel. Helm would have to 
serve three-fourths of his revised sentence before he would be 
eligible for parole, §24-15-5, and the provision for good-time 
27The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Da-
kota occurred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the 
prisoner in question has still not been paroled. App. 29. 
second draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 page 29. 
credits is far less generous, §24-5-1. 28 
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a 
hope for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little differ-
ent from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence under the 
Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare possibility would 
make judicial review under the Eighth Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate 
sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been 
treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have 
committed more serious crimes. He has been treated more harshly 
than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the pos-
sible exception of a single State. We conclude that his sentence 
is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
28Assume, for example, that Helm had been sentenced to a term 
of 40 years--his approximate life expectancy in 1979. Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for 
parole until he had served over 21 years. This is more than 
twice as long as the Rummel minimum. And this comparison is gen-
erous to South Dakota's position. If Rummel had been sentenced 
to 40 years rather than life, he could have been eligible for 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment pro-
scribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a sev-
enth nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary • 1 In 1972 he 
1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two 
sections of the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the 
nighttime with intent to commit a crime but under such 
circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the 
first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third de-
gree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any build-
ing within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not 
forming a part thereof, or any building or part of any 
building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as 
defined in §32-14-1, or any structure or erection in 
which any property is kept, with intent to commit lar-
ceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-9 (1967) (re-
pealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essen-
tially the same. See S.D. Code §13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 
1965 S.D. Laws, ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by 
"imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term not exceed-
ing fifteen years." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-10 (1967) (pre-
viously codified at S.D. Code §13.3705 (3) (1939)) (repealed 
1976). 
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was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 In 1973 
he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he was convicted 
of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 The record contains 
no details about the circumstances of any of these offenses, ex-
2In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any 
false token or writing, or other false pretense, 
obtains from any person any money or property • • • is 
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary 
not exceeding three years or in a county jail not ex-
ceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding three 
times the value of the money or property so obtained, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §22-41-4 {1967) {repealed 1976). 
3In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of 
personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with in-
tent to deprive another thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-37-1 
{1967) {repealed 1976). Grand larceny and petit larceny were 
distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the 
following cases: 
{1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding 
fifty dollars; 
{2) When such property, although not of a value ex-
ceeding fifty dollars, is taken from the person of an-
other; 
{3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §22-37-2 {1967) {repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by 
penitentiary not exceeding ten years 
county jail not exceeding one year." 
37-3 {1967) {repealed 1976). 
"imprisonment in the state 
or by imprisonment in the 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-
4A third offense of driving while under the influence of al-
cohol is a felony in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws §32-23-4 
{1976). See 1973 S.D. Laws, ch. 195, §7 {enacting version of 
§32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
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cept that they were all nonviolent, none was a crime against a 
person, and alcohol was a contributing factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are those 
given by Helm to the state trial court: 
"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places.'" State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no 
account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now codified 
at S.D. Codified Laws §22-6-1 (7) (Supp. 1982)). As a result of 
his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dakota's 
recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal 
felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be 
5The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or repre-
sentative of another for present consideration with 
intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial 
institution knowing at the time of such passing that he 
or his principal does not have an account with such 
financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony." 
S.D. Codified Laws §22-41-1.2 (1979). 
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enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. 
Codified Laws §22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment 
in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand dollar 
fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(now codified at S.D. Codified Laws §22-6-1 (3) (Supp. 1982)). 
6when Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law 
classified felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are 
divided into the following seven classes which are dis-
tinguished from each other by the respective maximum 
penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary. A lesser sentence may not be giv-
en for a Class A felony~ 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-
five thousand dollars may be imposed~ 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment 
in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine 
of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed~ 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in 
the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of 
fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed~ 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of ten 
thousand dollars may be imposed~ 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of five 
thousand dollars may be imposed~ and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary or a fine of two thousand 
dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sen-
tences for habitual criminals •••• 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by 
law, every offense declared to be a felony and not oth-
erwise classified is a Class 6 felony." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 
and 1980). 
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Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is 
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not 
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. 
Codified Laws §24-15-4 {1979). The Governor 7 is authorized to 
pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, S.D. Const., 
Art. IV, §3, but no other relief from sentence is available even 
to a rehabilitated prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the 
South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under §22-7-8. The court explained: 
"'I think you certainly earned this sentence and cer-
tainly proven that you're an habitual criminal and the 
record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation 
and that the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up 
for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have 
further victims of your crimes, just be coming back 
before Courts. You' 11 have plenty of time to think 
this one over."' State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 500 
{Henderson, J., dissenting) {quoting S.D. Circuit 
Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County 
{Parker, J.)) • 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed the 
sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the Eighth 
Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentia-
ry, he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a fixed 
term of years. Such a commutation would have had the effect of 
7The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make rec-
ommendations to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws §24-14-1 {1979): 
§24-14-5: S.D. Executive Order 82-04 {Apr. 12, 1982), but the 
Governor is not bound by the recommendation, §24-14-5. 
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making Helm eligible to be considered for parole when he had 
served three-fourths of his new sentence. See S.D. Codified Laws 
§24-15-5 (3) (1979). The Governor denied Helm's request in May 
1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm 
argued, among other things, that his sentence constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Although the District Court recognized that the sentence 
was harsh, it concluded that this Court's recent decision in 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.s. 263 (1980), was dispositive. It 
therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed. 684 F.2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals noted 
that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's sentence of 
life without parole was qualitatively different from Rummel's 
life sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota 
has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of the criminal justice 
system. The Court of Appeals examined the nature of Helm's of-
fenses, the nature of his sentence, and the sentence he could 
have received in other States for the same offense. It conclud-
ed, on the basis of this examination, that Helm's sentence was 
"grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." 684 
F.2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue 
the writ unless the State resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
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In view of the important Eighth Amendment question pre-
sented by this case, we granted certiorari. 459 U.S. {1982). 
We now affirm. 
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not only bar-
baric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate 
to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate 
to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-
law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna Carta were 
devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not be excessive. 9 
And the principle was repeated and extended in the First Statute 
of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 {1275). These were not hollow 
8An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the 
most common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 
2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 
{2ded.l909). 
9chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced 
for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a 
great crime according to the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Cod-
ified Laws, p. 4 {1978) {translation of Magna Carta). According 
to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna Carta more grateful to 
the mass of the people •.•• " F. Maitland, Pleas of the Crown for 
the County of Gloucester xxxiv {1884). Chapter 21 granted the 
same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same 
rights to the clergy. 
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guarantees, for the royal courts relied on them to invalidate 
disproportionate punishments. See, e.g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of 
Bishop of Winchester, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316}, 
reprinted in 52 Selden Society 3 (1934}. When prison sentences 
became the normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized 
that these, too, must be proportional. See, e.g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K. B. 1615} 
(Croke, J.} ("imprisonment ought always to be according to the 
quality of the offence"}. 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of 
proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor exces-
sive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments 
inflicted." 1 w. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689}. Although the pre-
cise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punish-
ment ••• should not be, by reason of its excessive length or se-
verity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." R. 
Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959}; see 4 w. Blackstone, 
Commentaries *16-19 (1769}; see also id., at *16-17 (in condemn-
ing "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean 
severe or excessive}. Indeed, barely three months after the Bill 
of Rights was adopted, the House of Lords declared that a "fine 
of thirty thousand pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench 
upon the earl of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against 
magna charta, the common right of the subject, and against the 
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law of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 
(1689}. 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the 
English principle of proportionality. The people were guaranteed 
the rights they had possessed as English subjects--including the 
right to be free from excessive punishments. 
B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been 
recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In 
the leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910}, 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document 
and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form of impris-
onment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil 
disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
10This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, Art. I, §9, authored by George Mason. 
11In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 u.s. 323 (1892}, the defendant had 
been conv1cted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor 
without authority," and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. 
The majority did not reach O'Neil's contention that this sentence 
was unconstitutional, for he did not include the point in his 
assignment of errors or in his brief. Id., at 331. Furthermore, 
the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not apply to 
the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. Id., at 336-337. 
The dissent, however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, ob-
serving that it "is directed ..• against all punishments which by 
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to 
the offences charged." Id., at 339-340 (Field, J., dissenting}. 
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offense," id., at 367, and held that the sentence violated the 
Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of propor-
tionality as a constitutional standard, see, e.g., id., at 372-
373, and determined that the sentence before it was "cruel in its 
excess of imprisonment," id., at 377. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a 
criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 
(1962) •12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for the 
crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The Court 
explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the ab-
stract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." Id., at 
667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric pun-
ishment. "But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. 
Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment 
for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of 
proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 u.S. (1982) (death 
penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant did not take 
life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be taken or 
that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 
(1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is grossly dispro-
portionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape"); id., 
12Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of 
proportionality in the meantime. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 
u.s. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring); id., at 125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
" 
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at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) ("ordinarily death is disproportionate punish-
ment for the crime of raping an adult woman"). And the Court has 
continued to recognize that the Eighth Amendment proscribes 
grossly disproportionate punishments, even when it has not been 
necessary to rely on the proscription. See, e.g., Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 
651, 667 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171-172 (1976) 
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Da-
vis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportion-
ate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S., at 274, n. 11 (same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the 
general principle of proportionality does not apply to felony 
prison sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests 
no exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, fines, 
and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S., at 664, and 
the text is explicit that bail and fines may not be excessive. 
13According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.s. 263 (1980), "one 
could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this 
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as 
felonies ••. the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a 
matter of legislative prerogative." Id., at 274 (emphasis 
added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but mere-
ly recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that 
the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless. 
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It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine 
and the greater punishment of death were both subject to proper-
tionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprison-
ment were not. There is also no historical support for such an 
exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth 
Amendment clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that pris-
on sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. See, e.g., 
Weems, 217 u.s., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S., at 685 
("Confinement in a prison is a form of punishment subject to 
scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in 
capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with imprisonment. 
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 176 (opinion of Stewart, POW-
ELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the "penalty of death 
differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in de-
gree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 408 u.s. 238, 306 (1972) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). As a result, "our decisions [in] cap-
i tal cases are of limited assistance in deciding the consti tu-
tionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case. Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 U.S., at 272. All this means, however, is that, 
"[o] utside the context of capital punishment, successful chal-
lenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] 
exceedingly rare," 14 ibid. (emphasis added); see Hutto v. Davis, 
14 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to 
be excessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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454 u.s., at 374. It does not mean that proportionality analysis 
is entirely inapplicable in noncapital cases. 
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. 
Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substantial deference 
to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining 
the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the 
discretion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted 
criminals. 15 But no penalty is per se constitutional. As the 
Court noted in Robinson v. California, 370 u.s., at 667, a single 
day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment, 
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases have 
recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the offense and 
But clearly no sentence short of death would be unconstitutional 
for Enmund's crime. 
15In view of the substantial deference properly due to legis-
latures and sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally 
will not be required to engage in extended analysis to determine 
that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate. 
16As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be disposi-
tive. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 u.s. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) (~ 
curiam)~ Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S., at 275-276. The inherent 
nature of our federal system and the need for individualized sen-
tencing decisions result in a wide range of constitutional sen-
tences. No single criterion can identify when a sentence is so 
grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amendment. 
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the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court 
examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great de-
tail. 458 U.S., at In Coker the Court considered the 
seriousness of the crime of rape, and compared it to other 
crimes, such as murder. 433 u.S., at 597-598 (plurality 
opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part). In Robinson the emphasis was 
placed on the nature of the "crime." 370 u.s., at 666-667. And 
in Weems, the Court's opinion commented in two separate places on 
the pettiness of the offense. 217 U.S., at 363 and 365. Of 
course, a court must consider the severity of the penalty in de-
ciding whether it is disproportionate. See, e.g., Coker, 433 
U.S., at 598 (plurality opinion); Weems, 217 u.s., at 366-367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more seri-
ous crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious 
penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue 
may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted that all of the 
other felony murderers on death row in Florida were more culpable 
than the petitioner there. 458 U.S., at The Weems Court 
identified an impressive list of more serious crimes that were 
subject to less serious penalties. 217 u.s., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sen-
tences imposed for commission of the same crime in other juris-
dictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review of 
capital punishment statutes and determined that "only about a 
third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant 
CHAMBERS DRAFT: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 page 15. 
[such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 U.S., at 
Even in those jurisdictions, however, the death penalty was al-
most never imposed under similar circumstances. Id., at 
The Court's review of foreign law also supported its conclusion. 
Id., at ___ , n. 22. The analysis in Coker was essentially the 
same. 433 U.S., at 593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on 
the fact that, under federal law, a similar crime was punishable 
by only two year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U.S., at 380. 
Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.s. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opin-
ion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the 
Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, includ-
ing (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the pen-
alty: ( i i) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction: and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are 
competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a rela-
tive scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments--just as legisla-
tures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons can be 
made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus in Enmund the 
Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not so serious 
as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, there are widely shared 
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views as to the relative seriousness of crimes. See Rossi, 
Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Struc-
ture and Individual Differences, 39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 
(1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent 
crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the 
threat of violence. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recog-
nizes that the criminal law is more protective of people than 
property) . 
There are other widely accepted principles that courts 
may apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the vic-
tim or society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be rele-
vant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious than 
stealing a hundred dollars--a point recognized in statutes dis-
tinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e.g., S.D. Codi-
fied Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would dispute that a 
lesser included offense should not be punished more severely than 
the greater offense. Thus a court is justified in viewing as-
sault with intent to murder as more serious than simple assault. 
See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d 168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (~ 
curiam), cert. denied, 430 u.s. 973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. 
State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed rob-
bery more serious than robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 
632, 281 P.2d 233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault 
with intent to commit rape) • It is also widely re.cogni zed that 
attempts are less serious than completed crimes. See, e.g., S.D. 
Codified Laws §22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, an 
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accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher penal-
ty than the principal. See, e.g., 18 u.s.c. §3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are 
again clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 u.s., at Most would agree that negligent con-
duct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for 
example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of seriousness as 
follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing acts, intentional 
acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified Laws §22-1-2(1) (f) 
(Supp. 1982). A court is also entitled to look at a defendant's 
motive in committing a crime. Thus a murder may be viewed as 
more serious when committed pursuant to a contract. See, e.g., 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 279, §69(a) (5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 
Blackstone *15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073 (1974). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illus-
trates that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing 
the severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the 
difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions be-
tween similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of course, 
is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the 
CHAMBERS DRAFT: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 page 18. 
death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather 
than degree. 17 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not 
so much one of ordering, but one of line-drawing. It is clear 
that a 25-year sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year 
sentence, 18 but in most cases it would be difficult to decide 
that the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the latter 
does not. Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are not 
unique to this area. The courts are constantly called upon to 
draw similar lines in a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example. 
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 {1970}, the Court upheld a 
criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member jury, and in 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 u.s. 404 {1972}, we upheld a conviction 
returned by ten members of a 12-member jury. In Ballew v. Geor-
~, 435 U.s. 223 {1978}, however, we reversed a conviction re-
turned by a unanimous 5-member jury. JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readily 
admit[ted] that we d[id] not pretend to discern a clear line be-
tween six members and five." Id., at 239 {opinion of BLACKMUN, 
J.}. He nevertheless found a difference between them of "consti-
tutional significance." Ibid d cf. id. , at 245-246 {POWELL, J. , 
concurring in the judgment}. And the following Term, in Burch v. 
Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 {1979}, we reversed a conviction returned 
17There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment 
and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 {1972}. 
18The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, 
depending upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
CHAMBERS DRAFT: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 page 19. 
by five members of a 6-member jury: 
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a 
bright line below which the number of jurors partici-
pating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit 
the jury to function in the manner required by our pri-
or cases. But ••• it is inevitable that lines must be 
drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial 
right is to be preserved." Id., at 13 7 {citations 
omitted). --
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-
drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the 
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v. New York, 
399 U.S. 66 { 197 0) , the Court determined that a defendant has a 
right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for more than six 
months is authorized." Id., at 69 {plurality opinion). In 
choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclu-
sively on the fact that only New York City denied the right to a 
jury trial for an offense punishable by more than six months. As 
JUSTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn--on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone--between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." 
Id., at 72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly may 
distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. It also 
supports our holding that courts properly may look to the prac-
tices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sen-
tences should be drawn. 
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IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider 
the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's 
argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to 
save an otherwise unconstitutional sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a 
person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 501 {Hender-
son, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor threat of 
violence to any person. The $100 face value of Helm's "no ac-
count" check was not trivial, but neither was it a large amount. 
One hundred dollars was less than half the amount South Dakota 
required for a felonious theft. 19 It is easy to see why such a 
crime is viewed by society as among the less serious offenses. 
See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., at 229. 
19 If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash 
register, S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-l {1979), or defrauding 
someone of $100, §22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, 
§22-30A-4{1), or blackmail, §22-30A-4{3), or using a false credit 
card to obtain $100, §22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, §22-30A-10, 
he would not be in prison today. All of these offenses would 
have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. §22-30A-17 {amended 1982). 
Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check against insufficient 
funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would have been 
guilty of a misdemeanor. §§22-41-1. Curiously, under South Da-
kota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" 
check for a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a 
small sum. §22-41-1.2. 
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Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely 
than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, can-
not be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although 
classified as felonies, were all relatively minor. 21 All were 
nonviolent and none was a crime against a person. Indeed, there 
was no minimum amount in either the burglary or the false pre-
tenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, supra, and the minimum amount 
-w 
covered byA grand larceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, 
supra. 22 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, 
20we must focus on the principal felony--the felon~a~ •:ri~e 1 
gers the life sentence--since Helm already has paid penalty 
for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize t Helm's 
prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision. 
21Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a 
professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to al-
cohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record 
involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him 
for life without possibility of parole is unlikely to advance the 
goals of our crimina! justice system in any substantial way. 
Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pursue 
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem. 
22As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary 
statute covered entering a building with the intent to steal a 
loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-16. It appears that the 
grand larceny statute would have covered the theft of a chicken. 
23Every life sentence in South Dakot is without 
possibility of parole. See supra, at ____ • We raise no question 
as to the general validity of sentences without possibility of 
parole. The only issue before us is whether, in the circum-
stances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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at ___ , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peni-
tentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was likely to 
have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his initial con-
finement, 24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. See 445 
u.s., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is more severe than any other 
sentence the State could have imposed on any crimina! for any 
crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital punishment, a penalty 
not authorized in South Dakota when Helm was sentenced, exceeds 
it. 
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was sen-
tenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a life sen-
tence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws §22-16-12 (1979) (amended 
1980), and was authorized to impose a life sentence for treason, 
§22-8-1, first degree manslaughter, §22-16-15, first degree ar-
son, §22-33-1, and kidnapping, S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 
(1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979). No other crime was pun-
ishable so severely on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. 
Codified Laws §22-4-1 (5) (1979), placing an explosive device on 
an aircraft, §22-14A-5, and first degree rape, §22-22-1 (amended 
1980 and 1982) , were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot, 
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment. 
24we note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight 
months of the Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 
16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
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§22-10-5, was only a Class 3 felony. Distribution of heroin, 
§§22-42-2 {amended 1982), 34-20B-13{7) {1977), and aggravated 
assault, §22-18-1.1 {amended 1980 and 1981), were only Class 4 
felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analy-
sis, but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under §22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or third 
conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, kidnap-
ping, or first degree arson, and a life sentence would have been 
authorized when a second or third conviction was for such crimes 
as attempted murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, 
or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7-8, under which Helm was 
sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convic-
tions, regardless of the crimes. 
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were neces-
sarily punished by life imprisonment: murder; and treason, first 
degree manslaughter, kidnapping, or first degree arson on a sec-
ond or third offense. There was a larger group for which life 
imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sentencing 
judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, kidnapping, 
or first degree arson; attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a second or third 
offense; and any felony after three prior offenses. Finally, 
there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life 
imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of 
heroin dealing or aggravated assault. 
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Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one uttering a 
"no account" check--even when the bad-check writer had already 
committed six minor felonies. Furthermore, there is no indica-
tion in the record that any habitual offender other than Helm has 
ever been given the maximum sentence on the basis of comparable 
crimes. It is more likely that the possibility of life imprison-
ment under §22-7-8 generally is reserved for criminals such as 
fourth-time heroin dealers, while habitual bad-check writers re-
cei ve more lenient treatment. 25 In any event, Helm has been 
treated in the same manner as, or more severely than, criminals 
who have committed far more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals 
found that "Helm could have received a life sentence without pa-
role for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F.2d, 
at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this finding. See Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that 
Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 
25The State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the 
Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment 
under §22-7-8 is discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for 
Petitioner 22. Helm, however, has challenged only his own sen-
tence. No one suggests that §22-7-8 may not be applied constitu-
tionally to fourth-time heroin dealers or other violent crimi-
nals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Un-
like in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See 
Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1119, 1160 (1979) • 
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50 States. But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without 
possibility of parole is merely authorized in these circum-
stances. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §207. 010 ( 2) (1981) . We are not 
advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses 
were so minor, actually has received the maximum penalty in Neva-
da. 26 It appears that Helm was treated more severely than he 
would have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially 
the same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute Helm's 
sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, that the 
South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally different from 
the parole system that was before us in Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular 
26under §207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a 
sentence of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or 
without possibility of parole. If the penalty fixed by the court 
is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, eligibility 
for parole beg ins when a minimum of 10 years has been served." 
It appears that most sentences imposed under §207.010(2} permit 
parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious than 
Helm's. See, e.g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P.2d 1302 
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of 
driving an automobile without the owner's consent, four first 
degree burglaries, two sales of marijuana, two sales of a re-
str icted dangerous drug, one sale of heroin, one escape from 
state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
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part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it 
is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. The law 
generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to be con-
sidered for parole, and details the standards and procedures ap-
plicable at that time. See, e.g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal 
Inmates, 442 u.s. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole 
procedures): Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) ("the 
practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their 
sentences has become an integral part of the penological 
system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at least to some ex-
tent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other 
hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor 
may commute a sentence at any time for any reason without refer-
ence to any standards. See, e.g., Connecticut Board of Pardons 
v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between 
parole and commutation in our prior cases. 27 Writing on behalf 
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER con-
trasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an ad hoc exer-
27 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the 
possibility of commutation is not equivalent to the possibility 
of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish [ ed] Rummel from a 
person sentenced under a recidivist statute like [Miss. Code Ann. 
§99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for a sentence of life 
without parole." 445 u.s., at 281. But the Mississippi Consti-
tution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal 
and penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." 
Art. 5, §124. The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized 
that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a 
convict's sentence. See Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 
603-604, 73 So.2d 137, 139-140 (1954). 
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cise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprison-
ment of convicted criminals." 408 U.S., at 477. In Dum..3_9hat, 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained that "there is a vast dif-
ference between a denial of parole ••• and a state's refusal to 
commute a lawful sentence." 452 U.S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In _Rummel, the Court did not rely simply on the 
existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked to the pro-
visions of the system presented, including the fact that Texas 
had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits 
to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a pris-
oner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as 
little as 12 years." 445 U.S., at 280. A Texas prisoner became 
eligible for parole when his calendar time served plus "good con-
duct" time equaled one-third of the maximum sentence imposed or 
20 years, whichever is less. Tex. Code Cr im. Proc. Ann. , Art. 
42.12, §15(b) (Vernon 1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days 
good-time per 30 days served, Brief for Respondent in _B._!;lmmel, 
O.T. 1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 
Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 
30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., 
(Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus Rummel could have 
been eligible for parole in as few as 10 years, and could have 
expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in 
only 12 years. 
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles is 
authorized to make commutation recommendations to the Governor, 
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see n. 7, supra, but §24-13-4 provides that "no recommendation 
for the commutation of ••• a life sentence, or for a pardon ••. , 
shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of 
the board." In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over 
eight years, App. 29, while parole--where authorized--has been 
granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Fur-
thermore, even if Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would 
be eligible to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no 
guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
system is far more stringent than the one before us in Rummel. 
Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence 
before he would be eligible for parole, §24-15-5, and the provi-
sion for good-time credits is far less generous, §24-5-1. 29 
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a 
hope for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little differ-
ent from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence under the 
Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare possibility would 
make judicial review under the Eighth Amendment meaningless. 
28The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Da-
kota occurred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the 
prisoner in question has still not been paroled. App. 29. 
29Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted 
Helm's sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life ex-
pectancy). Even if Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have 
been eligible for parole until he had served over 21 years--more 
than twice the Bummel minimum. And this comparison is generous 
to South Dakota's position. If Rummel had been sentenced to 40 
years rather than life, he could have been eligible for parole in 
less than 7 years. 
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v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate 
sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been 
treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have 
committed more serious crimes. He has been treated more harshly 
than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the pos-
sible exception of a single State. We conclude that his sentence 
is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment pro-
scribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a sev-
enth nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary • 1 In 1972 he 
was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 In 1973 
1In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two 
sections of the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the 
nighttime with intent to commit a crime but under such 
circumstances as do not constitute burglary in the 
first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third de-
gree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any build-
ing within the curtilage of a dwelling house but not 
forming a part thereof, or any building or part of any 
building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as 
defined in §32-14-1, or any structure or erection in 
which any property is kept, with intent to commit lar-
ceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-9 (1967) (re-
pealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essen-
tially the same. See S.D. Code §13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 
1965 S.D. Laws, ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by 
"imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term not exceed-
ing fifteen years." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-32-10 (1967) (pre-
viously codified at S.D. Code §13.3705 (3) (1939)) (repealed 
1976). 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
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he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he was convicted 
of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 The record contains 
no details about the circumstances of any of these offenses, ex-
2In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any 
false token or writing, or other false pretense, 
obtains from any person any money or property . • • is 
punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary 
not exceeding three years or in a county jail not ex-
ceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding three 
times the value of the money or property so obtained, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
3In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of 
personal property accomplished by fraud or stealth and with in-
tent to deprive another thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-37-1 
(1967) (repealed 1976). Grand larceny and petit larceny were 
distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the 
following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding 
fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value ex-
ceeding fifty dollars, is taken from the person of an-
other; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-
37-3 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
4A third offense of driving while under the influence of al-
cohol is a felony in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws §32-23-4 
(1976). See 1973 S.D. Laws, ch. 195, §7 (enacting version of 
§32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
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cept that they were all nonviolent, none was a crime against a 
person, and alcohol was a contributing factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are those 
given by Helm to the state trial court: 
"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places.'" State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no 
account" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D. 
eee~~~ee-Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (6) (3:9~91967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(now codified at S.D. Codified Laws §22-6-1 (7) (Supp. 1982)). As 
a result of his crimina! record, however, Helm was subject to 
South Dakota's recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal 
felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be 
5The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or repre-
sentative of another for present consideration with 
intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a financial 
institution knowing at the time of such passing that he 
or his principal does not have an account with such 
financial institution, is guilty of a Class 5 felony." 
S.D. Codified Laws §22-41-1.2 (1979). 
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enhanced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. 
Codified Laws §22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life imprisonment 
in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand dollar 
fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(now codified at S.D. Codified Laws §22-6-1 (3) (Supp. 1982)). 
6when Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law 
classified felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are 
divided into the following seven classes which are dis-
tinguished from each other by the respective maximum 
penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary. A lesser sentence may not be giv-
en for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-
five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment 
in the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine 
of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in 
the state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of 
fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of ten 
thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary. In addition, a fine of five 
thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary or a fine of two thousand 
dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sen-
tences for habitual criminals •.•• 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by 
law, every offense declared to be a felony and not oth-
erwise classified is a Class 6 felony." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 
and 1980). 
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Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is 
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not 
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S.D. 
Codified Laws §24-15-4 (1979}. The Governor 7 is authorized to 
pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, S.D. Const., 
Art. IV, §3, but no other relief from sentence is available even 
to a rehabilitated prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the 
South Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under §22-7-8. The court explained: 
"'I think you certainly earned this sentence and cer-
tainly proven that you're an habitual criminal and the 
record would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation 
and that the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up 
for the rest of your natural life, so you won't have 
further victims of your crimes, just be coming back 
before Courts. You' 11 have plenty of time to think 
this one over."' State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 500 
(Henderson, J., dissenting} (quoting S.D. Circuit 
Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County 
(Parker, J.}} • 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed the 
sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the Eighth 
Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentia-
ry, he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a fixed 
term of years. Such a commutation would have had the effect of 
7The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make rec-
ommendations to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws §24-14-1 (1979}; 
§ 24-14-5; S.D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982} , but the 
Governor is not bound by the recommendation, §24-14-5. 
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making Helm eligible to be considered for parole when he had 
served three-fourths of his new sentence. See S.D. Codified Laws 
§24-15-5 (3) (1979). 
1981. App. 26. 
The Governor denied Helm's request in May 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of South Dakota. Helm 
argued, among other things, that his sentence constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Although the District Court recognized that the sentence 
was harsh, it concluded that this Court's recent decision in 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), was dispositive. It 
therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit reversed. 684 F.2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals noted 
that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's sentence of 
life without parole was qualitatively different from Rummel's 
1 i fe sentence with the prospect of parole because South Dakota 
has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of the criminal justice 
system. The Court of Appeals examined the nature of Helm's of-
fenses, the nature of his sentence, and the sentence he could 
have received in other States for the same offense. It conclud-
ed, on the basis of this examination, that Helm's sentence was 
"grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." 684 
F.2d, at 587. It therefore directed the District Court to issue 
the writ unless the State resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
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Reee~Ai:2i:fH~- In view of the important Eighth Amendment 
question presented i:A-by this case, we granted certiorari. 459 
u.s. ___ {1982). We now affirm. 
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not only bar-
baric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate 
to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate 
to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-
law jurisprudence.§ In 12157 fe~-eMam~~e7-three chapters of Mag-
na Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 9 may not be 
excessive. 10 And the principle was repeated and extended in the 
a~fie-~~i:Aei:~~e-i:s-ey-Ae-meaftS-e~i:~i:fta~-~e-~fie-eemmeA-~aW7--%~ 
was- a- ~eee~Ai:2ea- ~i:mi:~a~i:eA- eft- ~I:!Ai:shmeA~s- i:A- ei:e~i:ea~- ~i:mes7 
See-BMeal:!s-~~~~3-~5~-be¥i:~i:el:!s-~4~~9-~9~-Bel:!~e~eAemy-~9~~97-~~7 
9An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the 
most common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 
2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 
{2d ed. 1909). 
10chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced 
for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a 
great crime according to the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Cod-
ified Laws, p. 4 {1978) {translation of Magna Carta). According 
to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna Carta more grateful to 
the mass of the people •••• " F. Maitland, Pleas of the Crown for 
the County of Gloucester xxxiv {1884). Chapter 21 granted the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 {1275). These were 
not hollow guarantees, for the royal courts relied on them to 
invalidate disproportionate punishments. See, e.g., Le Gras v. 
Bailiff of Bishop of Winchester, Y .B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 
{C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52 Selden Society 3 {1934). When pris-
on sentences became the normal criminal sanctions, the common law 
recognized that these, too, must be proportional. See, e.g. , 
Hodges v. Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 
{K.B. 1615) {Croke, J.) {"imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of 
proportionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor exces-
sive Fines imposed nor cruel! and unusual! Punishments 
inflicted." 1 w. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 {1689). Although the pre-
cise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the punish-
ment ••• should not be, by reason of its excessive length or se-
verity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." R. 
Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 {1959); see 4 W. Blackstone, 
Commentaries *16-19 {1769); see also id., at *16-17 {in condemn-
ing "punishments of unreasonable severity," uses "cruel" to mean 
severe or excessive). Indeed, barely three months after the Bill 
of Rights was adopted, the House of Lords declared that a "fine 
same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same 
rights to the clergy. 
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of thirty thousand pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench 
upon the earl of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against 
magna charta, the common right of the subject, and against the 
law of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 11 they also adopted the 
English principle of proportionality. The people were guaranteed 
the rights they had possessed as English subjects--including the 
right to be free from excessive punishments. 
B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been 
recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 12 In 
the leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public document 
and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form of impris-
11This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, Art. I, §9_, ~~41'~~~ 
12In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 u.s. 323 (1892), the defendant had 
been convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor 
without authority," and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. 
The majority did not reach O'Neil's contention that this sentence 
was unconstitutional, for he did not include the point in his 
assignment of errors or in his brief. Id., at 331. Furthermore, 
the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not apply to 
the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. Id., at 336-337. 
The dissent, however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, ob-
serving that it "is directed .•• against all punishments which by 
their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to 
the offences charged." Id., at 339-340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
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onment that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil 
disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a precept of justice 
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to 
offense," id., at 367, and held that the sentence violated the 
Eighth Amendment. The Court endorsed the principle of proper-
tionality as a constitutional standard, see, e.g., id., at 372-
373, and determined that the sentence before it was "cruel in its 
excess of imprisonment," id., at 377. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a 
criminal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 
(1962) • 13 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for the 
crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The Court 
explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the ab-
stract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." Id., at 
667. Thus there was no question of an inherently barbaric pun-
ishment. "But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. 
Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment 
for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of 
proportionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. (1982) (death 
penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant did not take 
life, attempt to take life, or intend ~e-~a~e-that a life be tak-
13Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of 
proportionality in the meantime. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 
u.s. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring); id., at 125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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en or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
= 
592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is grossly 
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of 
rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is disproportion-
ate punishment for the crime of raping an adult woman"). And the 
Court has continued to recognize that the Eighth Amendment pro-
scribes grossly disproportionate punishments, even when it has 
not been necessary to rely on the proscription. See, e.g., Hutto 
v. Finney, 437 u.s. 678, 685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 u.s. 
651, 667 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 171-172 (1976) 
(opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Da-
vis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally disproportion-
ate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 u.s., at 274, n. 11 (same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the 
general principle of proportionality does not apply to felony 
prison sentences. 14 The constitutional language itself suggests 
14According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) , "one 
could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of th1s 
Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as 
felonies ..• the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a 
matter of legislative prerogative." Id., at 274 (emphasis 
added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but mere-
ly recognized that the argument was possible. 
----~To the extent that the State ~ek~ to make~this argument 
, 't A , 
~~~1:--1 • 
i tutional duty to ensur 
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no exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, fines, 
and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 u.s., at 664, and 
the text is explicit that bail and fines may not be excessive. 
It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine 
and the greater punishment of death were both subject to proper-
tionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprison-
ment were not. There is also no historical support for such an 
exception. The common-law principle incorporated into the Eighth 
Amendment clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that pris-
on sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. See, e.g., 
Weems, 217 u.s., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S., at 685 
{"Confinement in a prison is a form of punishment subject to 
scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards"}. 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in 
capital cases, we have drawn no distinction with imprisonment. 
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s., at 176 {opinion of Stewart, POW-
ELL, and STEVENS, JJ.} • It is true that the "penalty of death 
differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in de-
gree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 {1972} 
' } . 
The class of "crimes classified and classifiable as 
felonies" is of little assist as an Eighth Amendment stand-
ard. Since !Fthe definition o a felony is invariably based on 
its legal consequences,';"- Sse, 18 U.S.C. §1{1} ,';"- 'Pth 
effect of this standara-woul([ : when a State concedeal 
punish a crime by imprisonment for a year, it could punis 
crime by life imprisonment without possibility of parole. 
~.· w~ ~ t~t-A&s- ~. J~-<. ~ ~ 
~4Av.~ ~7~ ~~~4-tll ~d 
~· kh-~~~~..-1---~ 
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(Stewart, J., concurring). As a result, "our decisions [in] cap-
i tal cases are of limited assistance in deciding the consti tu-
tionali ty of the punishment" in a noncapi tal case. Rummel v. 
Estelle, 445 u.s., at 272. All this means, however, is that, 
"[o] utside the context of capital punishment, successful chal-
lenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [will be] 
exceedingly rare," 15 ibid. (emphasis added); see Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U.S., at 374. It does not mean that proportionality analysis 
is entirely inapplicable in noncapital cases. 
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. 
enall9~ ~ti-tui!~nal 
~4+c-h...f<_ 
grant ~&igeraele deference 
~~ 
grouftds. Reviewing courts~should 
to the broad authority that legisla-
tures possess in determining the types and limits of punishments 
for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts pos-
sess in sentencing convicted criminals. 16 --~hee-~ft-mee~-eeeee-~~ 
15 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to 
be excess1ve for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. 
But clearly no sentence short of death would be unconstitutional 
for Enmund's crime. ~~ 
e to le is-
\ 
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no penalty is per se constitutional. As the Court noted in Rob-
inson v. California, 370 u.s., at 667, a single day in prison may 
be unconstitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment, 
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases have 
recognized. 17 First, we look to the gravity of the offense and ....... 
the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for example, the Court 
examined the circumstances of the defendant's crime in great de-
tail. 458 u.s., at In Coker the Court considered the 
seriousness of the crime of rape, and compared it to other 
crimes, such as murder. 433 u.s., at 597-598 (plurality 
opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) • In Robinson the emphasis was 
placed on the nature of the "crime." 370 u.s., at 666-667. And 
Amendment. 
third draft: Solem v. Helm, No. 82-492 
(marked to show changes from second draft} 
page 15. 
in Weems, the Court's opinion commented in two separate places on 
the pettiness of the offense. 217 u.s., at 363 and 365. Of 
course, a court must consider the severity of the penalty in de-
ciding whether it is disproportionate. See, e.g., Coker, 433 
u.s., at 598 (plurality opinion}; Weems, 217 u.s., at 366-367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more seri-
ous crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious 
penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue 
may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted that all of the 
other felony murderers on death row in Florida were more culpable 
than the petitioner there. 458 u.s., at The Weems Court 
identified an impressive list of more serious crimes that were 
subject to less serious penalties. 217 u.s., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sen-
tences imposed for commission of the same crime in other juris-
dictions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review of 
capital punishment statutes and determined that "only about a 
third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a defendant 
[such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 u.s., at 
Even in those jurisdictions, however, the death penalty was al-
most never imposed under similar circumstances. Id., at 
The Court's review of foreign law also supported its conclusion. 
Id., at ___ , n. 22. The analysis in Coker was essentially the 
same. 433 U.S., at 593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on 
the fact that, under federal law, a similar crime was punishable 
by only two year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 u.s., at 380. 
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ion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the 
Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, includ-
ing (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the pen-
al ty; ( i i) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same 
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are 
competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a rela-
tive scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments--just as legisla-
tures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons can be 
made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus in Enmund the 
Court determined that the petitioner's conduct was not so serious 
as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, there are widely shared 
views as to the relative seriousness of crimes. See Rossi, 
Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Struc-
ture and Individual Differences, 39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 
(1974). For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent 
crimes are less serious than crimes mar ked by violence or the 
~ 
threat of violence. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 
la~~::P; lo~ property). 
16 (State recognizes 
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The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. 
Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). 
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be pun-
more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is 
justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168, 
169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam) , cert. denied, 430 U.S. 973 
{1977) • Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 N .E. 2d 
815, 817 {1968) {armed robbery more serious than robbery); Cannon 
v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P.2d 233, 235 {1955) {rape more 
serious than assault with intent to commit rape) . It is also 
widely recognized that attempts are less serious than completed 
crimes. See, e.g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-4-1 (1979); 4 Black-
stone *15. Similarly, an accessory after the fact should not be 
subject to a higher penalty than the principal. See, e.g., 18 
u.s.c. §3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are 
again clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill ~e-in determineing that he was less culpable than his accom-
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plices. 458 u.s., at Most would agree that negligent con-
duct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Dakota, for 
example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of seriousness as 
follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing acts, intentional 
acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified Laws §22-1-2 {1) {f) 
(Supp. 1982). A court is also entitled to look at a defendant's 
4-B~ae~s~efte-z~5~-e~.-rft-fe-Pess7 -~9-€a~.36-9~97 -5~9-P.~e-~9~3 
·H:9~4t- -f~t!fft:'i:sh:'i:ft~- Aefe:'i:ft- ~e- €e~~ew- aee:'i:e~ -~e:'i:ft~- ~Afei::!~A -w:'i:~h-
efawai -ftee- se- sef:'i:el::!s- as- sale- ~ef -~fe€:'i:et•- -S:'i::fft:'i:iaf~y, -Thus a 
~ ~ t-44-VI...Il ~ 
murder 1\~ more serious when i~ committed pursuant to a con-
tract. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 279, §69(a) (5) (West 
Supp. 1982): cf. 4 Blackstone *15: In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 
p. 2d 10 7 3 ( 19 7 4) • 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illus-
trates that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing 
the severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the 
difficulties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions be-
tween similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of course, 
is between capital punishment and noncapital punishments, for the 
2 
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death penalty is different from other punishments in kind rather 
than degree. 18 For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not 
so much one of ordering, but one of line-drawing. It is clear 
that a 25-year sentence generally is more severe than a 15-year 
senten~but in most cases it would be difficult to de-
cide whether the former violates the Eighth Amendment while the 
latter does not. Decisions of this kind, although troubling, are 
not unique to this area. The courts are constantly called upon 
to draw similar lines in a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example. 
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) , the Court upheld a 
criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member jury, and in 
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), we upheld a conviction 
returned by ten members of a 12-member jury. In Ballew v. Geor-
~, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), however, we reversed a conviction re-
turned by a unanimous 5-member jury. JUSTICE BLACKMON "readily 
admit[ted] that we d[id] not pretend to discern a clear line be-
tween six members and five." Id., at 239 (opinion of BLACKMON, 
J.). He nevertheless found a difference between them of "consti-
tutional significance." Ibid.~ cf. id., at 245-246 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. 
Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction returned 
18There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment 
and sentences involving no deprivation of liberty. See 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
19The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, 
depending upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
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by five members of a 6-member jury: 
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a 
bright line below which the number of jurors partici-
pating in the trial or in the verdict would not permit 
the jury to function in the manner required by our pri-
or cases. But .•• it is inevitable that lines must be 
drawn somewhere if the substance of the jury trial 
right is to be preserved." Id. , at 13 7 (citations 
omitted). ---
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-
drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the 
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v. New York, 
399 u.s. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a defendant has a 
right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for more than six 
months is authorized." Id., at 69 (plurality opinion). In 
choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclu-
sively on the fact that only New York City denied the right to a 
jury trial for an offense punishable by more than six months. As 
JUSTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn--on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone--between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 1 serious 1 for purposes of trial by jury." 
Id., at 72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly may 
distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. It also 
supports our holding that courts~k~e practices in 
other jurisdictions in deciding where lines between sentences 
should be drawn. 
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It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first consider 
the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole. We then consider the State's 
argument that the possibility of commutation is sufficient to 
save an otherwise unconstitutional sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a 
person could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d, at 501 (Hender-
son, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor threat of 
violence to any person. The $100 face value of Helm's "no ac-
count" check was not trivial, but neither was it a large amount. 
One hundred dollars was less than half the amount South Dakota 
required for a felonious theft. 20 It is easy to see why such a 
crime is viewed by society as among the less serious offenses. 
See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., at 229. 
~I 
20If Helm had been convicted simply of t king $100 from a cash 
register, S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-l (1979), or defrauding 
someone of $100, §22-30A-3, or obtaining 100 through extortion, 
§22-30A-4(1), or blackmail, §22-30A-4{3), r using a false credit 
card to obtain $100, §22-30A-8.1, or embez ling $100, §22-30A-10, 
he would not be in prison today. All f these offenses would 
have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. §2 -30A-17 (amended 1982). 
Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 che k against insufficient 
funds, rather than a nonexistent accou t, he would have been 
guilty of a misdemeanor. §§22-41-1. nder South Dakota law 
there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. 
§22-41-1.2. 
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Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 21 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely 
than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, however, can-
not be considered in the abstract. His prior offenses, although 
classified as felonies, were all relatively minor. 22 All were 
nonviolent and none was a crime against a person. As the State 
conceded at oral argument, the three third-degree burglary con-
victions could have been the result of stealing three loaves of 
bread. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16. There was also no minimum amount in 
the statute against obtaining money under false pretenses. See 
n. 2, supra. Helm's "grand larceny" may have been no more than 
the theft of a chicken. See n. 3, ~~· face, Helm's 
ost serious crime was a felony case of driving while intoxicat-
ed, but he served barely nine months for that offense, Tr. of 
2.1 
~/ 17. Such a short suggests that the particu 
¥.vvu 21we must focus on the principal felony--the felonf:ft ~ J 
-~. JV gers the life sentence--since Helm already has paid the penalty 
for each of his prior offenses. But we recognize that Helm's 
~ prior convictions are relevant to the sentencing decision. 
tt/ 22Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a 
professional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to al-
cohol, and a consequent difficulty in holding a job. His record 
involves no instance of violence of any kind. Incarcerating him 
~~ for life without possibility of parole is unlikely to advance afty 
~:f· e~-the goals of our criminal justice system in any substantial 
way. Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pur-
su23clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem. 
The sentence was well below that authorized for even the 
least serious felony in South Dakota. See note 6, supra. It was 
also shorter than the sentences Helm served for other minor 
crimes. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. 
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Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without 
possibility of parole. 24 Barring executive clemency, see infra, 
~~at ___ , Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peni-
~ ,::::::::~ c:~g:;bel::::::::::::~:~h:::~:;~::~Ru:;::is:::i::::l:::: 
~nement, 25 a fact on which the Court d-".:.ied heavi~y. See 445 ~ : 
~~ u.s., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is t more l severe lthanJ any other'~ 
~ ~· sentence the State could have imposed on any criminal for any ) ~ 
I ~·t 
~ crime. See note 6 , s u12r a. Only capital punishment, a penalty ~ 
?~ ~ot authorized in South Dakota when Helm was sentenced, exceeds it:!; 
v~v""'. 1 t. 
~ ~r We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on~~ 
~r" other criminals in the same jurisdictio~. When Helm was sen~'-:t;_·'1 
~
~.' tenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a life sen-~? 
()AI'. tence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws §22-16-12 {1979) {amended ~ · 
~A~fi/ 1980), and was authorized to impose a life sentence for treason, ~ 
';t1' §22-8-1, first degree manslaughter, §22-16-15, first degree ar- ~-;j 
9f- J.,L ~ 
, ~1)/  
~j( 24we raise no question as to the general validity of sentences ~' 
~rL without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is 
. ..h whether, in the circumstances of this case and in light of the ~; 
40~r.~ constitutional principle of proportionality, the sentence imposed 
1 ~~- on this petitioner violates the Eighth Amendment. 
~,....!II) 25we note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight 
,1<) months of the Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 
- 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
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son, §22-33-1, and kidnapping, S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 
(1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979) 7 -eu•te-fi:f's~-ee~f'ee-af'seAT 
~~-33-~. No other crime was punishable so severely on the first 
offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws §22-4-1(5) (1979), 
placing an explosive device on an aircraft, §22-14A-5, and first 
degree rape, §22-22-1 (amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2 
felonies. Aggravated riot, §22-10-5, was only a Class 3 felony. 
Distribution of heroin, §§ 22-4 2-2 (amended 1982) , 34-20B-13 ( 7) 
(1977), and aggravated assault, §22-18-1.1 (amended 1980 and 
1981), were only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analy-
sis, but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under §22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or third 
conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, kidnap-
ping, or first degree arson, and a life sentence would have been 
authorized when a second or third conviction was for such crimes 
as attempted murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, 
or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7-8, under which Helm was 
sentenced, authorized life imprisonment after three prior convic-
tions, regardless of the crimes. 
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were neces-
sarily punished by life imprisonment: murder~ and treason, first 
degree manslaughter, kidnapping, or first degree arson on a sec-
ond or third offense. There was a larger group for which life 
imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sentencing 
judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, kidnapping, 
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or first degree arson~ attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a second or third 
offense~ and any felony after three prior offenses. Finally, 
there was a large group of very serious offenses for which life 
imprisonment was not authorized, including a third offense of 
heroin dealing or aggravated assault. 
rft- afty- f"a~oiefta3:- syseem7- eCr iminals committing any of 
these offenses ordinarily would be thought more deserving of pun-
ishment than one uttering a "no account" check--even when the 
bad-check writer had already committed six minor felonies. Fur-
thermore, there is no indication in the record that any habitual 
w-/o )1 ~~~ ? 
offender other than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence ' 
on the basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the 
possibility of life imprisonment under §22-7-8 generally is re-
served for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while 
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 26 We 
eaft-eft3:y-eefte3:~ee-~ha~-In any event, Helm has been treated in the 
same manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have commit-
ted far more serious crimes. 
26The State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the 
Texas habitual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment 
under §22-7-8 is discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for 
Petitioner 22. Helm, however, has challenged only his own sen-
tence. No one suggests that §22-7-8 may not be applied constitu-
tionally to fourth-time heroin dealers or other violent cr imi-
nals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judgment. Un-
like in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See 
Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1119, 1160 (1979). 
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Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals 
found that "Helm could have received a life sentence without pa-
role for his offense in only one other state, Nevada," 684 F.2d, 
at 586, and we have no reason to doubt ~~s-this finding. See Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, therefore, it is clear that 
Helm could not have received such a severe sentence in 48 of the 
50 States. But even under Nevada law, a life sentence without 
possibility of parole is merely authorized in these circum-
stances. See Nev. Rev. Stat. §207.010(2} (1981}. We are not 
advised that any defendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses 
were so minor, actually has received the maximum penalty in Neva-
da.27 It appears that Helm was treated more severely than he 
would have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially 
the same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
27under Ne¥.-Re¥.-S~a~.-§207.010(2), a Nevada court is author-
ized to impose a sentence of "imprisonment 1n the state prison 
for life with or without possibility of parole. If the penalty 
fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the possibility of 
parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years 
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010 ( 2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far 
more serious than Helm's. See, e.g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 
778, 617 P. 2d 1302 (1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-
felon, two instances of driving an automobile without the owner's 
consent, four first degree burglaries, two sales of marijuana, 
two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of heroin, one 
escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
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that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute Helm's 
sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, that the 
South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally different from 
the parole system that was before us in Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regular 
part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it 
is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. The law 
generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to be con-
sidered for parole, and details the standards and procedures ap-
plicable at that time. See, e.g., Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal 
Inmates, 442 u.s. 1 (1979) (detailing Nebraska parole 
procedures): Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) ("the 
practice of releasing prisoners on parole before the end of their 
sentences has become an integral part of the penological 
system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at least to some ex-
tent, when parole might be granted. Commutation, on the other 
hand, is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency. A Governor 
may commute a sentence at any time for any reason without refer-
ence to any standards. See, e.g., Connecticut Board of Pardons 
v. Dumschat, 452 u.s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between 
parole and commutation in our prior cases. 28 Writing on behalf 
28 rn Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the 
possibil1ty of commutation is not equivalent to the possibility 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER con-
trasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an ad hoc exer-
cise of clemency, parole is an established variation on imprison-
ment of convicted criminals." 408 U.S., at 4 77. In Dumscha t, 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained that "there is a vast dif-
ference between a denial of parole ••• and a state's refusal to 
commute a lawful sentence." 452 u.s., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply on the 
existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked to the pro-
visions of the system presented, including the fact that Texas 
had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits 
to its prisoners, a policy that historically has allowed a pris-
oner serving a life sentence to become eligible for parole in as 
little as 12 years." 445 u.s., at 280. A Texas prisoner became 
eligible for parole when his calendar time served plus "good con-
duct" time equaled one-third of the maximum sentence imposed or 
20 years, whichever is less. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 
42.12, §l5(b) (Vernon 1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days 
of parole. The Court carefully "distinguish [ed] Rummel from a 
person sentenced under a recidivist statute like [Miss. Code Ann. 
§99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for a sentence of life 
without parole." 445 u.s., at 281. But the Mississippi Consti-
tution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal 
and penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." 
Art. 5, §124. The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized 
that the power to pardon includes the power to commute a 
convict's sentence. See Whittington v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 
603-604, 73 So.2d 137, 139-140 (1954) .--~~e-R~mmel-ee~~e-~a¥e-Re 
we~~~e-ee-e~e-~eee~e~l~ey-e~-eMee~e~¥e-elemeRey~ 
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good-time per 30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 
O.T. 1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Ci v. Stat. Ann. , 
Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus Rummel could have 
been eligible for parole in as few as 10 years, and could have 
expected to become eligible, in the normal course of events, in 
only 12 years. 
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles is 
authorized to make commutation recommendations to the Governor, 
see n. 7, supra, but §24-13-4 provides that "no recommendation 
for the commutation of ••• a life sentence, or for a pardon ••• , 
shall be made by less than the unanimous vote of all members of 
the board." In fact, no life sentence has been commuted in over 
eight years, App. 29, while parole--where authorized--has been 
granted regularly during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Fur-
thermore, even if Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would 
be eligible to be considered for parole. 29 Not only is there no 
guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
system is far more stringent than the one before us in Rummel. 
Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his revised sentence 
before he would be eligible for parole, §24-15-5, and the provi-
sion for good-time credits is far less generous, §24-5-1. 30 
29The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Da-
kota occurred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the 
prisoner in question has still not been paroled. App. 29. 
Footnote(s) 30 will appear on following pages. 
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The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a 
hope for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little differ-
ent from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence under the 
Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare possibility would 
make judicial review under the Eighth Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penultimate 
sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has been 
treated more harshly than other criminals in the State who have 
committed more serious crimes. He has been treated more harshly 
than he would have been in any other jurisdiction, with the pos-
sible exception of a single State. We conclude that his sentence 
is significantly disproportionate to his crime, and is therefore 
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
30Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted 
Helm's hae-eeeH-sentencea to a term of 4o years --(H1s approxl-
mate~ife expectancy).-~H-l9~9. Even if Helm weire ai model pris-
oner' he would not nave been eligible for parole until he had 
served over 21 years--.--~h~s-~s-more than twice as-leH~-as-the 
Rummel minimum. Anar this comparison is generous to South 
Dakota's position. If Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years 
rather than life, he could have been eligible for parole in less 
than 7 years. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary.• In 1972 
' In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of 
the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent 
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute bur-
glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--32--8 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curti-
lage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or 
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in 
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with 
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the 
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws, 
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp. 
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he 
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. • 
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any 
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none 
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are 
those given by Helm to the state trial court: 
(1939)) (repealed 1976). 
z In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writ-
ing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or 
property . . . is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so ob-
tained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
a In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another 
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, 
is taken from the person of another; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--37-2 
(1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--37-3 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
• A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony 
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D. 
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of § 32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
6 The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended . up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no ac-
count" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now 
codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As 
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to 
South Dakota's recidivist statute: 
''When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, 
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to 
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws 
§22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony'' was life impris-
onment in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand 
dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another 
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a 
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his prin-
cipal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a 
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979). 
6 When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified 
felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the fol-
lowing seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the re-
spective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
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supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3) 
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly pro-
vides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life 
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of par-
dons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws §24-1f>.-.4 (1979). 
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to com-
mute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, § 3, but no other 
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated 
prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South 
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under §22-7-8. The court explained: 
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly 
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A less.er 
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; · 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a 
fine of two thousand dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual crimi-
nals .... 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense 
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony." 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 
1980). 
7 The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws § 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D. 
Executive Order 82-&1 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by 
the recommendation, § 24-14-5. 
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that 
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest 
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of 
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll 
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v. 
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Pennington County (Parker, J.)). 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a ~2 decision, affirmed 
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, 
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a 
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had 
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole 
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See 
S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15-5(3) (1979). The Governor de-
nied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Da-
kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court 
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this 
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals 
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's 
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different 
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole be-
cause South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of 
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined 
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the 
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same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination, 
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore di-
rected the District Court to issue the writ unless the State 
resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
In view of the important Eighth Amendment question pre-
sented by this case, we granted certiorari. 459 U. S. --
(1982). We now affinn. 
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to 
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna 
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not 
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and ex-
tended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal 
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish-
ments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches-
8 An amercement was similar to a modem-day fine. It was the most 
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pol-
lock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909). 
1 Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small 
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation 
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna 
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people .... " F. Maitland, Pleas of 
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted 
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to 
the clergy. 
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ter, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52 
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the 
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that 
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Buist. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of propor-
tionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the 
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the pun-
ishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length 
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." 
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at 
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable sever-
ity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed, 
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand 
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl 
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna 
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law 
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the 
English principle of proportionality. The people were guar-
anteed the rights they had possessed as English subjects-
including the right to be free from excessive punishments. 
10 This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason. 
It H _j The RecuR.. FroM RtAnnyme&e : {.ee , owo.rCA J 
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B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been rec-
ognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the 
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public docu-
ment and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form 
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and per-
manent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court en-
dorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional 
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the 
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment," 
id., at 377. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
nal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for 
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The 
Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in 
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." 
11 In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been 
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority," 
and sentenced to a tenn of over 54 years. The majority did not reach 
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not 
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. /d., at 331. 
Furthennore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not 
apply to the States." /d., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. /d., at 33&-337. The dissent, 
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is 
directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or se-
verity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." /d., at 
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
12 Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of propor-
tionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
82-492-0PINION 
SOLEM v. HELM 9 
I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently bar-
baric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 
Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of pro-
portionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. -- (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant 
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life. be 
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the 
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is 
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
. woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate 
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on 
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally dispro-
portionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11 
(same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison 
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no 
18 According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could 
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for 
crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of 
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, 
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death 
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is 
also no historical support for such an exception. The com-
mon-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment 
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that 
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. 
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison . . . is a form of pun-
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capi-
tal cases, we have drawn no distinction with imprisonment. 
See .Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of Stewart, 
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the "penalty of 
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not 
in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 
306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As a result, "our deci-
sions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding 
the constitutionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case. 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All this means, how-
ever, is that, "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, 
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sen-
tences [will be] exceedingly rare," 14 ibid. (emphasis added); 
ld., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard pro-
posed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the ex-
tent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless. 
•• In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be ex-
cessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no 
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see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. It does not mean that 
proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable in noncapital 
cases. 
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been con-
victed. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substan-
tial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess 
in determining the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in 
sentencing convicted criminals. 15 But no penalty is per se 
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be uncon-
stitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment, 
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases 
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the of-
fense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for ex-
ample, the Court examined the circumstances of the defend-
ant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at-----. In 
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of 
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433 
sentence short of death would be unconstitutional for Enmund's crime. 
'
5 In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and 
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to 
engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitu-
tionally disproportionate. 
11 As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive. See 
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373--374 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 27~276. The inherent nature of our federal 
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide 
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a 
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth 
Amendment. 
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U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666-667. And in Weems, the Court's 
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of 
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court 
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether 
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598 
(plurality .opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 36fh367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less seri-
ous penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted 
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida 
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at 
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of 
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penal-
ties. 217 U. S., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review 
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a 
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 
U. S., at--. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the 
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar cir-
cumstances. ld., at--. The Court's review of foreign 
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at --, n. 22. The 
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at 
59!>-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that, 
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two 
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
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(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are compe-
tent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative 
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as leg-
islatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons 
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the 
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus 
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's con-
duct was not }fJ serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness 
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness 
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the crimi-
nal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than 
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is 
more protective of people than property). 
There are other widely accepted principles that courts may 
apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the vic-
tim or society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be 
relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more seri-
ous than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in 
statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, 
e. g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few 
would dispute that a lesser included offense should not be 
punished more severely than the greater offense. Thus a 
court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as 
more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 
544 F. 2d 168, 16~170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
430 U. S. 973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 
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252, 240 N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more seri-
ous than robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 
P. 2d 233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with in-
tent to commit rape). It is also widely recognized that at-
tempts are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Simi-
larly, an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a 
higher penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again 
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent 
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Da-
kota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of 
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing 
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified 
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court is also entitled to 
look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. Thus a 
murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pur-
suant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 
279, §69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone *15; In re 
Foss , 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates 
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the 
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi-
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between 
similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of 
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
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ments, for the death penalty is different from other punish-
ments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of impris-
onment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one 
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally 
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it 
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the 
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of 
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area. 
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar line's in 
a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example. 
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld 
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member 
jury, and in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), we up-
held a conviction returned by ten members of a 12-member 
jury. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), however, 
we reversed a conviction returned by a unanimous 5-member 
jury. JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readily admit(ted] that we d(id] 
not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and 
five." I d., at 239 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J. ). He neverthe-
less found a difference between them of "constitutional sig-
nificance." Ibid.; cf. id., at 24&-246 (POWELL, J., concurring 
in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. Lou-
isiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction re-
turned by five members of a 6-member jury: 
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a 
bright line below which the number of jurors participat-
ing in the trial or in the verdict would not permit the 
jury to function in the manner required by our prior 
cases. But . . . it is inevitable that lines must be drawn 
17 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen-
tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 u. s. 25 (1972). 
11 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending 
upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
16 
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somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be 
preserved." Id., at 137 (citations omitted). 
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-draw-
ing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the 
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a 
defendant has a right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for 
more than six months is authorized." I d., at 69 (plurality 
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality re-
lied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City 
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by 
more than six months. As JUSTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone-between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at 
72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly 
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. 
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to 
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines be-
tween sentences should be drawn. 
IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first con-
sider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then con-
sider the State's argument that the possibility of commuta-
tion is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional 
sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a per-
son could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501 
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(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of 
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it 
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the 
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is 
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among 
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 
at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender.~ 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more se-
verely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, how-
ever, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior of-
fenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a 
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the 
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, 
"If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register, 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100, 
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or black-
mail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100, 
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison 
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. 
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check 
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South 
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a ''no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2. 
111 We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life 
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of-
fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are rel-
evant to the sentencing decision. 
21 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes-
sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a conse-
quent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is 
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substan-
tial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pursue 
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supra, and the minimum amount covered by grand larceny 
statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without pos-
sibility of parole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at 
--, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peniten-
tiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was 
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his 
initial confinement,24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. 
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is more severe 
than any._ sentence the State could have imposed on any 
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital 
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when 
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it. 
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was 
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a 
life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12 
(1979) (amended 1980), .and was authorized to impose a life 
sentence for treason, § 22-8-1, first degree manslaughter, 
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping, 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely 
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws 
a As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov-
ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered 
the theft of a chicken. 
11 Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole. 
See supra, at-. We raise no question as to the general validity of sen-
tences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether, 
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
"'We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the 
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
other than life 
imprisonment with-
out possibility 
of parole that 
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§ 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an aircraft, 
§ 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 (amended 1980 
and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot, 
§ 22-10-5, was only a Class 3 felony. Distribution of heroin, 
§§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) (1977), and aggra-
vated assault, § 22-1&-1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were 
only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, 
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under §22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or 
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, 
kidnapping, or first degree arson, and a life sentence would 
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was 
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 22-7-8, 
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprison-
ment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes. 
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessar-
ily punished by life imprisonment: murder; and treason, first 
degree manslaughter, kidnapping, or first degree arson on a 
second or third offense. There was a larger group for which 
life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sen-
tencing judge, including: treason, first degree manslaughter, 
kidnapping, or first degree arson; attempted murder, placing 
an explosive device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a 
second or third offense; and any felony after three prior of-
fenses. Finally, there was a large group of very serious of-
fenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, in-
cluding a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated 
assault. 
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one ut-
tering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer 
had already committed six minor felonies. Furthermore, 
there is no indication in the record that any habitual offender 
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other than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence 
on the basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the 
possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is 
reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, 
while habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treat-
ment. 25 In any event, Helm has been treated in the same 
manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have com-
mitted far more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Ap-
peals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence 
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N e-
vada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this 
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, there-
fore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a se-
vere sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N e-
vada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any de-
fendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor, 
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It 
• The State contends that § 22-7~ is more lenient than the Texas habit-
ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7~ is 
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, 
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that 
§ 22-7~ may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers 
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judg-
ment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note, 
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 
1160 (1979). 
• Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence 
of ''imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of 
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the pos-
sibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years 
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious 
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302 
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appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would 
have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially the 
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute 
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, 
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally 
different from the parole system that was before us in 
Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-
lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behav-
ior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to 
be considered for parole, and details the standards and proce-
dures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Ne-
braska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 477 (1972) (''the practice of releasing prisoners on parole 
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part 
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Com-
mutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of execu-
tive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards. 
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
u. s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between pa-
role and commutation in our prior cases. 27 Writing on behalf 
(1980) (possession of a fireann by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an 
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burgl_aries, two 
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of 
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
rr In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of 
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of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BuR-
GER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an 
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at 
477. In Dumsckat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained 
that ''there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . . 
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452 
U. S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply 
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked 
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact 
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good 
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has al-
lowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas 
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time 
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the 
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less. 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vern on 
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per 
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T. 
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2--3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus 
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10 
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor-
mal course of events, in only 12 years. 
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court care-
fully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § ~19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for 
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi 
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and 
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to par-
don includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington 
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954). 
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In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles 
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the 
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no 
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence, 
or for a pardon . . . , shall be made by less than the unani-
mous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sen-
tence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while 
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly dur-
ing that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. ~9. Furthermore, even if 
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible 
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee 
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
system is far more stringent than the one before us in 
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his re-
vised sentence before he would be ~ligible for parole. ~ 
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is ~--c/ 
generous, § 24-5-1.29 
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope 
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different 
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare 
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth 
Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
21 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota oc-
curred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in ques-
tion has still not been paroled. App. 29. 
11 Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's 
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole 
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel mini-
mum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If 
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have 
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years. 
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to detennine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penulti-
mate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has 
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State 
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State. 
We conclude that his sentence is significantly dispropor-
tionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972 
1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of 
the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent 
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute bur-
glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree. " S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curti-
lage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or 
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in 
§ 32-14--1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with 
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree. " S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the 
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed. , supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws, 
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code § 13.3705(3) 
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny.3 And in 1975 he 
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any 
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none 
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are 
those given by Helm to the state trial court: 
(1939)) (repealed 1976). 
2 In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writ-
ing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or 
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so ob-
tained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
8 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another 
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, 
is taken from the person of another; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-2 
(1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
• A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony 
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D. 
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of § 32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
5 The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended . up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no ac-
count" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now 
codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As 
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to 
South Dakota's recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, 
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to 
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws 
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life impris-
onment in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand 
dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another 
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a 
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his prin-
cipal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a 
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979). 
6 When Helm was sentenced in April1979, South Dakota law classified 
felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the fol-
lowing seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the re-
spective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
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supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3) 
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly pro-
vides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life 
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of par-
dons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws §24-15-4 (1979). 
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to com-
mute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, §3, but no other 
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated 
prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South 
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained: 
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly 
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser 
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a 
fine of two thousand dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual crimi-
nals .... 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense 
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony." 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 
1980). 
7 The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws§ 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D. 
Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by 
the recommendation, § 24-14-5. 
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that 
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest 
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of 
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll 
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v. 
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Pennington County (Parker, J.)). 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed 
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, 
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a 
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had 
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole 
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See 
S.D. Codified Laws § 24--15-5(3) (1979). The Governor de-
nied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Da-
kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court 
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this 
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals 
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's 
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different 
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole be-
cause South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of 
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined 
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the 
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same offense. oncluded, on the basis of this examination, 
that Helm's sentenc as "grossly disproportionate to the na-
ture of the offense." 84 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore di-
rected the District Cou to issue the writ unless the State 
resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
ighth Amendment question pre-
W@o~~~~te· !fiMii. 459 u.s.-
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to 
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three. chapters of Magna 
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not 
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and ex-
tended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal 
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish-
ments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches-
8 An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most 
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pol-
lock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909). 
• Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small 
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translati 
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there c ause in Magna 
Carta more grateful to the mass of the peopl .... " F. Maitland, Pleas of 
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted 
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to 
the clergy. 
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ter, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52 
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the 
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that 
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of propor-
tionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the 
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the pun-
ishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length 
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." 
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at 
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable sever-
ity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed, 
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand 
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl 
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna 
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law 
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the 
English principle of proportionality. The people were guar-
anteed the rights they had possessed as English subjects-
including the right to be free from excessive punishments. 
10 This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason. 
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B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been rec-
ognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the 
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public docu-
ment and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form 
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and per-
manent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court en-
dorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional 
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the 
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment," 
id., at 377. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
nal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for 
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The 
Cburt explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in 
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." 
"In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been 
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority," 
and sentenced to a tenn of over 54 years. The majority did not reach 
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not 
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. I d., at 331. 
Furthennore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not 
apply to the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. I d., at 336--337. The dissent, 
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is 
directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or se-
verity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." ld., at 
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
12 Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of propor-
tionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently bar-
baric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 
Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of pro-
portionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. -- (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant 
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be 
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the 
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is 
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate 
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on 
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally dispro-
portionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11 
(same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison 
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no 
13 According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could 
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for 
crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies ... the length of 
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, 
· fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death 
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is 
also no historical support for such an exception. The com-
mon-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment 
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that 
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. 
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of pun-
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capi-
tal cases, we have drawn no distinction with imprisonment. 
See .Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of Stewart, 
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the "penalty of 
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not 
in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 
306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As a result, "our deci-
sions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding 
the constitutionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case. 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All this means, how-
ever, is that, "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, 
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sen-
tences [will be] exceedingly rare," 14 ibid. (emphasis added); 
!d., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard pro-
posed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the ex-
tent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless. 
14 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be ex-
cessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no 
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see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. It does not mean that 
proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable in noncapital 
cases. 
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been con-
victed. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substan-
tial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess 
in determining the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in 
sentencing convicted criminals. 15 But no penalty is per se 
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be uncon-
stitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment, 
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases 
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the of-
fense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for ex-
ample, the Court examined the circumstances of the defend-
ant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at-----. In 
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of 
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433 
J. i$(r.fltlr1r,.lt .. te 
sentence short of death would be • ""n f ;' for Enmund's crime. 
16 In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and 
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to 
engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitu-
tionally disproportionate. 
16 As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive. See 
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U. S. , at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal 
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide 
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a 
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth 
Amendment. 
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U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666--667. And in Weems, the Court's 
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of 
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court 
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether 
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598 
(pluralityopinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366-367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less seri-
ous penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted 
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida 
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at 
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of 
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penal-
ties. 217 U. S., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review 
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a 
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 
U. S., at --. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the 
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar cir-
cumstances. Id., at--. The Court's review of foreign 
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at --, n. 22. The 
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at 
593--597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that, 
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two 
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
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(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are compe-
tent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative 
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as leg-
islatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons 
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the 
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus 
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's con-
duct was not lid' serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness 
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness 
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the crimi-
nal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than 
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is 
more protective of people than property). 
There are other J.IA8e-ly accepted principles that courts may 
apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the vic-
tim or society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be 
relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more seri-
ous than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in 
statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, 
e. g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few 
would dispute that a lesser included offense should not be 
punished more severely than the greater offense. Thus a 
court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as 
more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 
544 F. 2d 168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
430 U. S. 973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 
tA.~I , -r 
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252, 240 N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more seri-
ous than robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 
P. 2d 233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious thha~n~as~s!a~ul~t~WI~'Qth~in~--r-;::~::;:;:-;::::2~ 
t t t . ) I ;.,. 1 '..l.J.c c;:;; I d h -::1 JA-~~L. en o comimt rape . t _, a so VJ'ictety ;of ~cogruze t at at-L t7 _ 
tempts are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Simi-
larly, an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a 
higherpenaltythantheprincipal. See, e. g., 18U. S.C. §3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again 
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent 
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Da-
kota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of .~.~--- l'lA ,. _ L ,. _ w 
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing <:: I'~ 
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified ~A; 
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A courws ~ entitled to /.J-~ 
look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. Thus a ~ ~ ~ _~. ~-· ~~ 
murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pur-
suant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. w~ 
279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone *15; In re 
Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974). 11 ~ 
~ . 1~ '' _L This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates 'IJ""" 
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the ,) J,AA.,~ 
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi- ~ 1 _ ,, .'7. 
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between ~ 
similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of 
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
82-492-0PINION 
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ments, for the death penalty is different from other punish-
ments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of impris-
onment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one 
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally 
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it 
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the 
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of 
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area. 
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in 
a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example. 
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld 
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member 
jury, and in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), we up-
held a conviction returned by ten members of a 12-member 
jury. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), however, 
we reversed a conviction returned by a unanimous 5-member 
jury. JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readily admit(ted] that we d(id], 
not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and 
five." Id., at 239 (opinion ofBLACKMUN, J.). He neverthe-
less found a difference between them of "constitutional sig-
nificance." Ibid.; cf. id., at 245-246 (POWELL, J., concurring 
in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. Lou-
isiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction re-
turned by five members of a 6-member jury: 
"(W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a 
bright line below which the number of jurors participat-
ing in the trial or in the verdict would not permit the 
jury to function in the manner required by our prior 
cases. But ... it is inevitable that lines must be drawn 
17 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen-
tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 u. s. 25 (1972). 
18 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending 
upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
16 
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somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be 
preserved." Id., at 137 (citations omitted). 
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-draw-
ing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the 
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a 
defendant has a right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for 
more than six months is authorized." Id., at 69 (plurality 
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality re-
lied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City 
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by 
more than six months. As JusTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone--between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at 
72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly 
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. 
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to 
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines be-
tween sentences should be drawn. 
IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first con-
sider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then con-
sider the State's argument that the possibility of commuta-
tion is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional 
sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a per-
son could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501 
82-492-0PINION 
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(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of 
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it 
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the 
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is 
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among 
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 
at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more se-
verely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, how-
ever, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior of-
fenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a 
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the 
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, 
19 If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register, 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100, 
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or black-
mail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100, 
§ 22-30A--8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison 
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. 
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check 
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South 
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2. 
00 We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life 
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of-
fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are rel-
evant to the sentencing decision. 
21 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes-
sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a conse-
quent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is 
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substan-
tial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have any incentive to pursue 
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem. 
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supra, and the minimum amount covered by,.tgrand larceny 
statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without pos-
sibility ofparole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at 
--, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peniten-
tiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was 
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his 
initial confinement,24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. 
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. /1Ielm's sentence is more severe 
than any other sentence the S tate could have imposed on any 
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supriJ Only capital 
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when 
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it. 
jk l*f 1\ ~ ReMit coti,Sjder tl:~fil seft~enees that could be imposed on 
~ •~ _ . ~ f:-:': ~otber criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was 1/-~ - entenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a 
/~~ --1 life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12 
/~$ ~~1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life 
~ sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter, 
~ 4G-<~ § 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-3~1, and kidnapping, 
..ta., ~ S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely 
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws 
22 As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov-
ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered 
the theft of a chicken. 
23 Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole. 
See supra, at-. We raise no question as to the general validity of sen-
tences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether, 
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
24 We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the 
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
~. 
) 
SOLEM v. HELM 19 
~bJ~rt1:97'9)., -p}.~fiji!:..a.Jn explosive vice on an aircraft, 
14A-5, and first degree e, § 2 22-1 (amended 1980 
and 1982), ere only Class 2 fe ni . Aggravated rio~ 
22-10 as only a Class 3 felony. Distribution of heroin, 
§§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-208-13(7) (1977), and aggra-
vated assault, § 22-18-1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were 
only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, 
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or 
t · d con~as for treason, first degree manslaughter, 
kidna in ordkSt degree ars"Olt;>and a life sentence would 
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was 
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7-8, 
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprison-
ment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes. 
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessar-
ily{puni'Shed by life im risonment· der· and treason first 
degree manslaughter, ki na m or st de ee arso !On a 
second or third offens£:1 There was a larger group for which 
life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sen-
tencin 'ud~ including: treason, first degree manslaughter, 
dna m orHifst degree ars~ attempted murder, placing 
an explosive device on an aircraft, or first degree rape on a 
second or third offense; and any felony after three prior of-
fenses. Finally, there was a large group of very serious of-
fenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, in-
cluding a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated 
assault. 
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one ut-
tering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer l1.~. _ .... ~. _ A. 
had already committed six minor felonies. FYf't}term~rr,- '~,· 
there is no indication in the record that any habitual offender 
82-492-0PINION 
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other than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence 
on the basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the 
possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is 
reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, 
while habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treat-
ment. 26 In any event, Helm has been treated in the same 
manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have com-
mitted far more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Ap-
peals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence 
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N e-
vada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this 
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, there-
fore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a se-
vere sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N e-
vada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any de-
fendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor, 
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 211 It 
25 The State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habit-
ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is 
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, 
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that 
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers 
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judg-
ment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note, 
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 
1160 (1979). 
'"Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence 
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of 
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the pos-
sibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years 
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious 
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusting v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302 
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appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would 
have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially the 
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute 
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, 
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally 
different from the parole system that was before us in 
Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-
lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behav-
ior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to 
be considered for parole, and details the standards and proce-
dures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Ne-
bras~a Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Ne-
braska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole 
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part 
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Com-
mutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of execu-
tive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards. 
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
u. s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between pa-
role and commutation in our prior cases. 27 Writing on behalf 
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an 
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two 
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of 
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
Z1 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of 
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of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BUR-
GER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an 
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at 
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained 
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . . 
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452 
U. S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply 
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked 
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact 
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good 
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has al-
lowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas 
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time 
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the 
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less. 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon 
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per 
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T. 
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus 
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10 
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor-
mal course of events, in only 12 years. 
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court care-
fully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19--83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for 
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi 
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and 
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to par-
don includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington 
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954). 
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In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles 
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the 
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no 
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence, 
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unani-
mous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sen-
tence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while 
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly dur-
ing that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if 
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible 
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee 
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
system is far more stringent than the one before us in 
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his re-
vised sentence before he would be eligible for parole, 
§ 24-lfH>, and the provision for good-time credits is far less 
generous, § 24-5-1. 29 
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope 
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different 
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare 
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth 
Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
28 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota oc-
curred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in ques-
tion~not been paroled. App. 29. 
29 Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's 
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole 
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel mini-
mum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If 
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have 
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years. 
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to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penulti-
mate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has 
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State 
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State. 
We conclude that his sentence is significantly dispropor-
tionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-492 
HERMAN SOLEM, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. JERRY 
BUCKLEY HELM 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972 
'In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of 
the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent 
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute bur-
glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curti-
lage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or 
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in 
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with 
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the 
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws, 
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 22--32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code§ 13.3705(3) 
( 
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he 
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any 
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none 
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are 
those given by Helm to the state trial court: 
(1939)) (repealed 1976). 
2 In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writ-
ing, or other false pretense, . .. obtains from any person any money or 
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so ob-
tained, or by both such fine and imprisonment. " S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
3 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another 
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, 
is taken from the person of another; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-2 
(1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
' A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is .a felony 
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D. 
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
5 The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no ac-
count" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now 
codified at S.D. Codified Laws§ 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As 
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to 
South Dakota's recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, 
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to 
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws 
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life impris-
onment in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand 
dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another 
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a 
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his prin-
cipal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a 
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979). 
6 When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified 
felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the fol-
lowing seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the re-
spective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
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supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22--6-1(3) 
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly pro-
vides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life 
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of par-
dons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15-4 (1979). 
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to com-
mute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, §3, but no other 
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated 
prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South 
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained: 
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly 
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser 
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a 
fine of two thousand dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual crimi-
nals .... 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense 
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony." 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 
1980). 
7 The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws§ 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D. 
Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by 
the recommendation, § 24-14-5. 
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that 
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest 
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of 
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll 
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v. 
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Pennington County (Parker, J.)). 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3--2 decision, affirmed 
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, 
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a 
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had 
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole 
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See 
S.D. Codified Laws § 24--15-5(3) (1979). The Governor de-
nied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Da-
kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court 
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this 
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals 
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's 
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different 
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole be-
cause South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of 
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined 
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the 
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same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination, 
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore di-
rected the District Court to issue the writ unless the State 
resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
"ii __ _....._illlii .... lllli Eighth Amendment question pre-
sented by this case_.-
(1982). We now affirm. 
ts d nnsi 1f1!t> 459 U. S. --
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to 
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna 
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not 
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and ex-
tended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal 
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish-
ments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop ofWinches-
8 An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most 
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pol-
lock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909). 
9 Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small 
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation 
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "th~no clause in Magna 
Carta more grateful to the mass of the peoplE(;.~,.:·:, F; Maitland, Pleas of 
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted 
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ter, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52 
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the 
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that 
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Buist. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of propor-
tionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the 
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the pun-
ishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length 
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." 
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at 
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable sever-
ity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed, 
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand 
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl 
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna 
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law 
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the 
English principle of proportionality. The people were guar-
anteed the rights they had possessed as English subjects-
including the right to be free from excessive punishments. 
10 This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason. 1' 
- '-
See Pt. Howard > The Ro~d .froYI'\ 
RtAnflymede : frlaJntt Co.r-f(), ct n& 
( or~sti ttA. tror~ c. l1.s m In ltrt~er-ica 201- {t16e). 
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B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been rec-
ognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the 
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public docu-
ment and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form 
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and per-
manent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court en-
dorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional 
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the 
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment," 
id., at 377. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
nal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for 
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The 
Cburt explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in 
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." 
"In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been 
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority," 
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach 
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not 
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. Id., at 331. 
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not 
apply to the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. I d., at 336-337. The dissent, 
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is 
directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or se-
verity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." Id., at 
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
12 Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of propor-
tionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently bar-
baric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 
Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of pro-
portionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. -- (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant 
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be 
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the 
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is 
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate 
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on 
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally dispro-
portionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11 
(same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison 
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no 
'
3 According to Rummel v. Estelle , 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could 
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for 
crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of 
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, 
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death 
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is 
also no historical support for such an exception. The com-
mon-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment 
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that 
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. 
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 { 
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison . . . is a form of pun-____--1 
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendm~t 
standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality pr~ei le in capi-
tal cases, we have drawn no distinction with~mprisonment. 
See .Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opimon of Stewart, 
POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the "penalty of 
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not 
in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 
306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As a result, "our deci-
sions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance in deciding 
the constitutionality of the punishment" in a noncapital case. 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All this means, how-
ever, is that, "[o]utside the context of capital punishment, 
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sen-
tences [will be] exceedingly rare," 14 ibid. (emphasis added); 
!d., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard pro-
posed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the ex-
tent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless. 
14 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be ex-
cessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no 
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see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. It does not mean that 
proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable in noncapital 
cases. 
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been con-
victed. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substan-
tial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess 
in determining the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in 
·sentencing convicted criminals. 15 But no penalty is per se 
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be uncon-
stitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment, 
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases 
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the of-
fense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for ex-
ample, the Court examined the circumstances of the defend-
ant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at-----. In 
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of 
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433 
oF i ~ ,., .so., ""@ 
sentence or Enmund's crime. 
15 In VIew of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and 
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to 
engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitu-
tionally disproportionate. 
16 As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive. See 
Hutto v. Davis , 454 U. S. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U. S. , at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal 
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide 
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a 
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth 
Amendment.) 
4see JeFFrie~ &- Stephan, DeFer~~e~> 
{} ~ (}."'r) Bur-de~ oF ProoF Ill th-( rr'tSuiVlf I IO~S' ,, 
C rimiMI Y~le L, J. 1325) 
13 1-{, - 131-1 
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U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
"crime." 370 U. S., at 66(H)67. And in Weems, the Court's 
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of 
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court 
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether 
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598 
(pluralityopinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366--367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less seri-
ous penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted 
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida 
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at 
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of 
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penal-
ties. 217 U. S., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review 
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a 
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 
U. S., at --. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the 
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar cir-
cumstances. Id., at--. The Court's review of foreign 
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at --, n. 22. The 
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at 
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that, 
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two 
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
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(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are compe-
tent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative 
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as leg-
islatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons 
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the 
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus 
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's con-
duct was not • serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness 
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness 
of Crimes: Normative Structure and IndiYidual .Differences, 
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (!)74). For example, as the crimi-
nal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than 
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is 
more rotective of people than property). 
There are o er · accepted principles that courts may 
apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the vic-
tim or society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be 
relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more seri-
ous than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in 
statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, 
e. g., S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few 
would dispute that a lesser included offense should not be 
punished more severely than the greater offense. Thus a 
court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as 
more serious than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 
544 F. 2d 168, 169--170 (CA41976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
430 U. S. 973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 
--(j) 
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252, 240 N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (anned rob ry more seri-
ous than robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 r. 629, 632, 281 
c__-l-_____ .............. d.2~e more serious t an assault with in-
tent to commit rape). Ita also recognized that at-
tempts are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Simi-
larly, an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a 
higher penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again 
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in detennining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent 
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Da-
kota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of 
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing 
r acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified ) aF c~,.,r${', _ .,..L-aws 922-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A courws entitled to _ _ look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. Thus a 
murder may be viewed as more serious when committed pur-
suant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 
279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone *15; In re 
Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates 
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the 
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi-
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between 
similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of 
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
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ments, for the death penalty is different from other punish-
ments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of impris-
onment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one 
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally 
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it 
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the 
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of 
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area. 
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in 
a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example. 
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld 
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member 
jury, and in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), we up-
held a conviction returned by ten members of a 12-member 
jury. In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), however, 
we reversed a conviction returned by a unanimous 5-member 
jury. JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readily admit[ted] that we d[id] 
not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and 
five." Id., at 239 (opinion ofBLACKMUN, J.). He neverthe-
less found a difference between them of "constitutional sig-
nificance." Ibid.; cf. id., at 24~246 (POWELL, J., concurring 
in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. Lou-
isiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction re-
turned by five members of a 6-member jury: 
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a 
bright line below which the number of jurors participat-
ing in the trial or in the verdict would not permit the 
jury to function in the manner required by our prior 
cases. But ... it is inevitable that lines must be drawn 
17 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen-
tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin , 
407 u. s. 25 (1972). 
18 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending 
upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
16 
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somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be 
preserved." ld., at 137 (citations omitted). 
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-draw-
ing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the 
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a 
defendant has a right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for 
more than six months is authorized." ld., at 69 (plurality 
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality re-
lied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City 
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by 
more than six months. As JUSTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone-between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." !d., at 
72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly 
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. 
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to 
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines be-
tween sentences should be drawn. 
IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first con-
sider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then con-
sider the State's argument that the possibility of commuta-
tion is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional 
sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a per-
son could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501 
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(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of 
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it 
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the 
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is 
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among 
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 
at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more se-
verely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, how-
ever, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior of-
fenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a 
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the 
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, 
19 If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register, 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100, 
§ 22-30A--3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or black-
mail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100, 
§ 22-30A--8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison 
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. 
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check 
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South 
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2. 
'1IJ We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life 
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of-
fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are rel-
evant to the sentencing decision. 
21 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes-
sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a conse-
quent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of..parole-i 
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice sy~n any substan-
tial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have ant incentive to pursue 
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supra, and the minimum amount covered by grand larceny 
statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without pos-
sibility ofparole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at 
--, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peniten-
tiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was 
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his 
initial confinement,24 a fact on which the Court rfed heavily. 
See 445 U. S."' at 280-281. Helm's sentence is severe 
-- ~the State could have imposed on any 
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital 
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when 
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it. 
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was 
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a 
life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12 
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life 
sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter, 
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping, 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19--1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely 
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws 
22 As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov-
ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered 
the theft of a chicken. 
23 Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole. 
See supra, at-. We raise no question as to the general validity of sen-
tences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether, 
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
24 We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the 
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
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§ 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an aircraft, 
§ 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 (amended 1980 
and 1982), were onl Class 2 felonies. Agz.!:avated rio , 
10- , as on a Class 3 felon . Distribution of herom, 
§§ 22-42- (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) (1977), and aggra-
vated assault, § 22-18--1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were 
only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, 
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or 
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, 
t;:, . {kidnapp~ o/@r~ degree ar~ and a life sentence would 
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was 
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7-:;8, 
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imy:riSOn-
ment after three prior convictions, regard=ess of he crimes. 
In sum, there were a handful of crimes th IT~essa 
ily punished by life imprisonment: murde ; and_(treason, first 
egree mans aug ter, kidnappingAII!B•III••••-• 
ass 1 d 5I' M · 1 m an 0 There was a larger group for which 
life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of the sen-
tencin 'ud e including: treason first degree manslau h er, 
ki first de ee rso attem t r er, placing 
a11-ex osive device on an aircraft, st degree rape on a 
second or third offense; and any felony after three prior of-
fenses. Finally, there was a large group of very serious of-
fenses for which life imprisonment was not authorized, in-
cluding a third offense of heroin dealing or aggravated 
assault. 
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one ut-
tering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer 
had already committed six minor felonies. 
there is no indication in the record that any habitual offender 
/lore ~ver7 J 
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other than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence 
on the basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the 
possibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7--8 generally is 
reserved for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, 
while habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treat-
ment. 26 In any event, Helm has been treated in the same 
manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have com-
mitted far more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Ap-
peals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence 
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N e-
vada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this 
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, there-
fore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a se-
vere sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N e-
vada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev. 
Stat. §207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any de-
fendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor, 
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It 
25 The State contends that§ 22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habit-
ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is 
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, 
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that 
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers 
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judg-
ment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note, 
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 
1160 (1979). 
26 Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence 
of ''imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of 
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the pos-
sibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years 
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious 
than Helm's. See, e. g. , Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302 
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appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would 
have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially the 
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute 
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, 
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally 
different from the parole system that was before us in 
Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-
lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behav-
ior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to 
be considered for parole, and details the standards and proce-
dures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Ne-
braska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole 
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part 
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Com-
mutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of execu-
tive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards. 
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
u. s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between pa-
role and commutation in our prior cases. '1:1 Writing on behalf 
(1980) (possession of a fireann by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an 
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two 
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of 
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
27 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of 
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of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BuR-
GER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an 
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at 
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained 
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . . 
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452 
U. S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply 
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked 
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact 
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good 
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has al-
lowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas 
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time 
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the 
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less. 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon 
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per 
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T. 
1979, No. 78--6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus 
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10 
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor-
mal course of events, in only 12 years. 
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court care-
fully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for 
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi 
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and 
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to par-
don includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington 
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954). 
. 1h, 
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In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles 
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the 
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no 
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence, 
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unani-
mous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sen~ 
tence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while 
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly dur-
ing that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if 
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible 
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee 
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
system is far more stringent than the one before us in 
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his re-
vised sentence before he would be eligible for parol 
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is 
generous, ~ 24-5-1. 29 
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope 
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different 
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare 
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth 
Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
28 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota oc-
curred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in ques-
tion~ot been paroled. App. 29. 
29 Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's 
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole 
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel mini-
mum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If 
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have 
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years. 
82--492-0PINION 
24 SOLEM v. HELM 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penulti-
mate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has 
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State 
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State. 
We conclude that his sentence is significantly dispropor-
tionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted ofthird-degree burglary.' In 1972 
1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of 
the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent 
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute bur-
glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curti-
lage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or 
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in 
§ 32-14-1 , or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with 
intent to commit larceny or any felony , is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the 
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws, 
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by ''imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S.D. Code § 13.3705(3) 
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny.3 And in 1975 he 
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any 
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none 
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are 
those given by Helm to the state trial court: 
(1939)) (repealed 1976). 
2 In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writ-
ing, or other false pretense, . . . obtains from any person any money or 
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so ob-
tained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
• In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another 
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, 
is taken from the person of another; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-2 
(1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by ''imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-37-3 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
• A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony 
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D. 
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of § 32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
6 The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no ac-
count" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a five thousand dollar fine. See S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now 
codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As 
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to 
South Dakota's recidivist statute: 
''When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, 
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to 
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws 
§22-7--8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony'' was life impris-
onment in the state penitentiary and a twenty-five thousand 
dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another 
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a 
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his prin-
cipal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a 
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979). 
6 When Helm was sentenced in April1979, South Dakota law classified 
felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the fol-
lowing seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the re-
spective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
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supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § ~1(3) 
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly pro-
vides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life 
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of par-
dons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws §24-15-4 (1979). 
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to com-
mute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, § 3, but no other 
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated 
prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South 
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under §22-7-8. The court explained: 
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly 
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser 
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a 
fine of two thousand dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual crimi-
nals .... 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by Jaw, every offense 
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony." 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22--6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 
1980). 
7 The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws§ 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D. 
Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by 
the recommendation, § 24-14-5. 
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that 
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest 
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of 
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll 
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v. 
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Pennington County (Parker, J.)). 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a ~2 decision, affirmed 
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, 
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a 
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had 
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole 
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See 
S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15-5(3) (1979). The Governor de-
nied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Da-
kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court 
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this 
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals 
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's 
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different 
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole be-
cause South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of 
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined 
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature ofhis sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the 
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same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination, 
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore di-
rected the District Court to issue the writ unless the State 
resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment I 
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. -- (1982). We 
now affirm. 
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to 
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna 
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not 
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and ex-
tended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal 
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish-
8 An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most 
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pol-
lock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513--515 (2d ed. 1909). 
'Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small 
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation 
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna 
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people . . . . " F. Maitland, Pleas of 
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted 
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to 
the clergy. 
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ments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches-
ter, Y.B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.P. 1316), reprinted in 52 
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the 
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that 
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Buist. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of propor-
tionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell an~ unusuall Punishments 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the 
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the pun-
ishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length 
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." 
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at 
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable sever-
ity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed, 
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand 
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl 
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna 
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law 
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the 
'
0 This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason. See A. Howard, The I 
Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 
207 (1968). 
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English principle of proportionality. The people were guar-
anteed the rights they had possessed as English subjects-
including the right to be free from excessive punishments. 
B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been rec-
ognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the 
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public docu-
ment and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form 
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and per-
manent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court en-
dorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional 
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the 
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment," 
id., at 377. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
nal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for 
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The 
11 In O'Neil v. Vernwnt, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been 
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority," 
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach 
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not 
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. /d., at 331. 
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not 
apply to the States." I d., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. /d., at 33&-337. The dissent, 
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is 
directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or se-
verity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." /d., at 
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
12 Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of propor-
tionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
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Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in 
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." 
Id., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently bar-
baric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 
Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of pro-
portionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. -- (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant 
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be 
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the 
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is 
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate 
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on 
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally dispro-
portionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11 
(same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison 
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no 
1~126 (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting). 
a According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could 
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, 
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death 
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is 
also no historical support for such an exception. The com-
mon-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment 
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that 
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. 
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of pun-
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capi- f 
tal cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of impris-
onment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the 
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As are-
sult, "our decisions [in] capital cases az:e of li!!rlted as~stance 
in deciding the constitutionality of the purusfiment" in a 
noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. ~ 
'l _ -tftis meaas, A9We'V'eF, 4s that, "[o]utside the context of capital 1'"""' 
~ punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of 
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for 
crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of 
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 
!d., at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard pro-
posed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the ex-
tent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless. 
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particular sentences [ ·n be ex eedin 1 rare," 14 ib e. 6ue: :::.. 
phasis added); see H tto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. ~ 
not mean that propo ionality analysis is entirely inapplicable 
in noncapital cases. 
In sum, we hold hat a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been con-
victed. Reviewing courts, of course, ..ihg:aJQ grant substan- ~kf 
tial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess 
in determining the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in 
sentencing convicted criminals. 15 But no penalty is per se 
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be uncon-
stitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment, 
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases 
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the of-
fense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for ex-
ample, the Court examined the circumstances of the defend-
•• In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be ex-
cessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly nill 
sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund's crime. ~ 
In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures an ~ 
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to 
engage' in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitu-
tionally disproportionate. 
~ the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive. See 
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373-874 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal 
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide 
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a 
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of J 
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L.J. 1325, 1376-1377 (1979). 
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ant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at -- - --. In 
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of 
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433 
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
"crime." 370 U. S., at 66&-667. And in Weems, the Court's 
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of 
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court 
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether 
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598 
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 36fh367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less seri-
ous penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted 
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida 
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at 
--. The Weems Court identified an impressive list of 
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penal-
ties. 217 U. S., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review 
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a 
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 
U. S., at--. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the 
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar cir-
cumstances. I d., at --. The Court's review of foreign 
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at --, n. 22. The 
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at 
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that, 
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two 
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year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are compe-
tent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative 
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as leg-
islatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons 
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the 
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus 
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's con-
duct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness 
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness 
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224,237 (1974). For example, as the crim-
inal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than 
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is 
more protective of people than property). 
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply 
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be rele-
vant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious 
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in stat-
utes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g., 
S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would 
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished 
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more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is jus-
tified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d 
168, 169-170 (CA41976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S. f 
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (anned robbery more serious than 
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d 
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to 
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts 
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S.D. 
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, 
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher 
penalty than thetprincipal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again 
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent 
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Da-
kota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of 
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing 
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified 
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is enti-
tled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. 
Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when commit-
ted pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone 
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates 
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the 
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi-
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between 
similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
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that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of 
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
ments, for the death penalty is different from other punish-
ments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of impris-
onment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one 
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally 
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it 
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the 
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of 
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area. 
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in 
a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is an example. 
In Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld 
a criminal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-member 
jury, and in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (1972), we up-
held a conviction returned by ten members of a 12-member 
jury. ·In Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 (1978), however, 
we reversed a conviction returned by a unanimous 5-member 
jury. JUSTICE BLACKMUN "readili admit[ ted] that we d[id] 
not pretend to discern a clear line between six members and 
five." /d., at 239 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.). He neverthe-
less found a difference between them of "constitutional sig-
nificance." Ibid.; cf. id., at 24~246 (POWELL, J., concurring 
in the judgment). And the following Term, in Burch v. Lou-
isiana, 441 U. S. 130 (1979), we reversed a conviction re-
turned by five members of a 6-member jury: 
"[W]e do not pretend the ability to discern a priori a 
bright line below which the number of jurors participat-
17 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen-
tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 u. s. 25 (1972). 
18 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending 
upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
16 
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ing in the trial ·or in the verdict would not permit the 
jury to function in the manner required by our prior 
cases. But ... it is inevitable that lines must be drawn 
somewhere if the substance of the jury trial right is to be 
preserved." Id., at 137 (citations omitted). 
Another Sixth Amendment case illustrates the line-draw-
ing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on the 
method by which some lines may be drawn. In Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), the Court determined that a 
defendant has a right to a jury trial "where imprisonment for 
more than six months is authorized." I d., at 69 (plurality 
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality re-
lied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City 
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by 
more than six months. As JUSTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone-between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at 
72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly 
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. 
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to 
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines be-
tween sentences should be drawn. 
IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first con-
sider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then con-
sider the State's argument that the possibility of commuta-
tion is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional 
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sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a per-
son could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501 
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of 
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it 
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the 
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is 
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among 
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 
at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more se-
verely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, how-
ever, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior of-
fenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a 
11 If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register, 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100, 
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or black-
mail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100, 
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison 
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. 
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check 
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South 
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2. 
20 We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life 
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of-
fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are rel-
evant to the sentencing decision. 
!I Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes-
sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a conse-
quent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
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person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the 
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, 
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand lar-
ceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without pos-
sibility of parole. 22 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at 
--, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peniten-
tiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was 
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his 
initial confinement,24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. 
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most se- ' 
vere punishment that the State could have imposed on any 
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital 
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when 
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it. 
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was 
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a 
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is 
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substan-
tial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue I 
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of 
rehabilitation. 
zz As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov-
ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered 
the theft of a chicken. 
zz Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole. 
See supra, at-. We raise no question as to the general validity of sen-
tences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether, 
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
"'We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the 
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
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life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12 
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life 
sentence for treason, § 22-8-1, first degree manslaughter, 
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22--83-1, and kidnapping, · 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely 
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws 
§ 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an aircraft, 
§ 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 (amended 1980 
and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot was I 
only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distribution of heroin, 
§§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) (1977), and aggra-
vated assault, § 22-1~1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were 
only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, 
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or 
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, 
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would f 
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was 
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7-8, 
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprison-
ment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes. 
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessar-
ily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second l 
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first de-
gree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for 
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of 
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree man-
slaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted I 
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first 
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after 
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of 
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very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not au-
thorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggra-
vated assault. 
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one ut-
tering a "no account" check--even when the bad-check writer ' 
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there 
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other 
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the 
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the pos-
sibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is re-
served for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while 
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 25 
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as, 
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far 
more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Ap-
peals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence 
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N e-
vada," 684 F . 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this 
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg~ 21. At the very least, there-
fore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a se-
vere sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N e-
vada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev . 
., The State contends that § 22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habit-
ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is 
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, 
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that 
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers 
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judg-
ment. Unlike in Rummel, a Jesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note, 
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 
1160 (1979). 
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Stat. §207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any de-
fendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor, 
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It 
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would 
have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially the 
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute 
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, 
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally 
different from the parole system that was before us in 
Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-
lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behav-
ior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to 
be considered for parole, and details the standards and proce-
dures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Ne-
braska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole 
•Under §207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence 
of ''imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of 
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the pos-
sibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years 
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious 
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302 
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an 
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two 
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of 
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
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before the end of their sentences has become an integral part 
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Com-
mutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of execu-
tive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards. 
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
u. s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between pa-
role and commutation in our prior cases. zr Writing on behalf 
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BUR-
GER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an 
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at 
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained 
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . . 
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452 
U. S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply 
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked 
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact 
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good 
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has al-
lowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas 
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time 
n In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of 
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court care-
fully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § ~19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for 
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi 
Constttution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and 
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to par-
don includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington 
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603--604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954). 
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served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the 
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less. 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon 
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per 
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T. 
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus 
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10 
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor-
mal course of events, in only 12 years. 
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles 
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the 
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no 
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence, 
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unani-
mous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sen-
tence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while 
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly dur-
ing that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if 
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible 
to be considered for parole.28 Not only is there no guarantee 
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
system is far more stringent than the one before us in 
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his re-
vised sentence before he would be eligible for parole, 
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less gen-
erous, §24-5-1.29 
111 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota oc-
curred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in ques-
tion still has not been paroled. App. 29. 
11 Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's 
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole 
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel mini-
mum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If 
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The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope 
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different 
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare 
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth 
Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penulti-
mate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has 
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State 
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State. 
We conclude that his sentence is significantly dispropor-
tionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have 
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972 
1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of 
the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent 
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitut~b -
glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S.D 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curti-
lage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or 
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in 
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with 
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the 
same. See S.D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S.D. Laws, 
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp. 
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2 SOLEM v. HELM 
he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he 
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any 
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none 
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are 
those given by Helm to the state trial court: 
(1939)) (repealed 1976). 
' In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writ-
ing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or 
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so ob-
tained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
3 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another 
thereof." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, 
is taken from the person of another; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-2 
(1967) (repealed 1976). 
rand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state peniten-
ary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
eeding one year." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
· • A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony 
in South Dakota. S.D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S.D. 
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
'The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no ac-
count" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a~ thousand do r fine. See S.D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now 
codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As 
a result of his criminal record, however, Helm was subject to 
South Dakota's recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, 
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to 
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S.D. Codified Laws 
§22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life impris-
onment in the state penitentiary and a enty-five thousand 
c__dollar fine. 6 S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another 
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a 
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his prin-
cipal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a 
Class 5 felony." S.D. Codified Laws § 2~1-1.2 (1979). 
6 When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified 
felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the fol-
lowing seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the re-
spective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
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supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6--1(3) 
(Supp. 1982)). Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly pro-
vides that parole is unavailable: "A person sentenced to life 
imprisonment is not eligible for parole by the board of par-
dons and paroles." S.D. Codified Laws § 24-15-4 (1979). 
The Governor 7 is authorized to pardon prisoners, or to com-
mute their sentences, S.D. Const., Art. IV, §3, but no other 
relief from sentence is available even to a rehabilitated 
prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South 
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained: 
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly 
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser 
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a 
fine of two thousand dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual crimi-
nals . ... 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense 
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony." 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 
1980). 
7 The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor, S.D. Codified Laws§ 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; S.D. 
Executive Order 82--04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not bound by 
the recommendation, § 24-14-5. 
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would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that 
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest 
of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of 
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll 
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v. 
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S.D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Pennington County (Parker, J.)). 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a ~2 decision, affirmed 
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, 
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a 
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had 
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole 
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See 
S.D. Codified Laws § 24-1fH>(3) (1979). The Governor de-
nied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Da-
kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court 
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this 
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals 
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's 
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different 
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole be-
cause South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of 
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined 
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the 
82-492--0PINION 
6 SOLEM v. HELM 
same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination, 
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore di-
rected the District Court to issue the writ unless the State 
resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment 
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. -- (1982). We 
now affirm. 
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to 
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna 
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not 
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and ex-
tended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal 
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish-
8 An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most 
common criminal sanction in thirteenth century England. See 2 F. Pol-
lock & F . Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909). 
9 Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small 
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it." See 1 S.D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation 
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna 
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people . . . . " F. Maitland, Pleas of 
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted 
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to 
the clergy. 
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ments See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches-
ter, Y.~ . Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C.f. 1316), reprinted in 52 
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the 
normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that 
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Buist. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of propor-
tionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell an~ unusuall Punishments. 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the 
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the pun-
ishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length 
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." 
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *1~19 (1769); see also id., at 
*1~17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable sever-
ity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed, 
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand 
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl 
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna 
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law 
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the 
10 This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason. See A. Howard, The 
Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 
207 (1968). 
82-492--0PINION 
8 SOLEM v. HELM 
English principle of proportionality. The people were guar-
anteed the rights they had possessed as English subjects-
including the right to be free from excessive punishments. ~I) 
B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been rec-
ognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the 
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public docu-
ment and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form 
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and per-
manent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court en-
dorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional 
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the 
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment," 
id., at 377. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
nal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for 
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The 
11 In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been 
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority," 
and sentenced to a tenn of over 54 years. The majority did not reach 
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not 
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. !d., at 331. 
Furthennore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not 
apply to the States." !d., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. !d., at 336-337. The dissent, 
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is 
directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length o se-
verity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." !d., at 
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
12 Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of propor-
tionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
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Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in 
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." 
I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently bar-
baric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 
Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of pro-
portionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. -- (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant 
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be 
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the 
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is 
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate 
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on 
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally dispro-
portionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11 
(same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison 
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no 
12~126 (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting). 
13 According to Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980), "one could 
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, 
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death 
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is 
also no historical support for such an exception. The com-
mon-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment 
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that 
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. 
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of pun-
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capi-
tal cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of impris-
onment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the 
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As are-
sult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance 
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a 
noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All 
this means, however, is that, "[o]utside the context of capital 
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of 
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for 
crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of 
sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 
Id. , at 274 (emphasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard pro-
posed, but merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the ex-
tent that the State makes this argument here, we find it meritless. 
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particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," 14 ibid. (em-
phasis added); see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. It does 
not mean that proportionality analysis is entirely inapplicable 
in noncapital cases. 
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been con-
victed. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substan-
tial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess 
in determining the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in 
sentencing convicted criminals. 16 But no penalty is per se 
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be uncon-
stitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
In reviewing sentences under the Eighth Amendment, 
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases 
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the of-
fense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for ex-
ample, the Court examined the circumstances of the defend-
14 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be ex-
cessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no 
sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund's crime. 
'~ In view of the substantial deference properly due to legislatures and 
sentencing courts, most reviewing courts normally will not be required to 
engage' in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not constitu-
tionally disproportionate. 
'
6 As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive. See 
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) (per curiam); Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 275-276. The inherent nature of our federal 
system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a wide 
range of constitutional sentences. No single criterion can identify when a 
sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defe ses, Presumptions, and Burden of 
Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L J. 1325, 1376-1377 (1979). 
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ant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at-----. In 
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of 
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433 
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666--667. And in Weems, the Court's 
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of 
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court 
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether 
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598 
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366-367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less seri-
ous penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted 
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida 
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at 
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of 
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penal-
ties. 217 U. S., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review 
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a 
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 
U. S., at --. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the 
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar cir-
cumstances. I d., at --. The Court's review of foreign 
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at --, n. 22. The 
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at 
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that, 
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two 
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year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are compe-
tent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative 
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as leg-
islatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons 
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the 
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus 
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's con-
duct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness 
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness 
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the crim-
inal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than 
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is 
more protective of people than property). 
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply 
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be rele-
vant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious 
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in stat-
utes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g., 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would 
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished 
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more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is jus-
tified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d 
168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than 
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d 
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to 
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts 
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S.D. 
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, 
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher 
penalty than theAJl'fncipal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again 
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent 
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Da-
kota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of 
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing 
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S.D. Codified 
Laws§ 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is enti-
tled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. 
Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when commit-
ted pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone 
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates 
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the 
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi-
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between 
similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
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that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of 
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
ments, for the death penalty is different from other punish-
ments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of impris-
onment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one 
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally 
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it 
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the 
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of 
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area. 
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in 
a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment r · o a 
orida, 399 U. S. 7 , 
a c · ·nal conviction returned by a unanimous 6-me er 
jury, a ·n Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 404 (197 , we up-
held a con · ion returned by ten members of 2-member 
jury. In Ball v. Georgia, 435 U. S. 223 78), however, 
we reversed a conv ·on returned by a nimous 5-member 
jury. JUSTICE BLACK N "readil:y:' mit[ted] that we d[id] 
not pretend to discern a cl li etween six members and 
five." ld., at 239 (opinion o CKMUN, J.). He neverthe-
less found a difference ween t e of "constitutional sig-
nificance." Ibid.; c ., at 245-246 (POWELL, J., concurring 
in the judgmen . And the following Term, · Burch v. Lou-
44 . S. 130 (1979), we reversed a c viction re-
five members of a 6-member jury: 
]e do not pretend the ability to discern a pri i a 
bri ht line bel ·urors participa 
17 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen-
tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 u 0 s. 25 (1972). 
18 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending 
upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
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ng nc 1on o e JU 1ciary, 
method b which some lines 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970) 
defendant has a right to a jury rial "where imprisonment for 
more than six months is authorized." ld., at 69 (plurality 
opinion). In choosing the 6-month standard, the plurality re-
lied almost exclusively on the fact that only New York City 
denied the right to a jury trial for an offense punishable by 
more than six months. As JUSTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone-between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." !d. , at 
72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly 
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. 
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to 
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines be-
tween sentences should be drawn. 
IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first con-
sider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then con-
sider the State's argument that the possibility of commuta-
tion is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional 
----
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sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a per-
son could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501 
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of 
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it 
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the 
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is 
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among 
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 
at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more se-
verely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, how-
ever, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior of-
fenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a 
19 If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register, 
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100, 
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or black-
mail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100, 
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison 
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. 
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check 
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South 
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2. 
20 We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life 
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of-
fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are rel-
evant to the sentencing decision. 
21 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes-
sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a conse-
quent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
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person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the 
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, 
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand lar-
ceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without pos-
sibility ofparole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at 
--, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peniten-
tiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was 
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his 
initial confinement,24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. 
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most se-
vere punishment that the State could have imposed on any 
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital 
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when 
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it. 
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was 
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a 
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is 
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substan-
tial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue 
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of 
rehabilitation. 
22 As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov-
ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered 
the theft of a chicken. 
23 Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole. 
See supra, at--. We raise no question as to the general validity of sen-
tences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether, 
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
24 We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the 
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
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life sentence for murder, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12 
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life 
sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter, 
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping, · 
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely 
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S.D. Codified Laws 
§ 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an aircraft, 
§ 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 (amended 1980 
and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Aggravated riot was 
only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distribution of heroin, 
§§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) (1977), and aggra-
vated assault, § 22-18-1.1 (amended 1980 and 1981), were 
only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, 
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or 
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, 
first. degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would 
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was 
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 22-7-8, 
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprison-
ment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimesJ II 
In sum~ there were a handful of crimes that were necessar-
ily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second 
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first de-
gree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for 
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of 
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree man-
slaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted 
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first 
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after 
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of 
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very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not au-
thorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggra-
vated assault. 
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one ut-
tering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer 
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there 
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other 
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the 
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the pos-
sibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is re-
served for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while 
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 25 
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as, 
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far 
more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Ap-
peals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence 
without parole for his offense in only one other state, Ne-
vada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this 
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, there-
fore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a se-
vere sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N e-
vada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev. 
26 The State contends that§ 22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habit-
ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is 
discretionary' rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, 
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that 
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers 
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judg-
ment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note, 
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 
1160 (1979). 
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Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any de-
fendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor, 
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It 
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would 
have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially the 
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute 
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, 
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally 
different from the parole system that was before us in 
Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-
lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behav-
ior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to 
be considered for parole, and details the standards and proce-
dures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Ne-
braska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole 
26 Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence 
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of 
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the pos- j 
sibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 years 
has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious 
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302 
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an 
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two 
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of 
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
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before the end of their sentences has become an integral part 
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Com-
mutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of execu-
tive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards. 
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
u. s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between pa-
role and commutation in our prior cases. 27 Writing on behalf 
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BuR-
GER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an 
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at 
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained 
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . . 
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452 
U. S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply 
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked 
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact 
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good 
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has al-
lowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas 
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time 
27 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of 
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court care-
fully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 9~19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for 
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi 
Constttution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and 
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to par-
don includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington 
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603--604, 73 So. 2d 137, 13~140 (1954). 
82-492-0PINION 
SOLEM v. HELM 23 
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the 
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less. 
Tex. Code Grim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon 
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per 
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T. 
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus 
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10 
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor-
mal course of events, in only 12 years. 
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles 
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the 
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13--4 provides that "no 
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence, 
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unani-
mous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sen-
tence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while 
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly dur-
ing that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if 
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible 
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee 
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
system is far more stringent than the one before us in 
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his re-
vised sentence before he would be eligible for parole, 
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less gen-
erous, § 24-5-1. 29 
28 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota oc-
curred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in ques-
tion still has not been paroled. App. 29. 
29 Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's 
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole 
until he had served' over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel mini-
mum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If 
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The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope 
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different 
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare 
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth 
Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution reqwres us to examine Helm's sentence 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penulti-
mate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has 
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State 
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State. 
We conclude that his sentence is significantly dispropor-
tionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have 
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The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972 
1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of 
the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent 
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute bur-
glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S. D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curti-
lage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or 
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in 
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with 
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the 
same. SeeS. D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S. D. Laws, 
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S. D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 22-32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S. D. Code § 13.3705(3) 
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny.3 And in 1975 he 
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any 
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none 
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100.5 The only details we have of the crime are 
those given by Helm to the state trial court: 
(1939)) (repealed 1976). 
2 In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writ-
ing, or other false pretense, . . . obtains from any person any money or 
property .. . is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so ob-
tained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
3 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another 
thereof." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, 
is taken from the person of another; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
' A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony 
in South Dakota. S. D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S. D. 
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of § 32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
• The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another 
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S. D. 
1980) (Henderson, J. , dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no ac-
count" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. See S. D. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now codified at S. D. 
Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As a result of his 
criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dako-
ta's recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, 
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to 
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S. D. Codified Laws 
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life impris-
onment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine. 6 S. D. 
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a 
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his prin-
cipal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a 
Class 5 felony. " S. D. Codified Laws § 2~1-1.2 (1979). 
6 When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified 
felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the fol-
lowing seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the re-
spective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser 
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
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Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now 
codified at S. D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3) (Supp. 1982)). 
Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is 
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not 
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S. 
D. Codified Laws § 24-15--4 (1979). The Governor 7 is au-
thorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, 
S. D. Canst., Art. IV, § 3, but no other relief from sentence is 
available even to a rehabilitated prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South 
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under § 22-7-8. The court explained: 
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly 
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record 
would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that 
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest 
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a 
fine of two thousand dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual 
criminals .... 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense 
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony." 
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 
1980). 
7 The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor, S. D. Codified Laws § 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; 
S. D. Executive Order 82--{)4 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not 
bound by the recommendation, § 24-14-5. 
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of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of 
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll 
have plenty of time to think this one over.'" State v. 
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S. D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Pennington County (Parker, J.)). 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed 
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, 
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a 
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had 
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole 
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See 
S. D. Codified Laws § 24--11H>(3) (1979). The Governor de-
nied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Da-
kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court 
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this 
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals 
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's 
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different 
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole be-
cause South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of 
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined 
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the 
same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination, 
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
82-492-0PINION 
6 SOLEM v. HELM 
ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore di-
rected the District Court to issue the writ unless the State 
resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment 
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. -- (1982). We 
now affirm. 
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to 
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna 
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not 
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and ex-
tended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal 
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish-
ments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches-
ter, Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C. P. 1316), reprinted in 52 ~/ 
7 
J4. 
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the 
8 An amercement was similar to a mod~ ne. It was the most 
common criminal sanction in f · ~;~.r E~~land. See 2 F. Pol-
lock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909). 
9 Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small 
fault , but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it." See 1 S. D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation 
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna 
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people . . .. " F. Maitland, Pleas of 
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted 
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to 
the clergy. 
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normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that 
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K. B. 
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of propor-
tionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the 
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the pun-
ishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length 
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." 
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at 
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable sever-
ity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed, 
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand 
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl 
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna 
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law 
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State ~rials 133, 136 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted 
the English principle of proportionality. The people were 
guaranteed the rights they had possessed as English sub-
jects-including the right to be free from excessive 
punishments. 
'
0 This language had earlier been incorporated in the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, Art. I, § 9, authored by George Mason. See A. Howard, The 
Road from Runnymede: Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 
207 (1968). 
(, () v.l& 
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B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been rec-
ognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the 
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public docu-
ment and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form 
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and per-
manent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the 
sentence violated the ~ghth Amendment. The Court en-
dorsec1 t ha "'-~ipJe of proportionality as a constitutional 
-eL '' wtt7 
tl(;t((e?SGJ'' -:./ 
g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the 
twas "cruel in its excess of imprisonment," 
oF {11( 
I 





, applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 
1y sentence was found to be excessive for 
~ "addicted to the use of narcotics." The 
tat "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in 
1ishment which is either cruel or unusual." 
-
ont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been 
> of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority," 
e f-c m of over 54 years. The majority did not reach 
' t this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not 
assignment of errors or in his brief. !d., at 331. 
rity noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not 
[d ., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
fl a_r{tJ tv, ·a federal question. !d., at 336-337. The dissent, 
:ighth Amendment question, observing that it "is 
punishments which by their excessive length or 
;proportioned to the offences charged." !d., at 
nting). 
\\ _ rt continued to recognize the principle of propor-
e. See, e. g., Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
'; id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
, dissenting). 
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I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently bar-
baric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 
Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of pro-
portionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. -- (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant 
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be 
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the 
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is 
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate 
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on 
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally dispro-
porti~e); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11 
(same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison 
sentences. 13 The constitutional language itself suggests no 
13 A~ording tfummel ~Estelle , 445 D. S. 263 (19 0), "onefld 
argue without £ of contra iction by any ecision of thi Court th for 
crim s conc'eded y <;9ssified nd classifiable as felonies ... >1m len h of 
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, 
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death 
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is 
also no historical support for such an exception. The com-
mon-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment 
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that 
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. 
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of pun-
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capi-
tal cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of impris-
onment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the 
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As are-
sult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance 
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a 
noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. All 
this means, however, 's that, "[o]utside the context of capital 
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of 
particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare,"'4 ibid. (em- ,__ _____ ___, 
I~., ~2 (~mp sis add_ ~ The 9idid noyapopt t~e_,s andarg..p:>ro-
p s , me ely eco ze that ·t1ie m91{ wab po~1ole. To-th~ex-
t t at t Stat kes tll"s argument ere, we~<Yft mer less. 
14 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be ex-
cessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no 
I 
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phasis adged); see Hutto v. Davj.s, 54 U. S., at 374. Jt'does 
not mea~hat proportional· analysis is entirely inapplicable L-----
in noncap1tal cases. 
In sum, we hold at a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been con-
victed. Reviewing courts, of course, should grant substan-
tial deference to the broad authority that legislature possess 
in determining the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts possess in 
sentencing convicted criminals. 16 But no penalty is per se 
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be uncon-
stitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
In ~iewiRg to. sentences under the Eighth Amendment, 
courts should be guided by objective factors that our cases 
have recognized. 16 First, we look to the gravity of the of-
fense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for ex-
ample, the Court examined the circumstances of the defend-
ant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at-----. In 
Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of 
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rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433 
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666--667. And in Weems, the Court's 
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of 
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court 
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether 
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598 
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366--367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less seri-
ous penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted 
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida 
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at 
--. The Weems Court identified an impressive list of 
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penal-
ties. 217 U. S., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review 
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a 
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 
U. S., at --. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the 
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar cir-
cumstances. Id., at--. The Court's review of foreign 
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at --, n. 22. The 
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at 
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that, 
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two 
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
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In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are compe-
tent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative 
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as leg-
islatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons 
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the 
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus 
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's con-
duct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness 
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness 
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the crim-
inal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than 
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is 
more protective of people than property). 
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply 
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be rele-
vant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious 
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in stat-
utes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g., 
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would 
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished 
more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is jus-
tified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
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ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d 
168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than 
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d 
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to 
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts 
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S. D. 
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, 
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher 
penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again 
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent 
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Da-
kota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of 
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing 
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S. D. Codified 
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is enti-
tled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. 
Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when commit-
ted pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone 
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates 
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the 
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi-
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between 
similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of 
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course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
ments, for the death penalty is different from other punish-
ments in kind rather than degree. 17 For sentences of impris-
onment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one 
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally 
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 18 but in most cases it 
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the 
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of 
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area. 
The courts are constantly~a ea upon to draw sim~·lar lin! s1n 
a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment ight to a jury trial is a example. 
Baldwin v. New York, 39 U. S. 66 (1970), in particular, il-
lustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers 
guidance on the method by which some lines may be drawn. 
There the Court determined that a defendant has a right to a 
jury trial "where imprisonment for more than six months is 
authorized." /d., at 69 (plurality opinion). In choosing the 
6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on 
the fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury 
trial for an offense punishable by more than six months. As 
JUSTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone-between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." /d., at 
72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly 
17 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen-
tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 u. s. 25 (1972). 
18 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending 
upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
f 
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may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. 
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to 
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines be-
tween sentences should be drawn. 
IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first con-
sider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then con-
sider the State's argument that the possibility of commuta-
tion is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional 
sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a per-
son could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501 
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of 
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it 
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the 
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 19 It is 
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among 
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 
at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
19 lfHelm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register, 
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100, 
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or black-
mail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100, 
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison 
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. 
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check 
against insufficient funds , rather than a nonexistent account, he would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South 
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2. 
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"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 20 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more se-
verely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, how-
ever, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior of-
fenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
minor. 21 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a 
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the 
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, 
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand lar-
ceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 22 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without pos-
sibility of parole. 23 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at 
--, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peniten-
tiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was 
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his 
00 We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life 
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of-
fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are rel-
evant to the sentencing decision. 
21 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes-
sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a conse-
quent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is 
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substan-
tial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue 
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of 
rehabilitation. 
22 As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov-
ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered 
the theft of a chicken. 
23 Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole. 
See supra, at--. We raise no question as to the general validity of sen-
tences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether, 
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
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initial confinement, 24 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. 
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most se-
vere punishment that the State could have imposed on any 
criminal for any crime. See note 6, supra. Only capital 
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when 
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it. 
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was 
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a 
life sentence for murder, S. D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12 
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life 
sentence for treason, § 22-8-1, first degree manslaughter, 
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33--1, and kidnapping, 
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely 
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S. D. Codified 
Laws § 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an 
aircraft, § 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 
(amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Ag-
gravated riot was only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distri-
bution of heroin, §§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) 
(1977), and aggravated assault, § 22-1~1.1 (amended 1980 
and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, 
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or 
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, 
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would 
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was 
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, §22-7--8, 
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprison-
ment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes. 
24 We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the 
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
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In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessar-
ily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second 
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first de-
gree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for 
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of 
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree man-
slaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted 
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first 
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after 
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of 
very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not au-
thorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggra-
vated assault. 
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one ut-
tering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer 
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there 
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other 
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the 
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the pos-
sibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7--8 generally is re-
served for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while 
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 25 
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as, 
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far 
more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
26 The State contends that § 22-7--8 is more lenient than the Texas habit-
ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7--8 is 
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, 
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that 
§ 22-7--8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers 
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judg-
ment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note, 
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 
1160 (1979). 
82-492-0PINION 
20 SOLEM v. HELM 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Ap-
peals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence 
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N e-
vada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this 
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, there-
fore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a se-
vere sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N e-
vada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any de-
fendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor, 
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 26 It 
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would 
have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially the 
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute 
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, 
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally 
different from the parole system that was before us in 
Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-
26 Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence 
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of 
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 
years has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious 
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302 
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an 
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two 
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of 
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
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lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behav-
ior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to 
be considered for parole, and details the standards and proce-
dures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Ne-
braska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole 
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part 
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Com-
mutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of execu-
tive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards. 
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
u. s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between pa-
role and commutation in our prior cases. 27 Writing on behalf 
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JuSTICE BuR-
GER contrasted the two possibilities:. "Rather than being an 
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at 
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JuSTICE similarly explained 
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . . 
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452 
U. S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
'1:1 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of 
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court care-
fully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for 
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S. , at 281. But the Mississippi 
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and 
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to par-
don includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington 
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-{)04, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954). 
I 
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very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply 
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked 
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact 
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good 
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has al-
lowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas 
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time 
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the 
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less. 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon 
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per 
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T. 
1979, No. 78--6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus 
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10 
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor-
mal course of events, in only 12 years. · 
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles 
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the 
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no 
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence, 
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unani-
mous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life s -
tence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, while 
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly dur-
ing that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if 
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible 
to be considered for parole. 28 Not only is there no guarantee 
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
.(.-
28 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota oc-
curred in 1975. The record indicates, however, that the prisoner in ques-
tion still has not been paroled. App. 29. 
s~e n·Jc?r 
fvr n. 21,5 
[§]-
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system is far more stringent than the one before us in 
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his re-
vised sentence before he would be eligible for parole, 
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less gen-
erous, § 24-5-1. 29 
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope 
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different 
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare 
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth 
Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penulti-
mate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has 
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State 
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State. 
We conclude that his sentence is significantly dispropor-
tionate to his cri~, and is therefore prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
2i Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's 
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole 
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel mini-
mum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If 
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have 
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years. 
n, ]o 
HNlOR-MICHAL-POW 06/25/83 Helm: n. 10 rider 
Revised footnote 10, on page 7: 
10The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, §9 of the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights {1776), authored by George Mason. 
He, in turn, had adopted verbatim the language of the English 
Bill of Rights. There can be no doubt that the Declaration of 
Rights guaranteed at least "the liberties and privileges of En-
glishmen." See A. Nevins, The American States During and After 
the Revolution 146 {1924) {Declaration of Rights "was a restate-
ment of English principles--the principles of Magna Charta ••• 
and the Revolution of 1688"): A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede: 
Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 205-207 {1968). As 
Mason himself had explained earlier: 
"We claim Nothing but the Liberties & Privileges of 
Englishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had still con-
tinued among our Bretheren in Great Britain... • We 
have received [these rights] from our Ancestors, and, 
with God's Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired to 
our Posterity." Letter to "the Committee of Merchants 
in London" {June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 The Papers of 
George Mason 71 {Rutland ed. 1970). 
Cf. the Fairfax County Resolves {1774) {colonists entitled to all 
"Privileges, Immunities and Advantages" of the English Constitu-
tion), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 201. 
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HERMAN SOLEM, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. 
JERRY BUCKLEY HELM 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Col!rt. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972 
1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of 
the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent 
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute bur-
glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S. D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curti-
lage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or 
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in 
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with 
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the 
same. See S. D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S. D. Laws, 
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S. D. Comp. 
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny.3 And in 1975 he 
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any 
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none 
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100.5 The only details we have of the crime are 
those given by Helm to the state trial court: 
(1939)) (repealed 1976). 
2 In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writ-
ing, or other false pretense, .. . obtains from any person any money or 
property . . . is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so ob-
tained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
3 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another 
thereof." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, 
is taken from the person of another; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
4 A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony 
in South Dakota. S. D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S. D. 
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
5 The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another 
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S. D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no ac-
count" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. SeeS. D. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 22-6--1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now codified at S. D. 
Codified Laws § 22-6--1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As a result of his 
criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dako-
ta's recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, 
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to 
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S. D. Codified Laws 
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life impris-
onment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine. 6 S. D. 
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a 
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his prin-
cipal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a 
Class 5 felony." S. D. Codified Laws § 22--41-1.2 (1979). 
•When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified 
felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the fol-
lowing seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the re-
spective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser 
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
82-492-0PINION 
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Comp. Laws Ann. §22-&-1(2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now 
codified at S. D. Codified Laws § 22-&-1(3) (Supp. 1982)). 
Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is 
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not 
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." S. 
D. Codified Laws §24-15-4 (1979). The Governor 7 is au-
thorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, 
S.D. Const., Art. IV,§ 3, but no other relief from sentence is 
available even to a rehabilitated prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South 
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained: 
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly 
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record 
would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that 
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest 
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a 
fine of two thousand dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual 
criminals . . .. 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense 
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony." 
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 
1980). 
7 The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor, S. D. Codified Laws § 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; 
S. D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not 
bound by the recommendation, § 24-14-5. 
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of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of 
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll 
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v. 
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S. D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Pennington County (Parker, J.)). 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a ~2 decision, affirmed 
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, 
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a 
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had 
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole 
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See 
S. D. Codified Laws § 24-15--5(3) (1979). The Governor de-
nied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Da-
kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court 
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this 
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals 
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's 
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different 
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole be-
cause South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of 
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined 
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the 
same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination, 
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
82--492-0PINION 
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ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore di-
rected the District Court to issue the writ unless the State 
resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment 
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. -- (1982). We 
now affirm. 
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to 
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna 
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not 
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and ex-
tended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal 
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish-
ments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches-
ter, Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C. P. 1316), reprinted in 52 
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the 
8 An amercement was similar to a m ern-day fine. It was the most 
common criminal sanction in century England. See 2 F. Pol-
lock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909). 
9 Chapter 20 declared that "(a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small 
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it." See 1 S. D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation 
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna 
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people . . .. " F. Maitland, Pleas of 
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted 
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to 
the clergy. 
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normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that 
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K. B. 
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of propor-
tionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the 
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the pun-
ishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length 
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." 
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *16-19 (1769); see also id., at 
*16-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable sever-
ity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed, 
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand 
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl 
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna 
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the la 
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 1 , 36 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendme adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 t y also adopted 
the English principle of proportionality. 
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B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been rec-
ognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the 
leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public docu-
ment and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form 
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and per-
manent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduateu___,..--
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367 nd-hel at the 
sentence violated the Eighth ment. The Court en-
dorsed the principle o oportionality as a constitutional 
standard, see, e. . , ta., at 372-373, and determined that the 
sentence be£ e it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment," 
id., at 377 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
nal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for 
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The 
Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in 
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." 
11 In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been 
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority," 
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach 
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not 
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. I d., at 331. 
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not 
apply to the States." ld., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. I d., at 336-337. The dissent, 
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is 
directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or 
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." Jd., at 
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
12 Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of propor-
tionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
125--126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently bar-
baric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 
Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of pro-
portionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. -- (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant 
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be 
taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the 
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is 
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate 
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on 
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally dispro-
portio~te); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11 
(same). 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison 
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, 
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death 
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is 
also no historical support for such an exception. The com-
mon-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment 
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that 
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. 
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of pun-
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capi-
tal cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of impris-
onment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the 
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As are-
sult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistanc 
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a 
noncapital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. 
· · that, "[o]utside the context of capi al 
punishment, successfUl challenges-to the-p~ionality of 
particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," ibid. (em-
a (e ~as· atd). The ourt id a~o th' st dard o 
, y ec ized hat e me was oss "ble. T the e -
hat t a s t ~men ere e d i e :itless. 
In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be ex-
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phasis ad ~ed); see utto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. does 
not mean that prop rtionality analysis is entirely inapplicable 
in noncap1tal cases 
In sum, we hold that a criminal sentence must be propor-
tionate to the crime for which the defendant has been 
victed. Reviewing courts, of course, should grants stan-
tial deference to the broad authority that legislatures ossess 
in determining the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts ossess in 
sentencing convicted criminals. ut no penalty is per se 
constitutional. As the Court noted in Robinson v. Califor-
nia, 370 U. S., at 667, a single day in prison may be uncon-
J 





sentences under the Eighth Amendment, ~ J 
courts should be guided by objective factru:s that our cases ~
have recognized . .- First, we look to the gravity of the of-
fense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for ex-
ample, the Court examined the circumstances of the defend-
ant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at-----. In 
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rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433 
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
"crime." 370 U. S., at 666-667. And in Weems, the Court's 
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of 
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court 
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether 
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598 
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366--367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less seri-
ous penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted 
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida 
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at 
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of 
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penal-
ties. 217 U. S., at 380.-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review 
of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a 
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 
U. S., at --. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the 
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar cir-
cumstances. I d., at --. The Court's review of foreign 
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at --, n. 22. The 
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at 
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that, 
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two 
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
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In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are compe-
tent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative 
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as leg-
islatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons 
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the 
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus 
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's con-
duct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness 
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness 
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the crim-
inal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than 
crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is 
more protective of people than property). 
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply 
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be rele-
vant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious 
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in stat-
utes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g., 
S.D. Codified Laws §22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would 
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished 
more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is jus-
tified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
82-492-0PINION 
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ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d 
168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than 
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d 
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to 
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts 
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S. D. 
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, 
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher 
penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again 
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent 
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Da-
kota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of 
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing 
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S. D. Codified 
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is enti-
tled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. 
Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when commit-
ted pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone 
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates 
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the 
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi-
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between 
similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of 
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course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish- J 
ments, for the death penalty is different from other punish- --{fii) 
ments in kind rather than degree."' F'or sentences of impris-
onf m
1
. entd, the. problie~ is
1
not sho muc2h5one111o~f~o~r$d~er~i~n~g~, ~bliu~t1 :aolln~e------r'/1--: j o me- raWing. tIS c ear t at a -ye~ sentence en 
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, ut in most cases it 
j 
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the 
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of 
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area. 
The courts are constantly called upon to dra · 'lal!-line......:..· ----t 
a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is a examp . 
Baldwin v. New York, 3 9 U. S. 66 (1970), in particular, il-
lustrates the line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers 
guidance on the method by which some lines may be drawn. 
There the Court determined that a defendant has a right to a 
jury trial "where imprisonment for more than six months is 
authorized." Id., at 69 (plurality opinion). In choosing the 
6-month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on 
the fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury 
trial for an offense punishable by more than six months. As 
JUSTICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone-between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at 
72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly 
~ tPfhere is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen-
 tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
j 407 u. s. 25 (1972). 
/1 a "'" The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending 
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may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. 
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to 
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines be-
tween sentences should be drawn. 
IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first con-
sider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then con-
sider the State's argument that the possibility of commuta-
tion is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional 
sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a per-
son could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501 
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of 
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it 
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half~ J 
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. It is '<.. 2 ° ) 
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among 
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 
at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
-;::;-:-, ____ If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register, 
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100, 
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or black-
mail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100, 
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison 
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. 
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check 
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South 
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2. 
J 
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"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 
And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more se-
verely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, how-
ever, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior of-
fenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
'\------...,.,;,· U'r'P.-. All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a 
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the 
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, 
J 
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand la~ J 
ceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. _ \(.._~ 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without pos-
sibility ofparo e. Barring executive clemency, see infra, at 
--, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peniten-
tiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was 
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his 
J ~We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life  sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of-
. fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are rel-
evant to the sentencing decision. 
J ~
Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes-
2 2 sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a conse-
quent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is 
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substan-
tial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue 
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of 
J rehabilitation. ~As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov-
 ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered 
the theft of a chicken. ___-
j ~-~Every life s~nBOuth Dakota is without possibility of parole. 
 ~::supra, at --f;:-· _ V!_e raise no question as to the general validity of sen-
tences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether, 
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
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initial confinement,..-afa"ct on which the Court relied heavily. 
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most se-
vere punishment that the State co~ imposed .1ln .any 
criminal for any crime. See ~ ~'. supra. Only capital 
punishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when 
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it. 
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was 
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a 
life sentence for murder, S. D. Codified Laws § 2~16-12 
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life 
sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter, 
§ 2~16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping, 
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 2~19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely 
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S. D. Codified 
Laws § 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an 
aircraft, § 2~14A-5, and first degree rape, § 2~2~1 
(amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Ag-
gravated riot was only a Class 3 felony. § 2~10-5. Distri-
bution of heroin, §§ 2~~2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) 
(1977), and aggravated assault, § 2~18-1.1 (amended 1980 
and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, 
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 2~7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or 
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, 
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would 
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was 
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 2~7--8, 
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprison-
ment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes. 
*We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the 
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
-cn. J J 
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In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessar-
ily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second 
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first de-
gree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for 
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of 
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree man-
slaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted 
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first 
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after 
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of 
very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not au-
thorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggra-
vated assault. 
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one ut-
tering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer 
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there 
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other 
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the 
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the pos-
sibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is re-
served for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while 
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as, 
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far 
more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
J ~The State oontends that § 22-7-8 Is more lenient than the Texas habl~ 
 ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is 
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, 
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that 
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers 
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judg-
ment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note, 
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of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Ap-
peals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence 
without parole for his offense in only one other state, N e-
vada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this 
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, there-
fore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a se-
vere sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N e-
vada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any de-
fendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so mino 
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. It 
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would 
have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially the 
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute 
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, 
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally 
different from the parole system that was before us in 
Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
) concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-
~Under § 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence 
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of 
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 
years has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious 
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusling v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302 
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an 
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two 
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of 
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
J 
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lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behav-
ior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 
The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to 
be considered for parole, and details the standards and proce-
dures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. N e-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Ne-
braska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole 
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part 
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Com-
mutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of execu-
tive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards. 
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
u. s. 458 (1981). J 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction betw..e..en .. pa-_ ---·~ 
role and commutation in our prior cases. Writing on behalf ~
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JuSTICE BUR-
GER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an 
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at 
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained 
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . . 
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452 
U. S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
~ • In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of 
 commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court care-
fully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for 
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi 
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and 
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to par-
don includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington 
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954). 
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very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply 
on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked 
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact 
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good 
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has al-
lowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas 
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time 
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the 
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less. 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon 
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per 
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T. 
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus 
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10 
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor-
mal course of events, in only 12 years. 
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles 
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the 
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no 
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence, 
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unani-
mous vote of all members of the board." In f life sen-
tence has been commuted in over eight years, App. 29, 
parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly dur-
ing that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, even if 
Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be eligible 
to be considered or parole:- Not only is there no guarantee 
that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota parole 
heW note 2_q iS OVl 
new note ~0 is on 
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system is far more stringent than the one before us in 
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his re-
vised sentence before he would be eligible for parole, 
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less gen-
erous, §24-5-1. 
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope 
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different 
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare 
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth 
Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penulti-
mate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has 
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State 
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
treated more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State. 
We conclude that his sentence is significantly dispropor-
tion te to -his crim~, and is therefore prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
J ~Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's 
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole 
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel mini-
mum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If 
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have 
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years. 
new note '32 oV\ [HtJs 2 RJ J 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary.' In 1972 
1 In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of 
the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent 
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute bur-
glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S. D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curti-
lage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or 
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in 
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with 
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the 
same. SeeS. D. Code § 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S. D. Laws, 
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S. D. Comp. 
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny.3 And in 1975 he 
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any 
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none 
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are 
those given by Helm to the state trial court: 
(1939)) (repealed 1976). 
2 In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writ-
ing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or 
property .. . is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so ob-
tained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
3 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another 
thereof." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, 
is taken from the person of another; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
'A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony 
in South Dakota. S. D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976). See 1973 S. D. 
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
' The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another 
•. 
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places."' State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S. D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no ac-
count" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. SeeS. D. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now codified at S. D. 
Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As a result of his 
criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dako-
ta's recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, 
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to 
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S. D. Codified Laws 
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony'' was life impris-
onment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine. 6 S. D. 
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a 
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his prin-
cipal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a 
Class 5 felony." S. D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979). 
6 When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified 
felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the fol-
lowing seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the re-
spective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser 
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In addi-
·" 
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Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now 
codified at S. D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3) (Supp. 1982)). 
Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is 
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not 
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." 
S. D. Codified Laws§ 24-15-4 (1979). The Governor 7 is au-
thorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, 
S. D. Const., Art. IV, § 3, but no other relief from sentence is 
available even to a rehabilitated prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South 
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under§ 22-7-8. The court explained: 
" 'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly 
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record 
would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that 
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest 
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 fekmy: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a 
fine of two thousand dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual 
criminals .... 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense 
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony." 
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 2~1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 
1980). 
7 The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor, S. D. Codified Laws § 24-14-1 (1979); § 24-14-5; 
S. D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not 
bound by the recommendation, § 24-14-5. 
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of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of 
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll 
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v. 
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S. D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Pennington County (Parker, J.)). 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3--2 decision, affirmed 
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
Mter Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, 
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a 
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had 
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole 
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See 
S. D. Codified Laws § 24-15-5(3) (1979). The Governor de-
nied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Da-
. kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court 
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this 
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals 
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's 
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different 
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole be-
cause South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of 
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined 
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the 
same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination, 
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
. • 
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ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore di-
rected the District Court to issue the writ unless the State 
resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment 
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. -- (1982). We 
now affirm. 
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to 
the criine is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna 
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not 
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and ex-
tended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal 
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish-
ments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches-
ter, Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C. P. 1316), reprinted in 52 
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the 
8 An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most I 
common criminal sanction in 13th century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F. 
Maitland, The History of English Law 51S-515 (2d ed. 1909). 
9 Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small 
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it." See 1 S. D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation 
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna 
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people ... . " F. Maitland, Pleas of 
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted 
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to 
the clergy . 
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normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that 
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K. B. 
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of propor-
tionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. ·2 (1689). Although the 
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incoq)o-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the pun-
ishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length 
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." 
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *1&-19 (1769); see also id., at 
* 1 &-17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable sever-
ity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed, 
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand 
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl 
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna 
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law 
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials,133, 136 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the 
10 The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, § 9 of the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights (1776), authored by George Mason. He, in 
turn, had adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of Rights. 
There can be no doubt that the Declaration of Rights guaranteed at least 
the liberties and privileges of Englishmen. See A. Nevins, The American 
States During and After the Revolution 146 (1924) (Declaration of Rights 
"was a restatement of English principles-the principles of Magna Charta 
... and the Revolution of 1688"); A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede: 
Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 205-207 (1968). As Mason 
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English principle of proportionality. Indeed, one of the con-
sistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the 
rights of English subjects. See, e. g., 1 J. Continental Con-
gress 83 (Ford ed. 1904) (Address to the People of Great Brit-
ain, Oct. 21, 1774) ("we claim all the benefits secured to the 
subject by the English constitution"); 1 American Archives 
700 (4th series 1837) (Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774) 
("his Majesty's subjects in America ... are entitled to the 
same rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellow-
subjects in Great Britain"). Thus our Bill of Rights was de-
signed in part to ensure that these rights were preserved. 
Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth 
Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English counter-
part, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is 
convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the 
same protection-including the right to be free from exces-
sive punishments. 
B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been rec-
ognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the 
himself had explained: ''We claim Nothing but the Liberties & Privileges of 
En lishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had still continued among our 
~------;B;:;-r .... e~th;.,. ren in Great Britain. . . . We have received [these rights] from 
·" 
our Ancestors, and, with God's Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired 
to our Posterity." Letter to "the Committee of Merchants in London" 
(June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 71 (Rutland ed. 
1970); cf. the Fairfax County Resolves (1774) (colonists entitled to all 
"Privileges, Immunities and Advantages" of the English Constitution), re-
printed in 1 The Papers of George Mason 201. 
11 In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been 
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority," 
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach 
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional, for he did not 
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. I d., at 331. 
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not 
apply to the States." Id., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. !d., at 336-337. The dissent, 
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leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public docu-
ment and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form 
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and per-
manent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court en-
dorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional 
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the 
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment," I 
id., at 377, as well as in its shackles and restrictions. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
nal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for 
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The 
Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in 
the abstract, a punishment which is either Ct:Uel or unusual." 
I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently bar-
baric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 
Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of pro-
portionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. -- (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant 
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be 
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is 
directed . . . against all punishments which by their excessive length or 
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." ld., at 
339-340 (Field, J . , dissenting). 
12 Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of propor-
tionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J ., concurring); id., at 
125-126 (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting). 
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taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the 
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is 
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate 
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on 
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153> 171-172 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally dispro-
portionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11 
(same). 13 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison 
sentences. 14 The constitutional language itself suggests no 
13 The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any concept of 
stare decisis." Post, at 1; cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14. On the contrary, our deci-
sion is entirely consistent with this Court's prior cases-including Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980). Seen. 32, infra. It is rather the dissent 
that would discard prior precedent. Its assertion that the Eighth Amend-
ment establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is contrary to 
the entire line of cases cited in the text. 
14 According to Rummel v. Estelle, "one could argue without fear of 
contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly clas-
sified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms 
of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of sentence actually im-
posed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 445 U. S., at 274 (em-
phasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but 
merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that the 
I 
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, 
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death 
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is 
also no historical support for such an exception. The com-
mon-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment 
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that 
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. 
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison ... is a form of pun-
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capi-
tal cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of impris-
onment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the 
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As are-
sult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance 
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a non-
capital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. We 
agree, therefore, that, "[o]utside the context of capital pun-
ishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of par-
ticular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," 15 ibid. ( empha-
State--or the dissent, see post, at 4-makes this argument here, we find it 
meritless. 
15 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be ex-
cessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no 
·' 
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sis added); see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S., at 374. This does ' 
not mean, however, that proportionality analysis is entirely 
inapplicable in noncapital cases. 
In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sen-
tence must be proportionate to the crime for which the de-
fendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, 
should grant substantial deference to the broad authority 
that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types I 
and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discre-
tion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted crimi-
nals. 16 But no penalty is per se constitutional. As the Court I 
noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S., at 667, a single 
day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
When sentences are reviewed under the Eighth Amend- I 
ment, courts should be guided by objective factors that our 
cases have recognized. 17 First, we look to the gravity of the 
sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund's crime. 
16 Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, post, at 2, 12, we do not adopt or 
imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of sentences. Absent 111••• authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its 
udgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a 
particular sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appel-
late court decides only whether the sentence under review is within con-
stitutional limits. In view of the substantial deference that must be ac-
corded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be 
required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not 
constitutionally disproportionate. 
17 The dissent concedes-as it must-that some sentences of imprison-
ment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Post, at 8, n. 3; cf. id., at 7, n. 2. 
It offers no guidance, however, as to how courts are to judge these admit-
tedly rare cases. We reiterate the objective factors that our cases have 
recognized. See, e. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plural-
ity opinion). As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive 
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offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for 
example, the Court examined the circumstances of the de-
fendant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at-----. 
In Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of 
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433 
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
"crime." 370 U. S., at 66&-667. And in Weems, the Court's 
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of 
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court 
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether 
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598 
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 366--367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less seri-
ous penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted 
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida 
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at 
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of 
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penal-
ties. 217 U. S., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review 
in a given case. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373--374 n. 2 (1982) I 
(per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S., at 275-276. The inherent na-
ture of our federal system and the need for individualized sentencing deci-
sions result in a wide range of constitutional sentences. Thus no single I 
criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it 
violates the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Pre-
sumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L. J. 1325, 
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of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a 
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 
U. S., at --. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the 
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar cir-
cumstances. I d., at --. The Court's review of foreign 
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at --, n. 22. The 
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at 
59~97. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that, 
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two 
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are compe-
tent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative 
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as leg-
islatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons 
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the 
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus 
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's con-
duct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness 
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness 
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the crim-
inal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than 
·" 
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crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is 
more protective of people than property). 
There are ·other accepted principles that courts may apply 
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be rele-
vant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious 
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in stat-
utes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g., 
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would 
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished 
more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is jus-
tified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d 
168, 169-170 (CA41976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than 
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d 
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to 
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts 
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S. D. 
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, 
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher 
penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again 
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent 
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Da-
kota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of 
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing 
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S. D. Codified 
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is enti-
tled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. 
·" 
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Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when commit-
ted pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone 
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates 
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the 
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi-
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between 
similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of 
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
ments, for the death penalty is different from other punish-
ments in kind rather than degree. 18 For sentences of impris- I 
onment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one 
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally 
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 19 but in most cases it \ 
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the 
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of 
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area. 
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in 
a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment offers two good examples. A State 
is constitutionally required to provide an accused with a 
speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 
(1967), but the delay that is permissible must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. "[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial 
claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the par-
18 There is also a clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen-
tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Hamlin , 
407 u. s. 25 (1972). 
19 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending I 
upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
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ticular context of the cas .... " Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 
514, 522 (1972) (unanimo s opinion). In Barker, we identi-
fied some of the objective factors that courts should consider 
in determining whether a particular delay ·was excessive. 
I d., at 530. None of these factors is "either a necessary or 
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right 
of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must 
be considered together with such other circumstances as may 
be relevant." I d., at 533. Thus the type of inquiry that a 
court should conduct to determine if a given sentence is con-
stitutionally disproportionate is similar to the type of inquiry 
required by the Speedy Trial Clause. 
The right to a jury trial is another example. Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), in particular, illustrates the 
line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on 
the method by which some lines may be drawn. There the 
Court determined that a defendant has a right to a jury trial 
"where imprisonment for more than six months is author-
ized." Id., at 69 (plurality opinion). In choosing the 6-
month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the 
fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury trial 
for an offense punishable by more than six months. As Jus-
TICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone-between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at 
72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly 
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. 
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to 
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines be-
tween sentences should be drawn. 
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IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first con-
sider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then con-
sider the State's argument that the possibility of commuta-
tion is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional 
sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a per-
son could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501 
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of 
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it 
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the 
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 20 It is I 
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among 
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 
at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 21 I 
20 If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register, l 
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100, 
§ 22-30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22-30A-4(1), or black-
mail, § 22-30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100, 
§ 22-30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22-30A-10, he would not be in prison 
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. 
§ 22-30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check 
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South 
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing" a "no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2. 
21 We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life I 
sentenc~since Helm .already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of-
fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are rel-
evant to the sentencing decision. 
22-25 
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And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more se-
verely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, how-
ever, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior of-
fenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
minor. 22 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a I 
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the 
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, 
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand lar- l 
ceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 23 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without pos-
sibility of parole. 24 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at \ * ' Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peniten-
tiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was 
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his 
initial confinement,25 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. \ 
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most se-
22 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes- I 
sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a conse-
quent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is 
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substan-
tial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue 
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of 
rehabilitation. 
23 As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov- I 
ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered 
the theft of a chicken. 
24 Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole. ' 
See supra, at 4. We raise no question as to the general validity of sen-
tences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether, 
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
'II> We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the I 
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
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vere punishment that the State could have imposed on any 
criminal for any crime. See n. 6, supra. Only capital pun- I 
ishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when 
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it. 
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was 
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a 
life sentence for murder, S. D. Codified Laws § 22-16-12 
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life 
sentence for treason, § 22--8-1, first degree manslaughter, 
§ 22-16-15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping, 
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely 
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S. D. Codified 
Laws § 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an 
aircraft, § 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 
(amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Ag-
gravated riot was only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distri-
bution of heroin, §§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) 
(1977), and aggravated assault, § 22-18-1.1 (amended 1980 
and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, 
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or 
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, 
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would 
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was 
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 22-7-8, 
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprison-
ment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes. 
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessar-
ily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second 
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first de-
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gree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for 
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of 
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree man-
slaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted 
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first 
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after 
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of 
very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not au-
thorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggra-
vated assault. 
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one ut-
tering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer 
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there 
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other 
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the 
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the pos-
sibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is re-
served for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while I 
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 26 
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as, 
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far 
more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Ap-
peals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence 
26 The State contends that §22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habit- I 
ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is 
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, 
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that 
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers 
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judg-
ment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note, 
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 
1160 (1979). 
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without parole for his offense in only one other state, N e-
vada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this 
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, there-
fore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a se-
vere sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N e-
vada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any de-
fendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor, 
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. ?:1 It I 
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would 
have been in any ·other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially the 
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute 
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, 
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally 
different from the parole system that was before us in 
Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-
lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behav-
ior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 
'1:1 Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence I 
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of 
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 
years has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious 
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusting v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302 
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an 
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two 
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one sale of 
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
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The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to 
be considered for parole, and details the standards and proce-
dures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Ne-
braska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole 
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part 
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Com-
mutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of execu-
tive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards. 
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
u. s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between pa- l 
role and commutation in our prior cases. 28 Writing on behalf 
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BUR-
GER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an 
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at 
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JusTICE similarly explained 
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . . 
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452 
U. S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply 
28 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of l 
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court care-
fully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for 
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi 
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and 
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to par-
don includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington 
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954). 
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on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked 
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact 
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of granting 'good 
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has al-
lowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas 
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time 
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the 
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less. 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon 
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per 
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T. 
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus 
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10 
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor-
mal course of events, in only 12 years. 
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles 
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the 
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no 
recommendation for the commutation of . . . a life sentence, 
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unani-
mous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sen-
tence has been commuted in over eight years, 29 App. 29, 
29 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota oc-
curred in 1975. App. 29. During the eight years since then, over 100 re-
quests for commutation have been denied. See id., at 22-26. Although 
22 life sentences were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975, 
see id., at 29; but see n. 30, infra, we do not have- complete figures on the 
number of requests that were denied during the same period. We are told 
only that at least 35 requests were denied. See app. 22-26. In any 
event, past practice in this respect-particularly the practice of a decade 
ago-is not a reliable indicator of future performance when the relevant 
decision is left to the unfettered discretion of each Governor. Indeed, the 
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while parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly 
during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, 
even if Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be 
eligible to be considered for parole. 80 Not only is there no I 
guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota 
parole system is far more stringent than the one before us in 
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his re-
vised sentence before he would be eligible for parole, 
§ 24-1&-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less gen- 1 
erous, §24--&-1.31 
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope 
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different 
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare 
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth 
Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penulti-
mate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has 
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State 
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
best indication we have of Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that I 
his request already has been denied. Id., at 26. 
30 The record indicates that the prisoner whose life sentence was com-
muted in 1975, see n. 29, supra, still has not been paroled. App. 29. 
81 Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's 
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole 
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel mini-
mum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If 
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have 
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years. 
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treated more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State. 
We conclude that his sentence is significantly dispropor-
tionate to his crim~, and is therefore prohibited by the \ 
Eighth Amendment. 32 The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
32 Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our conclusion 
today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle. The Rummel Court 
recognized-as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n. 3---that some sentences 
of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they violate the Eighth 
Amendment. 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11. Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 454 
U. S., at 374, and n. 3, makes clear that Rummel should not be read to 
foreclose proportionality review of sentences of imprisonment. Rummel 
did reject a proportionality challenge to a particular sentence. But since 
the Rummel Court-like the dissent today-offered no standards for 
determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, it is con-
trolling only in a similar factual situation. Here the facts are clearly 
distinguishable. Whereas Rummel was eligible for a reasonably early pa-
role, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to life with no possibility of parole. 
See supra, at fr - --fr:• and -It --fr· 
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-492 
HERMAN SOLEM, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. 
JERRY BUCKLEY HELM 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[June 28, 1983] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented is whether the Eighth Amendment 
proscribes a life sentence without possibility of parole for a 
seventh nonviolent felony. 
I 
By 1975 the State of South Dakota had convicted respond-
ent Jerry Helm of six nonviolent felonies. In 1964, 1966, and 
1969 Helm was convicted of third-degree burglary. 1 In 1972 
' In 1969 third-degree burglary was defined in at least two sections of 
the South Dakota criminal code: 
"A person breaking into any dwelling house in the nighttime with intent 
to commit a crime but under such circumstances as do not constitute bur-
glary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the third degree." S. D. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22--32-8 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
"A person breaking or entering at any time any building within the curti-
lage of a dwelling house but not forming a part thereof, or any building or 
part of any building, booth, tent, railroad car, vessel, vehicle as defined in 
§ 32-14-1, or any structure or erection in which any property is kept, with 
intent to commit larceny or any felony, is guilty of burglary in the third 
degree." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-32-9 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
In 1964 and 1966 the third-degree burglary definition was essentially the 
same. SeeS. D. Code§ 13.3703 (1939 ed., supp. 1960); 1965 S. D. Laws, 
ch. 32. Third-degree burglary was punishable by "imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for any term not exceeding fifteen years." S.D. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 22--32-10 (1967) (previously codified at S. D. Code§ 13.3705(3) 
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he was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. 2 
In 1973 he was convicted of grand larceny. 3 And in 1975 he 
was convicted of third-offense driving while intoxicated. 4 
The record contains no details about the circumstances of any 
of these offenses, except that they were all nonviolent, none 
was a crime against a person, and alcohol was a contributing 
factor in each case. 
In 1979 Helm was charged with uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. 5 The only details we have of the crime are 
those given by Helm to the state trial court: 
(1939)) (repealed 1976). 
' In 1972 the relevant statute provided: 
"Every person who designedly, by color or aid of any false token or writ-
ing, or other false pretense, ... obtains from any person any money or 
property ... is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary not 
exceeding three years or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by a 
fine not exceeding three times the value of the money or property so ob-
tained, or by both such fine and imprisonment." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-41-4 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
3 In 1973 South Dakota defined "larceny" as "the taking of personal prop-
erty accomplished by fraud or stealth and with intent to deprive another 
thereof." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-1 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny and petit larceny were distinguished as follows: 
"Grand larceny is larceny committed in any of the following cases: 
(1) When the property taken is of a value exceeding fifty dollars; 
(2) When such property, although not of a value exceeding fifty dollars, 
is taken from the person of another; 
(3) When such property is livestock. 
Larceny in other cases is petit larceny." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 22-37-2 (1967) (repealed 1976). 
Grand larceny was then punishable by "imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary not exceeding ten years or by imprisonment in the county jail not ex-
ceeding one year." S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-37-3 (1967) (repealed 
1976). 
'A third offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol is a felony 
in South Dakota. S. D. Codified Laws § 32-23-4 (1976) . See 1973 S. D. 
Laws, ch. 195, § 7 (enacting version of§ 32-23-4 in force in 1975). 
5 The governing statute provides, in relevant part: 
"Any person who, for himself or as an agent or representative of another 
•. 
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"'I was working in Sioux Falls, and got my check that 
day, was drinking and I ended up here in Rapid City 
with more money than I had when I started. I knew I'd 
done something I didn't know exactly what. If I would 
have known this, I would have picked the check up. I 
was drinking and didn't remember, stopped several 
places.'" State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d 497, 501 (S. D. 
1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Helm). 
After offering this explanation, Helm pleaded guilty. 
Ordinarily the maximum punishment for uttering a "no ac-
count" check would have been five years imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary and a $5,000 fine. See S. D. Comp. Laws 
Ann. §22-6-1(6) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now codified at S.D. 
Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982)). As a result of his 
criminal record, however, Helm was subject to South Dako-
ta's recidivist statute: 
"When a defendant has been convicted of at least three 
prior convictions [sic] in addition to the principal felony, 
the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced to 
the sentence for a Class 1 felony." S. D. Codified Laws 
§ 22-7-8 (1979) (amended 1981). 
The maximum penalty for a "Class 1 felony" was life impris-
onment in the state penitentiary and a $25,000 fine." S. D. 
for present consideration with intent to defraud, passes a check drawn on a 
financial institution knowing at the time of such passing that he or his prin-
cipal does not have an account with such financial institution, is guilty of a 
Class 5 felony." S. D. Codified Laws § 22-41-1.2 (1979). 
n When Helm was sentenced in April 1979, South Dakota law classified 
felonies as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided by law, felonies are divided into the fol-
lowing seven classes which are distinguished from each other by the re-
spective maximum penalties hereinafter set forth which are authorized 
upon conviction: 
(1) Class A felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. A lesser 
sentence may not be given for a Class A felony; 
(2) Class 1 felony: life imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In a~ldi-
82-492-0PINION 
4 SOLEM v. HELM 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-6-1(2) (1967 ed., supp. 1978) (now 
codified at S. D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(3) (Supp. 1982)). 
Moreover, South Dakota law explicitly provides that parole is 
unavailable: "A person sentenced to life imprisonment is not 
eligible for parole by the board of pardons and paroles." 
S. D. Codified Laws § 24-15-4 (1979). The Governor 7 is au-
thorized to pardon prisoners, or to commute their sentences, 
S. D. Const., Art. IV, § 3, but no other relief from sentence is 
available even to a rehabilitated prisoner. 
Immediately after accepting Helm's guilty plea, the South 
Dakota Circuit Court sentenced Helm to life imprisonment 
under § 22-7-8. The court explained: 
"'I think you certainly earned this sentence and certainly 
proven that you're an habitual criminal and the record 
would indicate that you're beyond rehabilitation and that 
the only prudent thing to do is to lock you up for the rest 
tion, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(3) Class 2 felony: twenty-five years imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary. In addition, a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(4) Class 3 felony: fifteen years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. 
In addition, a fine of fifteen thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(5) Class 4 felony: ten years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of ten thousand dollars may be imposed; 
(6) Class 5 felony: five years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. In 
addition, a fine of five thousand dollars may be imposed; and 
(7) Class 6 felony: two years imprisonment in the state penitentiary or a 
fine of two thousand dollars, or both. 
"Nothing in this section shall limit increased sentences for habitual 
criminals .... 
"Except in cases where punishment is prescribed by law, every offense 
declared to be a felony and not otherwise classified is a Class 6 felony." 
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-~1 (1967 eel., supp. 1978) (amended 1979 and 
1980). 
7 The board of pardons and paroles is authorized to make recommenda-
tions to the Governor, S. D. Codified Laws ~ 24-14-1 (1979); ~ 24-14-5; 
S. D. Executive Order 82-04 (Apr. 12, 1982), but the Governor is not 
bound by the recommendation, § 24-14-5. 
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of your natural life, so you won't have further victims of 
your crimes, just be coming back before Courts. You'll 
have plenty of time to think this one over."' State v. 
Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 500 (Henderson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting S. D. Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, 
Pennington County (Parker, J.)). 
The South Dakota Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, affirmed 
the sentence despite Helm's argument that it violated the 
Eighth Amendment. State v. Helm, supra. 
After Helm had served two years in the state penitentiary, 
he requested the Governor to commute his sentence to a 
fixed term of years. Such a commutation would have had 
the effect of making Helm eligible to be considered for parole 
when he had served three-fourths of his new sentence. See 
S. D. Codified Laws § 24-1~5(3) (1979). The Governor de-
nied Helm's request in May 1981. App. 26. 
In November 1981, Helm sought habeas relief in the 
United States District Court for the District of South Da-
kota. Helm argued, among other things, that his sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the District Court 
recognized that the sentence was harsh, it concluded that this 
Court's recent decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 
(1980), was dispositive. It therefore denied the writ. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. 684 F. 2d 582 (1982). The Court of Appeals 
noted that Rummel v. Estelle was distinguishable. Helm's 
sentence of life without parole was qualitatively different 
from Rummel's life sentence with the prospect of parole be-
cause South Dakota has rejected rehabilitation as a goal of 
the criminal justice system. The Court of Appeals examined 
the nature of Helm's offenses, the nature of his sentence, and 
the sentence he could have received in other States for the 
same offense. It concluded, on the basis of this examination, 
that Helm's sentence was "grossly disproportionate to the na-
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ture of the offense." 684 F. 2d, at 587. It therefore di-
rected the District Court to issue the writ unless the State 
resentenced Helm. Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to consider the Eighth Amendment 
question presented by this case. 459 U. S. -- (1982). We 
now affirm. 
II 
The Eighth Amendment declares: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and un-
usual punishments inflicted." The final clause prohibits not 
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are dis-
proportionate to the crime committed. 
A 
The principle that a punishment should be proportionate to 
the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon-law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna 
Carta were devoted to the rule that "amercements" 8 may not 
be excessive. 9 And the principle was repeated and ex-
tended in the First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 
(1275). These were not hollow guarantees, for the royal 
courts relied on them to invalidate disproportionate punish-
ments. See, e. g., Le Gras v. Bailiff of Bishop of Winches-
ter, Y. B. Mich. 10 Edw. II, pl. 4 (C. P. 1316), reprinted in 52 
Selden Society 3 (1934). When prison sentences became the 
• An amercement was similar to a modern-day fine. It was the most 
common criminal sanction in 13th century England. See 2 F. Pollock & F. 
Maitland, The History of English Law 513-515 (2d ed. 1909). 
• Chapter 20 declared that "[a] freeman shall not be amerced for a small 
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great crime according to 
the heinousness of it." See 1 S. D. Codified Laws, p. 4 (1978) (translation 
of Magna Carta). According to Maitland, "there was no clause in Magna 
Carta more grateful to the mass of the people .... " F. Maitland, Pleas of 
the Crown for the County of Gloucester xxxiv (1884). Chapter 21 granted 
the same rights to the nobility, and chapter 22 granted the same rights to 
the clergy. 
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normal criminal sanctions, the common law recognized that 
these, too, must be proportional. See, e. g., Hodges v. 
Humkin, 2 Bulst. 139, 140, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K. B. 
1615) (Croke, J.) ("imprisonment ought always to be accord-
ing to the quality of the offence"). 
The English Bill of Rights repeated the principle of propor-
tionality in language that was later adopted in the Eighth 
Amendment: "excessive Baile ought not to be required nor 
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments 
inflicted." 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). Although the 
precise scope of this provision is uncertain, it at least incorpo-
rated "the longstanding principle of English law that the pun-
ishment ... should not be, by reason of its excessive length 
or severity, greatly disproportionate to the offense charged." 
R. Perry, Sources of Our Liberties 236 (1959); see 4 W. 
Blackstone, Commentaries *1~19 (1769); see also id., at 
*1~17 (in condemning "punishments of unreasonable sever-
ity," uses "cruel" to mean severe or excessive). Indeed, 
barely three months after the Bill of Rights was adopted, the 
House of Lords declared that a "fine of thirty thousand 
pounds, imposed by the court of King's Bench upon the earl 
of Devon, was excessive and exorbitant, against magna 
charta, the common right of the subject, and against the law 
of the land." Earl of Devon's Case, 11 State Trials 133, 136 
(1689). 
When the Framers of the Eighth Amendment adopted the 
language of the English Bill of Rights, 10 they also adopted the 
10 The Eighth Amendment was based directly on Art. I, § 9 of the Vir-
ginia Declaration of Rights (1776), authored by George Mason. He, in 
turn, had adopted verbatim the language of the English Bill of Rights. 
There can be no doubt that the Declaration of Rights guaranteed at least 
the liberties and privileges of Englishmen. See A. Nevins, The American 
States During and After the Revolution 146 (1924) (Declaration of Rights 
"was a restatement of English principles-the principles of Magna Charta 
... and the Revolution of 1688"); A. Howard, The Road from Runnymede: 
Magna Carta and Constitutionalism in America 205-207 (1968). As Mason 
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English principle of proportionality. Indeed, one of the con-
sistent themes of the era was that Americans had all the 
rights of English subjects. See, e. g., 1 J. Continental Con-
gress 83 (Ford ed. 1904) (Address to the People of Great Brit-
ain, Oct. 21, 1774) ("we claim all the benefits secured to the 
subject by the English constitution"); 1 American Archives 
700 (4th series 1837) (Georgia Resolutions, Aug. 10, 1774) 
("his Majesty's subjects in America ... are entitled to the 
same rights, privileges, and immunities with their fellow-
subjects in Great Britain"). Thus our Bill of Rights was de-
signed in part to ensure that these rights were preserved. 
Although the Framers may have intended the Eighth 
Amendment to go beyond the scope of its English counter-
part, their use of the language of the English Bill of Rights is 
convincing proof that they intended to provide at least the 
same protection-including the right to be free from exces-
sive punishments. 
B 
The constitutional principle of proportionality has been rec-
ognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century. 11 In the 
himself had explained: "We claim Nothing but the Liberties & Privileges of 
Englishmen, in the same Degree, as if we had still continued among our 
Brethren in Great Britain. . . . We have received [these rights] from 
our Ancestors, and, with God's Leave, we will transmit them, unimpaired 
to our Posterity." Letter to "the Committee of Merchants in London" 
(June 6, 1766), reprinted in 1 The Papers of George Mason 71 (Rutland ed. 
1970); cf. the Fairfax County Resolves (1774) (colonists entitled to all 
"Privileges, Immunities and Advantages" of the English Constitution), re-
printed in 1 The Papers of George Mason 201. 
11 In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323 (1892), the defendant had been 
convicted of 307 counts of "selling intoxicating liquor without authority," 
and sentenced to a term of over 54 years. The majority did not reach 
O'Neil's contention that this sentence was unconstitutional , for he did not 
include the point in his assignment of errors or in his brief. !d. , at 331. 
Furthermore, the majority noted that the Eighth Amendment "does not 
apply to the States." I d., at 332. Accordingly the Court dismissed the 
writ of error for want of a federal question. !d., at 336-337. The dissent, 
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leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), 
the defendant had been convicted of falsifying a public docu-
ment and sentenced to 15 years of "cadena temporal," a form 
of imprisonment that included hard labor in chains and per-
manent civil disabilities. The Court noted "that it is a pre-
cept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated 
and proportioned to offense," id., at 367, and held that the 
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court en-
dorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitutional 
standard, see, e. g., id., at 372-373, and determined that the 
sentence before it was "cruel in its excess of imprisonment," 
id., at 377, as well as in its shackles and restrictions. 
The Court next applied the principle to invalidate a crimi-
nal sentence in Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 
(1962). 12 A 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for 
the crime of being "addicted to the use of narcotics." The 
Court explained that "imprisonment for ninety days is not, in 
the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual." 
I d., at 667. Thus there was no question of an inherently bar-
baric punishment. "But the question cannot be considered 
in the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 
Ibid. 
Most recently, the Court has applied the principle of pro-
portionality to hold capital punishment excessive in certain 
circumstances. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. -- (1982) 
(death penalty excessive for felony murder when defendant 
did not take life, attempt to take life, or intend that a life be 
however, reached the Eighth Amendment question, observing that it "is 
directed ... against all punishments which by their excessive length or 
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." I d., at 
339-340 (Field, J., dissenting). 
12 Members of the Court continued to recognize the principle of propor-
tionality in the meantime. See, e. g., Trap v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurality opinion); id., at 111 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 
125-126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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taken or that lethal force be used); Coker v. Georgia, 433 
U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("sentence of death is 
grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the 
crime of rape"); id., at 601 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is 
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult 
woman"). And the Court has continued to recognize that 
the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate 
punishments, even when it has not been necessary to rely on 
the proscription. See, e. g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 
685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977); 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 171-172 (1976) (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.); cf. Hutto v. Davis, 
454 U. S. 370, 374, and n. 3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that some prison sentences may be constitutionally dispro-
portionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11 
(same). 13 
c 
There is no basis for the State's assertion that the general 
principle of proportionality does not apply to felony prison 
sentences. 14 The constitutional language itself suggests no 
13 The dissent charges that "the Court blithely discards any concept of 
stare decisis." Post, at 1; cf. id., at 2, 8-9, 14. On the contrary, our deci-
sion is entirely consistent with this Court's prior cases-including Rummel 
v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980). Seen. 32, infra. It is rather the dissent 
that would discard prior precedent. Its assertion that the Eighth Amend-
ment establishes only a narrow principle of proportionality is contrary to 
the entire line of cases cited in the text. 
"According to Rummel v. Estelle, "one could argue without fear of 
contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly clas-
sified and classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms 
of imprisonment in a state penitentiary, the length of sentence actually im-
posed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 445 U. S., at 274 (em-
phasis added). The Court did not adopt the standard proposed, but 
merely recognized that the argument was possible. To the extent that the 
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exception for imprisonment. We have recognized that the 
Eighth Amendment imposes "parallel limitations" on bail, 
fines, and other punishments, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U. S., at 664, and the text is explicit that bail and fines may 
not be excessive. It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser 
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death 
were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the inter-
mediate punishment of imprisonment were not. There is 
also no historical support for such an exception. The com-
mon-law principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment 
clearly applied to prison terms. See Hodges v. Humkin, 
supra. And our prior cases have recognized explicitly that 
prison sentences are subject to proportionality analysis. 
See, e. g., Weems, 217 U. S., at 377; cf. Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U. S., at 685 ("Confinement in a prison . . . is a form of pun-
ishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment 
standards"). 
When we have applied the proportionality principle in capi-
tal cases, we have drawn no distinction with cases of impris-
onment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 176 (opinion of 
Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). It is true that the 
"penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal pun-
ishment, not in degree but in kind." Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U. S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). As are-
sult, "our decisions [in] capital cases are of limited assistance 
in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment" in a non-
capital case. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 272. We 
agree, therefore, that, "[o]utside the context of capital pun-
ishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of par-
ticular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare," 15 ibid. (empha-
State-{)r the dissent, see post, at 4-makes this argument here, we find it 
meritless. 
15 In Enmund, for example, the Court found the death penalty to be ex-
cessive for felony murder in the circumstances of that case. But clearly no 
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sis added); see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. 8., at 374. This does 
not mean, however, that proportionality analysis is entirely 
inapplicable in noncapital cases. 
In sum, we hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sen-
tence must be proportionate to the crime for which the de-
fendant has been convicted. Reviewing courts, of course, 
should grant substantial deference to the broad authority 
that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types 
and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the discre-
tion that trial courts possess in sentencing convicted crimi-
nals. 16 But no penalty is per se constitutional. As the Court 
noted in Robinson v. California, 370 U. 8., at 667, a single 
day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances. 
III 
A 
When sentences are reviewed under the Eighth Amend-
ment, courts should be guided by objective factors that our 
cases have recognized. 17 First, we look to the gravity of the 
sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate for Enmund's crime. 
16 Contrary to the dissent's suggestions, post, at 2, 12, we do not adopt or 
imply approval of a general rule of appellate review of sentences. Absent 
specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its 
judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a 
particular sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appel-
late court decides only whether the sentence under review is within con-
stitutional limits. In view of the substantial deference that must be ac-
corded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing court rarely will be 
required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is not 
constitutionally disproportionate. 
17 The dissent concedes-as it must-that some sentences of imprison-
ment are so disproportionate that they are unconstitutional under the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Post, at 8, n. 3; cf. id., at 7, n. 2. 
It offers no guidance, however, as to how courts are to judge these admit-
tedly rare cases. We reiterate the objective factors that our cases have 
recognized. See, e. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977) (plural-
ity opinion). As the Court has indicated, no one factor will be dispositive 
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offense and the harshness of the penalty. In Enmund, for 
example, the Court examined the circumstances of the de-
fendant's crime in great detail. 458 U. S., at -- - --. 
In Coker the Court considered the seriousness of the crime of 
rape, and compared it to other crimes, such as murder. 433 
U. S., at 597-598 (plurality opinion); id., at 603 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
In Robinson the emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
"crime." 370 U. S., at 66&-667. And in Weems, the Court's 
opinion commented in two separate places on the pettiness of 
the offense. 217 U. S., at 363 and 365. Of course, a court 
must consider the severity of the penalty in deciding whether 
it is disproportionate. See, e. g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 598 
(plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U. S., at 36&-367. 
Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less seri-
ous penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at 
issue may be excessive. Thus in Enmund the Court noted 
that all of the other felony murderers on death row in Florida 
were more culpable than the petitioner there. 458 U. S., at 
The Weems Court identified an impressive list of 
more serious crimes that were subject to less serious penal-
ties. 217 U. S., at 380-381. 
Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdic-
tions. In Enmund the Court conducted an extensive review 
in a given case. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U. S. 370, 373-374 n. 2 (1982) 
(per curiam); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S., at 275-276. The inherent na-
ture of our federal system and the need for individualized sentencing deci-
sions result in a wide range of constitutional sentences. Thus no single 
criterion can identify when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it 
violates the Eighth Amendment. See Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Pre-
sumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L. J. 1325, 
1376-1377 (1979). But a combination of objective factors can make such 
analysis possible. 
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of capital punishment statutes and determined that "only 
about a third of American jurisdictions would ever permit a 
defendant [such as Enmund] to be sentenced to die." 458 
U. S., at--. Even in those jurisdictions, however, the 
death penalty was almost never imposed under similar cir-
cumstances. I d., at --. The Court's review of foreign 
law also supported its conclusion. I d., at --, n. 22. The 
analysis in Coker was essentially the same. 433 U. S., at 
593-597. And in Weems the Court relied on the fact that, 
under federal law, a similar crime was punishable by only two 
year's imprisonment and a fine. 217 U. S., at 380. Cf. Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 102-103 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth 
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, including 
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; 
(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same ju-
risdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
B 
Application of these factors assumes that courts are compe-
tent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative 
scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, and 
courts traditionally have made these judgments-just as leg-
islatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons 
can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the 
victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. Thus 
in Enmund the Court determined that the petitioner's con-
duct was not as serious as his accomplices' conduct. Indeed, 
there are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness 
of crimes. See Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness 
of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 
39 Am. Soc. Rev. 224, 237 (1974). For example, as the crim-
inal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than 
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crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. Cf. Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 16 (the State recognizes that the criminal law is 
more protective of people than property). 
There are other accepted principles that courts may apply 
in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or 
society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be rele-
vant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious 
than stealing a hundred dollars-a point recognized in stat-
utes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. See, e. g., 
S. D. Codified Laws § 22-30A-17 (Supp. 1982). Few would 
dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished 
more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is jus-
tified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more seri-
ous than simple assault. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F. 2d 
168, 169-170 (CA4 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 
973 (1977). Cf. Dembowski v. State, 251 Ind. 250, 252, 240 
N. E. 2d 815, 817 (1968) (armed robbery more serious than 
robbery); Cannon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 632, 281 P. 2d 
233, 235 (1955) (rape more serious than assault with intent to 
commit rape). It also is generally recognized that attempts 
are less serious than completed crimes. See, e. g., S. D. 
Codified Laws § 22-4-1 (1979); 4 Blackstone *15. Similarly, 
an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher 
penalty than the principal. See, e. g., 18 U.S. C. §3. 
Turning to the culpability of the offender, there are again 
clear distinctions that courts may recognize and apply. In 
Enmund the Court looked at the petitioner's lack of intent to 
kill in determining that he was less culpable than his accom-
plices. 458 U. S., at--. Most would agree that negligent 
conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. South Da-
kota, for example, ranks criminal acts in ascending order of 
seriousness as follows: negligent acts, reckless acts, knowing 
acts, intentional acts, and malicious acts. S. D. Codified 
Laws § 22-1-2(1)(f) (Supp. 1982). A court, of course, is enti-
tled to look at a defendant's motive in committing a crime. 
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Thus a murder may be viewed as more serious when commit-
ted pursuant to a contract. See, e. g., Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann., ch. 279, § 69(a)(5) (West Supp. 1982); cf. 4 Blackstone 
*15; In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 519 P. 2d 1073 (1974). 
This list is by no means exhaustive. It simply illustrates 
that there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the 
severity of different crimes on a broad scale, despite the diffi-
culties courts face in attempting to draw distinctions between 
similar crimes. 
c 
Application of the factors that we identify also assumes 
that courts are able to compare different sentences. This as-
sumption, too, is justified. The easiest comparison, of 
course, is between capital punishment and noncapital punish-
ments, for the death penalty is different from other punish-
ments in kind rather than degree. 18 For sentences of impris-
onment, the problem is not so much one of ordering, but one 
of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence generally 
is more severe than a 15-year sentence, 19 but in most cases it 
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the 
Eighth Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of 
this kind, although troubling, are not unique to this area. 
The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in 
a variety of contexts. 
The Sixth Amendment offers two good examples. A State 
is constitutionally required to provide an accused with a 
speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 
(1967), but the delay that is permissible must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. "[A]ny inquiry into a speedy trial 
claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the par-
18 There is also a. clear line between sentences of imprisonment and sen-
tences involving no deprivation of liberty. See Argersinger v. Ham lin, 
407 u. s. 25 (1972). 
19 The possibility of parole may complicate the comparison, depending 
upon the time and conditions of its availability. 
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ticular context of the case .... " Barker v. Wingo, 407 
U. S. 514, 522 (1972) (unanimous opinion). In Barker, we 
identified some of the objective factors that courts should 
consider in determining whether a particular delay was ex-
cessive. I d., at 530. None of these factors is "either a nec-
essary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of 
the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors 
and must be considered together with such other circum-
stances as may be relevant." I d., at 533. Thus the type of 
inquiry that a court should conduct to determine if a given 
sentence is constitutionally disproportionate is similar to the 
type of inquiry required by the Speedy Trial Clause. 
The right to a jury trial is another example. Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), in particular, illustrates the 
line-drawing function of the judiciary, and offers guidance on 
the method by which some lines may be drawn. There the 
Court determined that a defendant has a right to a jury trial 
"where imprisonment for more than six months is author-
ized." I d., at 69 (plurality opinion). In choosing the 6-
month standard, the plurality relied almost exclusively on the 
fact that only New York City denied the right to a jury trial 
for an offense punishable by more than six months. As Jus-
TICE WHITE explained: 
"This near-uniform judgment of the Nation furnishes us 
with the only objective criterion by which a line could 
ever be drawn-on the basis of the possible penalty 
alone-between offenses that are and that are not re-
garded as 'serious' for purposes of trial by jury." I d., at 
72-73. 
In short, Baldwin clearly demonstrates that a court properly 
may distinguish one sentence of imprisonment from another. 
It also supports our holding that courts properly may look to 
the practices in other jurisdictions in deciding where lines be-
tween sentences should be drawn. 
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IV 
It remains to apply the analytical framework established 
by our prior decisions to the case before us. We first con-
sider the relevant criteria, viewing Helm's sentence as life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole. We then con-
sider the State's argument that the possibility of commuta-
tion is sufficient to save an otherwise unconstitutional 
sentence. 
A 
Helm's crime was "one of the most passive felonies a per-
son could commit." State v. Helm, 287 N. W. 2d, at 501 
(Henderson, J., dissenting). It involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person. The $100 face value of 
Helm's "no account" check was not trivial, but neither was it 
a large amount. One hundred dollars was less than half the 
amount South Dakota required for a felonious theft. 20 It is 
easy to see why such a crime is viewed by society as among 
the less serious offenses. See Rossi et al., 39 Am. Soc. Rev., 
at 229. 
Helm, of course, was not charged simply with uttering a 
"no account" check, but also with being an habitual offender. 21 
20 If Helm had been convicted simply of taking $100 from a cash register, 
S. D. Codified Laws § 22--30A-1 (1979), or defrauding someone of $100, 
§ 22--30A-3, or obtaining $100 through extortion, § 22--30A-4(1), or black-
mail, § 22--30A-4(3), or using a false credit card to obtain $100, 
§ 22--30A-8.1, or embezzling $100, § 22--30A-10, he would not be in prison 
today. All of these offenses would have been petty theft, a misdemeanor. 
§ 22--30A-17 (amended 1982). Similarly, if Helm had written a $100 check 
against insufficient funds, rather than a nonexistent account, he would 
have been guilty of a misdemeanor. §§ 22-41-1. Curiously, under South 
Dakota law there is no distinction between writing a "no account" check for 
a large sum and writing a "no account" check for a small sum. § 22-41-1.2. 
2
' We must focus on the principal felony-the felony that triggers the life 
sentence-since Helm already has paid the penalty for each of his prior of-
fenses. But we recognize, of course, that Helm's prior convictions are rel-
evant to the sentencing decision. 
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And a State is justified in punishing a recidivist more se-
verely than it punishes a first offender. Helm's status, how-
ever, cannot be considered in the abstract. His prior of-
fenses, although classified as felonies, were all relatively 
minor. 22 All were nonviolent and none was a crime against a 
person. Indeed, there was no minimum amount in either the 
burglary or the false pretenses statutes, see nn. 1 and 2, 
supra, and the minimum amount covered by the grand lar-
ceny statute was fairly small, see n. 3, supra. 23 
Helm's present sentence is life imprisonment without pos-
sibility ofparole. 24 Barring executive clemency, see infra, at 
22-25, Helm will spend the rest of his life in the state peni-
tentiary. This sentence is far more severe than the life sen-
tence we considered in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel was 
likely to have been eligible for parole within 12 years of his 
initial confinement, 25 a fact on which the Court relied heavily. 
See 445 U. S., at 280-281. Helm's sentence is the most se-
22 Helm, who was 36 years old when he was sentenced, is not a profes-
sional criminal. The record indicates an addiction to alcohol, and a conse-
quent difficulty in holding a job. His record involves no instance of vio-
lence of any kind. Incarcerating him for life without possibility of parole is 
unlikely to advance the goals of our criminal justice system in any substan-
tial way. Neither Helm nor the State will have an incentive to pursue 
clearly needed treatment for his alcohol problem, or any other program of 
rehabilitation. 
23 As suggested at oral argument, the third-degree burglary statute cov-
ered entering a building with the intent to steal a loaf of bread. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 14-16. It appears that the grand larceny statute would have covered 
the theft of a chicken. 
24 Every life sentence in South Dakota is without possibility of parole. 
See supra, at 4. We raise no question as to the general validity of sen-
tences without possibility of parole. The only issue before us is whether, 
in the circumstances of this case and in light of the constitutional principle 
of proportionality, the sentence imposed on this petitioner violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
u, We note that Rummel was, in fact, released within eight months of the 
Court's decision in his case. See L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, p. 1, col. 3. 
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vere punishment that the State could have imposed on any 
criminal for any crime. See n. 6, supra. Only capital pun-
ishment, a penalty not authorized in South Dakota when 
Helm was sentenced, exceeds it. 
We next consider the sentences that could be imposed on 
other criminals in the same jurisdiction. When Helm was 
sentenced, a South Dakota court was required to impose a 
life sentence for murder, S. D. Codified Laws § 22-16--12 
(1979) (amended 1980), and was authorized to impose a life 
sentence for treason, § 22-8-1, first degree manslaughter, 
§ 22-16--15, first degree arson, § 22-33-1, and kidnapping, 
S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 22-19-1 (1967 ed., supp. 1978) 
(amended 1979). No other crime was punishable so severely 
on the first offense. Attempted murder, S. D. Codified 
Laws § 22-4-1(5) (1979), placing an explosive device on an 
aircraft, § 22-14A-5, and first degree rape, § 22-22-1 
(amended 1980 and 1982), were only Class 2 felonies. Ag-
gravated riot was only a Class 3 felony. § 22-10-5. Distri-
bution of heroin, §§ 22-42-2 (amended 1982), 34-20B-13(7) 
(1977), and aggravated assault, §22-18-1.1 (amended 1980 
and 1981), were only Class 4 felonies. 
Helm's habitual offender status complicates our analysis, 
but relevant comparisons are still possible. Under§ 22-7-7, 
the penalty for a second or third felony is increased by one 
class. Thus a life sentence was mandatory when a second or 
third conviction was for treason, first degree manslaughter, 
first degree arson, or kidnapping, and a life sentence would 
have been authorized when a second or third conviction was 
for such crimes as attempted murder, placing an explosive 
device on an aircraft, or first degree rape. Finally, § 22-7-8, 
under which Helm was sentenced, authorized life imprison-
ment after three prior convictions, regardless of the crimes. 
In sum, there were a handful of crimes that were necessar-
ily punished by life imprisonment: murder, and, on a second 
or third offense, treason, first degree manslaughter, first de-
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gree arson, and kidnapping. There was a larger group for 
which life imprisonment was authorized in the discretion of 
the sentencing judge, including: treason, first degree man-
slaughter, first degree arson, and kidnapping; attempted 
murder, placing an explosive device on an aircraft, and first 
degree rape on a second or third offense; and any felony after 
three prior offenses. Finally, there was a large group of 
very serious offenses for which life imprisonment was not au-
thorized, including a third offense of heroin dealing or aggra-
vated assault. 
Criminals committing any of these offenses ordinarily 
would be thought more deserving of punishment than one ut-
tering a "no account" check-even when the bad-check writer 
had already committed six minor felonies. Moreover, there 
is no indication in the record that any habitual offender other 
than Helm has ever been given the maximum sentence on the 
basis of comparable crimes. It is more likely that the pos-
sibility of life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 generally is re-
served for criminals such as fourth-time heroin dealers, while 
habitual bad-check writers receive more lenient treatment. 26 
In any event, Helm has been treated in the same manner as, 
or more severely than, criminals who have committed far 
more serious crimes. 
Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission 
of the same crime in other jurisdictions. The Court of Ap-
peals found that "Helm could have received a life sentence 
26 The State contends that § 22-7-8 is more lenient than the Texas habit-
ual offender statute in Rummel, for life imprisonment under § 22-7-8 is 
discretionary rather than mandatory. Brief for Petitioner 22. Helm, 
however, has challenged only his own sentence. No one suggests that 
§ 22-7-8 may not be applied constitutionally to fourth-time heroin dealers 
or other violent criminals. Thus we do not question the legislature's judg-
ment. Unlike in Rummel, a lesser sentence here could have been entirely 
consistent with both the statute and the Eighth Amendment. See Note, 
Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisonment, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1119, 
1160 (1979). 
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without parole for his offense in only one other state, N e-
vada," 684 F. 2d, at 586, and we have no reason to doubt this 
finding. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. At the very least, there-
fore, it is clear that Helm could not have received such a se-
vere sentence in 48 of the 50 States. But even under N e-
vada law, a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
merely authorized in these circumstances. See Nev. Rev. 
Stat. § 207.010(2) (1981). We are not advised that any de-
fendant such as Helm, whose prior offenses were so minor, 
actually has received the maximum penalty in Nevada. 27 It 
appears that Helm was treated more severely than he would 
have been in any other State. 
B 
The State argues that the present case is essentially the 
same as Rummel v. Estelle, for the possibility of parole in 
that case is matched by the possibility of executive clemency 
here. The State reasons that the Governor could commute 
Helm's sentence to a term of years. We conclude, however, 
that the South Dakota commutation system is fundamentally 
different from the parole system that was before us in 
Rummel. 
As a matter of law, parole and commutation are different 
concepts, despite some surface similarities. Parole is a regu-
lar part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behav-
ior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 
27 Under§ 207.010(2), a Nevada court is authorized to impose a sentence 
of "imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without possibility of 
parole. If the penalty fixed by the court is life imprisonment with the 
possibility of parole, eligibility for parole begins when a minimum of 10 
years has been served." It appears that most sentences imposed under 
§ 207.010(2) permit parole, even when the prior crimes are far more serious 
than Helm's. See, e. g., Rusting v. State, 96 Nev. 778, 617 P. 2d 1302 
(1980) (possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, two instances of driving an 
automobile without the owner's consent, four first degree burglaries, two 
sales of marijuana, two sales of a restricted dangerous drug, one 'sale of 
heroin, one escape from state prison, and one second degree burglary). 
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The law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to 
be considered for parole, and details the standards and proce-
dures applicable at that time. See, e. g., Greenholz v. Ne-
braska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1 (1979) (detailing Ne-
braska parole procedures); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 
471, 477 (1972) ("the practice of releasing prisoners on parole 
before the end of their sentences has become an integral part 
of the penological system"). Thus it is possible to predict, at 
least to some extent, when parole might be granted. Com-
mutation, on the other hand, is an ad hoc exercise of execu-
tive clemency. A Governor may commute a sentence at any 
time for any reason without reference to any standards. 
See, e. g., Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 
u. s. 458 (1981). 
We explicitly have recognized the distinction between pa-
role and commutation in our prior cases. 28 Writing on behalf 
of the Morrissey Court, for example, CHIEF JUSTICE BuR-
GER contrasted the two possibilities: "Rather than being an 
ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an established varia-
tion on imprisonment of convicted criminals." 408 U. S., at 
477. In Dumschat, THE CHIEF JUSTICE similarly explained 
that "there is a vast difference between a denial of parole . . . 
and a state's refusal to commute a lawful sentence." 452 
U. S., at 466. 
The Texas and South Dakota systems in particular are 
very different. In Rummel, the Court did not rely simply 
28 In Rummel itself the Court implicitly recognized that the possibility of 
commutation is not equivalent to the possibility of parole. The Court care-
fully "distinguish[ed] Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like [Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19--83 (Supp. 1979)], which provides for 
a sentence of life without parole." 445 U. S., at 281. But the Mississippi 
Constitution empowers the Governor to grant pardons in "all criminal and 
penal cases, excepting those of treason and impeachment." Art. 5, § 124. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has long recognized that the power to par-
don includes the power to commute a convict's sentence. See Whittington 
v. Stevens, 221 Miss. 598, 603-604, 73 So. 2d 137, 139-140 (1954). 
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on the existence of some system of parole. Rather it looked 
to the provisions of the system presented, including the fact 
that Texas had "a relatively liberal policy of gyanting 'good 
time' credits to its prisoners, a policy that historically has al-
lowed a prisoner serving a life sentence to become eligible for 
parole in as little as 12 years." 445 U. S., at 280. A Texas 
prisoner became eligible for parole when his calendar time 
served plus "good conduct" time equaled one-third of the 
maximum sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less. 
Tex. Code Grim. Proc. Ann., Art. 42.12, § 15(b) (Vernon 
1979). An entering prisoner earned 20 days good-time per 
30 days served, Brief for Respondent in Rummel, 0. T. 
1979, No. 78-6386, p. 16, and this could be increased to 30 
days good-time per 30 days served, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. 
Ann., Art. 6181-1, §§ 2-3 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Thus 
Rummel could have been eligible for parole in as few as 10 
years, and could have expected to become eligible, in the nor-
mal course of events, in only 12 years. 
In South Dakota commutation is more difficult to obtain 
than parole. For example, the board of pardons and paroles 
is authorized to make commutation recommendations to the 
Governor, see n. 7, supra, but § 24-13-4 provides that "no 
recommendation for the commutation of ... a life sentence, 
or for a pardon ... , shall be made by less than the unani-
mous vote of all members of the board." In fact, no life sen-
tence has been commuted in over eight years, 29 App. 29, 
29 The most recent commutation of a life sentence in South Dakota oc-
curred in 1975. App. 29. During the eight years since then, over 100 re-
quests for commutation have been denied. See id., at 22-26. Although 
22 life sentences were commuted to terms of years between 1964 and 1975, 
see id., at 29; but see n. 30, irifra, we do not have complete figures on the 
number of requests that were denied during the same period . We are told 
only that at least 35 requests were denied. See app. 22-26. In any 
event, past practice in this respect-particularly the practice of a decade 
ago-is not a reliable indicator of future performance when the relevant 
decision is left to the unfettered discretion of each Governor. Indeed, the 
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while parole-where authorized-has been granted regularly 
during that period, Tr. of Oral Arg. 8-9. Furthermore, 
even if Helm's sentence were commuted, he merely would be 
eligible to be considered for parole. 30 Not only is there no 
guarantee that he would be paroled, but the South Dakota 
parole system is far more stringent than the one before us in 
Rummel. Helm would have to serve three-fourths of his re-
vised sentence before he would be eligible for parole, 
§ 24-15-5, and the provision for good-time credits is less gen-
erous, § 24-5-1. 31 
The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope 
for "an ad hoc exercise of clemency." It is little different 
from the possibility of executive clemency that exists in 
every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence 
under the Eighth Amendment. Recognition of such a bare 
possibility would make judicial review under the Eighth 
Amendment meaningless. 
v 
The Constitution requires us to examine Helm's sentence 
to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. Applying ob-
jective criteria, we find that Helm has received the penulti-
mate sentence for relatively minor criminal conduct. He has 
been treated more harshly than other criminals in the State 
who have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
best indication we have of Helm's chance for commutation is the fact that 
his request already has been denied. I d., at 26. 
"' The record indicates that the prisoner whose life sentence was com-
muted in 1975, see n. 29, supra, still has not been paroled. App. 29. 
31 Assume, for example, that in 1979 the Governor had commuted Helm's 
sentence to a term of 40 years (his approximate life expectancy). Even if 
Helm were a model prisoner, he would not have been eligible for parole 
until he had served over 21 years-more than twice the Rummel mini-
mum. And this comparison is generous to South Dakota's position. If 
Rummel had been sentenced to 40 years rather than life, he could have 
been eligible for parole in less than 7 years. 
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treated more harshly than he would have been in any other 
jurisdiction, with the possible exception of a single State. 
We conclude that his sentence is significantly dispropor-
tionate to his crime, and is therefore prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment. 32 The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals is accordingly 
Affirmed. 
32 Contrary to the suggestion in the dissent, post, at 2-9, our conclusion 
today is not inconsistent with Rummel v. Estelle. The Rummel Court 
recognized-as does the dissent, see post, at 8, n. 3-that some sentences 
of imprisonment are so disproportionate that they violate the Eighth 
Amendment. 445 U. S., at 274, n. 11. Indeed, Hutto v. Davis, 454 
U. S., at 374, and n. 3, makes clear that Rummel should not be read to 
foreclose proportionality review of sentences of imprisonment. Rummel 
did reject a proportionality challenge to a particular sentence. But since 
the Rummel Court-like the dissent today--offered no standards for 
determining when an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred, it is con-
trolling only in a similar factual situation. Here the facts are clearly 
distinguishable. Whereas Rummel was eligible for a reasonably early pa-
role, Helm, at age 36, was sentenced to life with no possibility of parole. 
See supra, at 19-20, and 22-25. 
